Thursday, December 2, 2010

What does it matter?

So now it turns out that the young Scotswoman Linda Norgrove, kidnapped by Afghans back in September, died at the hands of her rescuers.The BBC is quoted as saying that the hostage rescue team made an airmobile assault into the mountainous area her captors had occupied on 8 OCT. The unit, said to be from U.S. "special forces", was apparently moving to the objective - or what they thought was the objective - by bounding (the unit is described as "two teams"); the moving element was "along a narrow ledge" when the Afghans detected the movement and initiated fire.

The British Foreign Secretary attended Norgrove's burial. He is quoted as saying that the unit "believed Ms Norgrove was being held in buildings higher up a mountain" when they made contact. One of the SF team used a grenade, probably in an attempt to break contact; that was our SOP in the 82nd, anyway, for a ambush where either the terrain did not permit or the tactical situation made assaulting through the enemy impractical. A firefight ensued; the news reports are sparse. At some point it sounds as if the Afghans broke contact; the AC-130 is said to have killed two. It appears that the SF team occupied the ambush site.

The woman's body was found at the site, killed by the grenade; I don't doubt that the troopers knew this at the time; a grenade tends to rip up the outside of people a fair bit more than 5.56 rounds do. But they are said to have kept this from their superiors, who then announced to the world that the woman was killed by the Bad Guys. When the truth emerged, as it had to, it made ISAF look either foolish or duplicitous. So everyone involved can now be considered to have failed.

I can't imagine how to put a good face on this. ISAF was apparently warned that the Dewagal Valley, where Norgrove was held, was badass injun country, a real old-fashioned Afghan tribal holler, a kind of Ozarks with more goats.It sounds to me as if the strike team, described as "highly experienced personnel", still lacked good intelligence prep of the battlefield as well as adequate reconniassance and security once off the LZ. Even with aerial observation they were ambushed trying to move to the objective. Once in contact the team seems to have gone into immediate-action-drill mode, which is completely understandible given the circumstances. But the result, for this poor woman's family and beloveds, was tragic. The team then withheld critical information from their commanders, who were allowed to sound like liars or fools.

What a fucking mess.

This seems to summarize the current Western experience in Afghanistan in a single firefight. The quixotic mission of the young woman. The tribal rapacity of her captors. The opacity of the landscape. The mistakes, confusion, and mutual incomprehension of the occupiers and the local headmen. The sudden flurry of misdirected violence. And, finally, the silence of the dead, and the grieving of the living.

It may be that by the long and patient application of force and diplomacy that the Western occupiers and their local proxy can "beat" the Talibs in some fashion.

But what then?

The foreigner, unless he wishes to become the colonial power, must leave. The local, who stays, cannot change the immutable calculus of men and mountains. Afghanistan will remain Afghanistan; the mullahs and headmen, farmers and smugglers, bazaar badmashes and an entire generation that has grown up with nothing but war...these will remain to decide the future of the land.

Linda is today's headline, and her life and death made subject of our passing interest. But the works of Linda Norgrove, and the soldier who killed her, what will they matter? To the Afghans, or to us? Five, ten years from now, who will care?For that was in another country and besides, the wench is dead.

21 comments:

  1. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qFHbwikzNds&feature=


    I have a dream, a song to sing
    To help me cope with anything
    If you see the wonder of a fairy tale
    You can take the future even if you fail
    I believe in angels
    Something good in everything I see
    I believe in angels
    When I know the time is right for me
    I'll cross the stream - I have a dream

    I have a dream, a fantasy
    To help me through reality
    And my destination makes it worth the while
    Pushing through the darkness still another mile
    I believe in angels
    Something good in everything I see
    I believe in angels
    When I know the time is right for me
    I'll cross the stream - I have a dream
    I'll cross the stream - I have a dream

    I have a dream, a song to sing
    To help me cope with anything
    If you see the wonder of a fairy tale
    You can take the future even if you fail
    I believe in angels
    Something good in everything I see
    I believe in angels
    When I know the time is right for me
    I'll cross the stream - I have a dream
    I'll cross the stream - I have a dream

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  2. At night, her black hair, and dark eyes
    Stare at me like photographs I have
    Hanging from the wall, she is a skull
    Grinning constantly at me, she is smiling
    And her eyes flash every time she stares at me
    I am in love with her
    I want to go where she goes,
    Where normal women can never go,
    The place where we all meet in the end
    The harvest ground, the wet, cold earth. . .
    There is tiredness to this land
    And everything in me feels it,
    From the way I pour sugar in my coffee
    Every morning to the time it takes
    For me to close my eyes and remember nothing. . .
    Everything is nothing to that smile you have, though
    I want to go and find out where it comes from
    Show me.

    "The Angel of Death sleeps beside me"

    (Jean Jones)

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  3. So I am confused on three issues - about her status, about who her captors were, and about her attempted rescuers.

    1] When kidnapped was she working for IFAW, a UK based animal rights organization? Or was she working under contract for AID, the American Agency for International Development? If working for AID, which has sometimes in the past been used as a front by Helms, Colby et al, then was she part of a CIA smokescreen either knowingly or perhaps unknowingly?

