Showing posts with label Bush. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bush. Show all posts

Monday, April 4, 2011

The Libyan Intervention, or a Nation Bushed? Part II



Day 17 of the Libyan intervention and there are signs that it may succeed in spite of a bumpy ride. The rebel Transitional National Council (TNC) has a website up and is promoting what appears to be a representatively democratic agenda. There are also noises coming from inside MQ's camp that he maybe thinking it's getting close to "exit time". The TNC rejects any negotiation with MQ or his family, so there is a ways to go.

The rebel military force is starting to train its volunteers and in the field is advancing yet again on Brega. There are workable plans for Western support in training these volunteers which there seems to be no shortage of.

So, in all, reasons for optimism and hope that this may still succeed in a relatively short period of time. The goal of the intervention being the removal of MQ's control over Libya and a fresh start for the TNC and Libya in general. Three countries, Italy, France and Qatar have recognized the TNC as representing Libya. I have indicated my reasons for the intervention which have not changed in my mind. They are mostly the same as those mentioned by Nicholas Kristof here.

The center of gravity of this campaign remains MQ's political base, which is seemingly crumbling. We have seen significant figures defect over the last several days as well as members of his military forces deserting to the rebels. While most of the maneuvering has to be at this political level, the military actions on the ground play a very important role as well reflecting the continued support of the rebels by the Allies and denying MQ any chance of defeating the TNC on the ground. A military strategy of persistence is thus called for.

At the same time, and contrary to the goals of the intervention, the US is signaling that they are implementing a strategy of extrication, removing its aircraft from frontline missions and limiting itself to "supporting roles only" (AWACS and C3I, but not combat missions are mentioned). This latest news was a contradiction from the day before when it was said that A-10 and other groundattack aircraft would be on call if requested by NATO. The A-10 is perhaps the best aircraft suited for this type of mission.

I am not arguing that the US should take on the greatest share of the air missions or that we should commit more, but extrication at this point in time is a truly remarkable response, indicating an astonishing level of strategic confusion, of no sense at all of what military force is about. By all means allow the French, British and others to fly most of the sorties, but support these missions as well, especially since there are applicable and ready US forces in theater.

On my earlier thread, the initial part to this one, I posted:

First, it seems unquestioningly obvious at this point in time that the US is still somehow traumatized by what happened during the George W Bush administration, we see military intervention/the use of force in exclusively "Bushist" terms, as either supporting or countering Bush policies. That is policy decisions which have nothing to do with GWB are seen solely in his terms, whether supporting his policies or not. It seems that in retrospect we are very much in the George W Bush era and will continue to be for some time, which includes the simple fact that his policies were essentially a series of strategic disasters for this country. We seem to be unable to break the mindset that he has imposed on us. Which is that any additional use of military power is inherently corrupt and done for unsavory reasons and will end up in disaster, thus we have become a Nation, bushed. . .

This notion of a Nation Bushed, of course leads us to the simple fact that we are unable and unwilling to hold GWB or any members of his administration accountable for any of their corrupt and possibly criminal actions. Not to mention it has become politically impossible to put an end to either of his lost wars (Af-Pak or Iraq) . . . So despite the fact that Americans are scarred by GWB's corrupt polices we lack at the same time any will to confront that reality. Instead we simply abstract those feelings to cover any military action done as part of US policy.


I think this pretty much explains what we are doing. We are not only a nation bushed, we have a thoroughly bushed President, a hopelessly bushed pundit blathering class, and in many ways a bushed military.

Colonel Pat Lang seemingly agrees:

Most people in the US do not want to do anything to help the rebels in Libya. A variety of reasons for this are presented; money, unwillingness to inflict casualties deliberately or accidentally, indifference to MENA affairs except for Israel and oil, etc. In truth this is all about war weariness. The Bush Administration expended the emotional war making potential of the United States. The staffs can "roll up the maps" in the planning shops in the Pentagon. They will not be needed for a long time. One can say (tongue in cheek) that now is the time for Canada and Mexico to exercize whatever revanchist and irredentist inclinations toward the US that they may have. . .


This is a dangerous situation for our country and goes far beyond Libya. The Arab Spring of 2011 has shown the corrupt lie about what has been the cornerstone of US foreign policy since 9/11, that being the Global War on Terror (GWOT) or simply the war against Al Qaida. If any one had any doubts even at this late date, it should be clear now that for the last nine plus years we have been conducting a world-wide struggle against a willofthewhisp. Al Qaida is not so much an entity, as a label we conveniently put on the reactions to our own strategic mistakes, failures and disasters. The real motivation/driving force behind the democratic surge among the Arab peoples is the corrupt nature of the governments who have been our allies in the GWOT. Al Qaida is not the response, it has no influence on the Arab Spring, no presence at all, but in fact only shows up where we in fact create it.

It's time we realized what is at stake in Libya and also what is at stake with our continued strategy of self-defeating/self-serving delusions. Let the success of this intervention and the birth of democracy in Libya bring us to the realization of the mistakes made and the need for a radical correction in not only our foreign, but also domestic policies.

The Washington Rules have been in play for too long. Now is time to formulate a new foreign policy which not only corresponds to our interests and ideals, but also to our current and future reality.

Postscript:

I would like to first of all thank FDChief for being a worthy and brilliant interlocutor on first his own and then my two follow up threads in regards to the Libyan intervention. Also, everyone else as well for their comments and thoughts. It has been a difficult, and for me at least rewarding discussion, and I hope for you as well.

While acknowledging the validity of those arguments against mine, I wish here to attempt to put the Libyan intervention within a larger US political context which I think supports my view however limitedly.