    2] Were her kidnappers Talibs, or were they criminal tribesmen hoping for ransom, or a combo of the above?

    3] Why was her rescue team American Special Forces? Why not the British SAS? But then the answer to this probably depends on the answer to number one.

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  4. 1. It sounds like the young woman was not knowingly gathering intelligence. And so far as I can tell the kidnapping was more about procuring a ransom, or possibly selling her to the Talibs, than taking her as an intel asset.

    2. I'm not sure there is a difference in the Dewagal Valley.

    3. I'm guessing it was because the woman was being held in a U.S. AO, so the primary C3I was U.S. Integrating an SAS team into a USAO would have taken longer and been more difficult than using the local SF group, so I'm guessing that's why it went down the way it did.

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  5. It was the lie that was so foul.

    Truth may be the first victim of war.
    Trust is probably the second.

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  6. "It was the lie that was so foul."

    So true. Those who tried to cover up their mistake, were caught and were harshly punished. Careers were ended and a pretty powerful message was sent to the rest of the community. (note to a would be assaulter: When every assaulter has a video camera on their helmet, and you have ISR assets overhead recording your every move, you might want to think long and hard about your story)

    GEN McCrystal, as the JSOC Cdr, used to say, "Integrity = Freedom of Maneuver."

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  7. bg: Although based on foul experience, I have to wonder...was it the team members who covered up and lied? I'm just known too many staff majors and PAO pricks who would have gimmicked their AAR because they were worried about the Army's "image".

    The lie WAS the nastiest bit. But I just can't feel confident that the "right" people payed the price. Not to mention the almost-forgotten doctrine that you can delegate authority but not responsibility. It seems like these wars in central Asia have seen a hell of a lot of squaddies hammered while their commissioned superiors skate off into the sunset...

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  8. FDC,

    It was a "lie by omission" by the ground team. When the assaulters were asked what happened, they said they didn't know, or had some other story. Later investigation clearly showed that an assaulter tossed the grenade. It was the ground team that failed to admit the whole truth until confronted with the evidence. This is the only part of the story that I know, which was made common knowledge to both AAR the event, and to make a point about integrity and lack of tolerance for those who attempt to hide the truth or lie to the chain of command (no matter who, or how Special they are).

    I think the investigation is still pending, but I am sure more details will be released when it is complete. (misspoke above, careers "will" be ended pending the investigation).

    Trust me, the ghost of Pat Tillman is still alive, especially with SOF in Afghanistan.

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  9. bg: Very sorry to hear that. When the "zero defect" mentality has worked its way down to the line dogs, then we've gone too far towards professionalism. We need a forceful injection of citizen into our soldiers if this is the case; when enlisted guys and NCOs are more worried about their careers than warfighting...that's a really bad sign.

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  10. mike:

    If working for AID, which has sometimes in the past been used as a front by Helms, Colby et al, then was she part of a CIA smokescreen either knowingly or perhaps unknowingly

    mike, if you're still around, what information do you, or actually anyone here, have about intelligence agencies using aid agencies to collect information, and worse?

    bb

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  11. FDC,

    No, no, you got it wrong. There is no zero defect mentality. There is zero tolerance for lying or covering up the truth. No tolerance for violating integrity. The message was very clear that the actions on the objective were regrettable, but understandable. It was the after actions that were the problem.

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  12. bg: But I know that shit happens in war. Intel sucks, Joe Snuffy forgets to put the safety on, the NVG battery fails at the wrong moment.

    And people get hurt. Or killed. Because of shit like that. And what happens - if you're a good troop in a good outfit - is that you stand up and take your ass chewing like a man, move out and draw fire.

    The only reason I can see the team covering this up is because they expected to get handed an unjustified ration of shit; NCOER downchecks, removal from active team status...whatever the sort of shit-list punishment their chain was likely to bring down on them. That's a "zero-defect" mentality to me; the expectation that you will be punished for things that happen as part of the fortunes of war.

    What other motivation would they have to lie?

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  13. "What other motivation would they have to lie?"

    Pride. Ego. Arrogance.

    We aren't talking about Joe Snuffy. We are talking about some elite guys with years of training. We are also talking about a chain of command who are elite guys with decades of experience who all understand that shit happens in war. No, that isn't the environment. Not at least for these guys.

    When I select people to work for me, Pride, Ego and Arrogance are what I consider to be the most vile of sins. Those who exhibit these three attributes will find themselves doing the duffle bag drag far away from my organization. I see it all the time and have no doubt that was the case here.

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  14. "We are talking about some elite guys with years of training. We are also talking about a chain of command who are elite guys with decades of experience who all understand that shit happens in war. No, that isn't the environment. Not at least for these guys."

    I guess I have to chalk this up to "shit I'll never understand". Because it would seem to me that the very "eliteness" and the years of training would make everyone involved MORE understanding and accepting of the "shit just happens" reality rather than less.

    I mean, I'd hope that anyone in a fighting organization would be proud of their skills and the team they fight with, and have enough of an ego and the arrogance that goes with it to be a cocky SOB - fighters aren't usually meek people. But at the same time, the whole point of combat is that Shit Happens. That mortar round doesn't know that the smart guy is down in defilade and the dumb fucker is standing on top of a knoll. If it drops into the ditch it kills the smart guy...

    So I guess I just Don't Get It. IMO the team made so other bad decisions, but the immediate action drill that killed the Norgrove woman? Not one of them. Just don't understand why they had to lie about that...

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  15. "Just don't understand why they had to lie about that..."

    I know we are talking in circles. But IMO the answer lies in Pride, Ego and Arrogance.

    Pride because the team didn't want any of their peers to know that their team made a mistake in what is considered their bread and butter mission, hostage rescue.

    Ego. I quote George Constanza, "it isn't a lie if you believe it.".

    Arrogance. " No one will ever know anyway, we won't get caught." Maybe they should have also had a "wardrobe malfunction" and erase the video on their helmet cams. Maybe they forgot about the unblinking eye above. Maybe they just assumed that no one would doubt their word and there would be no real investigation.

    I love the community I am in, but I will tell you, some organizations recruit for some interesting attributes for their assaulters. I guess it takes a special kind of person to do what they do. I have the greatest respect for the guys. But I am basing my opinion not just on this raid, but on a few years of working knowledge. These kinds of raids happen every single night, but only the very few (just the bad ones) get any attention.

    Here is one that I am very proud to say I was a key player in (from the intel level) that most people didn't notice or remember:

    http://www.navytimes.com/news/2008/11/military_air_rescue_110708w/

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  16. But I'm still puzzled. Why was what happened AFTER the contact considered a "mistake"?

    I'd argue that there WERE some mistakes prior to the contact. The team seems to have walked into an ambush or were surprised by a chance contact - that's not great infantry fieldcraft. Their higher also seems to have given them some bad intel about the likely location of the woman. And they don't seem to have chosen a very good route to the objective.

    But when the shooting started...why feel the need to hide that 1) one of their guys threw a grenade, and 2) the grenade landed next to the woman and killed her?

    That's just bad luck, right? Fortunes of war and all that?

    It's not that I don't understand the pressure to hide mistakes - the Army has never been tolerant of mistakes, that's always been one of our problems - but it just seems to me like they picked the thing that WASN'T a mistake to lie about.

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  17. Chief,
    Your cmt about the choice of routes to the objective is a very valid observation.
    In both the Miller and Murphy actions the routes seem just plain dumb and poorly thought out.
    We must keep in mind that these troops are SPECIAL and should be operating a notch or two up from normal units.
    ISTM that we just don't understand terrain, and obviously do not use it to our advantage.WTF?
    jim

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  18. Chief,
    I've written an upcoming piece on the Miller MOH scenario.
    To be posted soon. I address terrain considerations.
    jim

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  19. jim: My experience was that many U.S. officers and most NCOs - including the SF types who taught us patrolling at SFQC Ph.I - are frighteningly ignorant of ground and use it poorly if they think of it at all. I can't tell you how many times I've been led over the tops of ridges or hills, through blind defilades, set up ORPs and patrol bases in low ground with good terrain just half a klick away.

    My impression was that it was 1) a lack of training; most U.S. instructors are never taught to use the ground, never taught to look at ground tactically, never taught to use a map recon to find covered or concealed routes to or from the objective, and 2) a lack of patience. Using ground well requires moving slowly, looking and listening, taking the time to explore alternative routes and scanning the way ahead to check for good ambush sites, danger areas, rally points, and other key terrain. We tend to get "no-later-than times" and are told to salute and move out smartly. Part of that (I think) is we trust too much in our indirect fires (aerial and artillery) to haul our asses out of the shit when everything goes sideways.

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  20. FDC and Jim,

    There is more to the story, don't get wrapped around the tactical situation as described in the article. It does NOT jive with what I was told.

    But what I don't think you are getting is the mindset of the elite assualters in DoD. This isn't about tactics, which are well proven and tested at this point, these assaulters literally have 100s of raids under their belts, and it isn't about intel. It isn't about a zero defect environment from higher. It is about a guy who was too proud to admit a mistake, or too much ego to believe he made it, or too arrogant to believe no one would ever know.

    You may not believe me, but we are talking a different culture from the rest of the Army. Very different culture if the assaulters were Navy (which I believe they were).

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  21. bg: SEALs? These guys were SEALs? WTF, over?

    I do believe you about the SOF community drawing away from the line dogs (which is a mistake, IMO, since these guys are being used as no more than Super Line Dogs, really - these raids are not all that different from any combat patrol, and certainly not the SF missions that jim's SF was trained to do back in the day). But regardless, if the actual situation was different from the one the article describes, then suddenly the actions of the assault team and the individual you mention take on a different meaning.

    The tactical situation as described made grenading the muj' contact element perfectly sensible. If the actual situation wasn't as described, if the employment of a grenade or grenades to break contact or suppress the enemy wasn't needed...well, then you have something very different.

    I'm sorry to hear that, actually. It makes the waste of the young woman's life that much more tragic. What a miserable situation...

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