I've compared Obama's actions in regard to Libya to his handling of his Health Care Reform plan (using Glenn Greenwald's argument). Let us consider another important policy, also defining, but in regards to our military and foreign policy.

The official Iraq withdrawal of the US military is set for the end of this year, so Obama says, so it is . . . But we can't forget the rest of the story - we don't really wish to leave Iraq for a whole variety of reasons including having to deal with the strategic consequences of Bush's war, leaving those bases we built and of course "losing" the oil.

Is there still a chance that Maliki might "request 17,000 US troops stay after the end of 2011"? Possibly, but why worry since we are planning . . .

. . . to more than double its [The US State Department] private security guards, up to as many as 7,000, according to administration officials who disclosed new details of the plan. Defending five fortified compounds across the country, the security contractors would operate radars to warn of enemy rocket attacks, search for roadside bombs, fly reconnaissance drones and even staff quick reaction forces to aid civilians in distress, the officials said.


It's just like we never left. A new type of mercenary army? Ask anyone on the street about Iraq and they'll probably (over 60%) tell you - if they are American - that "we won" with whatever qualifications, a result of the "surge to victory" meme, and maybe even that we are no longer there. If you ask any person of any other nationality they will probably (over 60% easy) tell you that it was all a miserable bloody failure and that we're still there.

None of these three Obama policies (Health Care Reform, Iraq Withdrawal or the Libyan intervention) in question have anything to do with being straight with the American people, thinking or acting in the national interest or promoting and maintaining any national honor which we could agree on or even speak of. They are all about protecting and promoting the interests of the Washington Rules and those behind it . . .

In regards to the Arab Spring and this has been perhaps the defining element /question in regards to the Libyan intervention: Two Questions. What should our policy be? And where do we stand in regards to the Arab reform/revolutionary movement? It seems that we have decided. We are now with the reaction. Who in Washington would wish to deal with "Turkey times 5" (walrus's comment on this SST thread)?

William Pfaff seemingly agrees:

The worst outcome is, however, the one that seems most likely: a new American effort to manage the region through chosen political clients and favorites, in the self-deluding belief that this is “democratization” – the identical policy that has already given the region wars in or around Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the threat of war with Iran, and now the Libyan intervention. One must do better.


It makes you wonder in what way would Al Qaida be resuscitated? It would be part of the deal after all . . .

I don''t pity the Libyans, I envy them. Those I support are fighting for what they believe in, their potential deaths for their political and social communities have meaning (following Weber) in their people's eyes, middle class men with families are joining to learn how to fight and defend their people, their families. It's a bloody, mess but it is a bloody mess that they would rather be part of than see go against their interests, their common will for a better future. It is not about loot or plunder that motivates them, but the future of their children. Songs will be sung about them in the years to come . . . .

Sunday, March 27, 2011

The Libyan Intervention after the First Week, or a Nation Bushed?


A week ago on FDChief's Desert Rats post I commented:

This intervention is the opposite of Iraq, which I never supported. This one I do support. There is no need for any occupation and we can most likely do it mostly with air power and let the French, Italians or preferably allied Arabs send in a limited number of ground troops to mop up whatever the locals can't. Once MQ's gone, we drop it in the Libyans' lap and it's "see ya'll around" . . .

What is required is speed and right now MQ's on the run. Within a week he might be gone and we'll already be in the stand down phase . . .


I supported then and continue to support the Libyan intervention, in fact it is the first time in ten years that I do support US foreign policy in regards to the use of military force. I am also pleased with the way the situation on the ground is shaping up there. While it would be nice if we could gloat over the fall of MQ today, the fact that he is showing significant signs of wear at this point indicates that things could still fold up relatively quickly, this is the nature of the type of conflict we are involved in, consisting of sub-state groupings, or rather tribes and moral rather than material cohesion.

I also understand that my arguments have been very polemic in nature. I am not relying on strategic theory for this argument for the most part since while some concepts are useful in military planning (such as center of gravity) the overall application is retrospectively analytical, which means it can tell you what went wrong after the fact, but is a poor guide for what will happen in the future, the nature of war being simply too complex.

This post is intended to cover several specific aspects.

First, it seems unquestioningly obvious at this point in time that the US is still somehow traumatized by what happened during the George W Bush administration, we see military intervention/the use of force in exclusively "Bushist" terms, as either supporting or countering Bush policies. That is policy decisions which have nothing to do with GWB are seen solely in his terms, whether supporting his policies or not. It seems that in retrospect we are very much in the George W Bush era and will continue to be for some time, which includes the simple fact that his policies were essentially a series of strategic disasters for this country. We seem to be unable to break the mindset that he has imposed on us. Which is that any additional use of military power is inherently corrupt and done for unsavory reasons and will end up in disaster, thus we have become a Nation, bushed.

Professor Juan Cole, who supports the Libyan intervention (in fact his blog is a good source of information on the campaign) dismisses any similarity with Bush's Iraq war. This notion of a Nation Bushed, of course leads us to the simple fact that we are unable and unwilling to hold GWB or any members of his administration accountable for any of their corrupt and possibly criminal actions. Not to mention it has become politically impossible to put an end to either of his lost wars (Af-Pak or Iraq) and even those who would support an end find themselves supporting the status quo in order to "support the troops". So despite the fact that Americans are scarred by GWB's corrupt polices we lack at the same time any will to confront that reality. Instead we simply abstract those feelings to cover any military action done as part of US policy.

Second, I would like to address the Libyan rebellion itself. It seems that President Obama "turned on a dime" in deciding on intervention in Libya. Both VP Biden and Sec of Defense Gates were against, while Sec of State Clinton was for intervention. The reason?

"This is the greatest opportunity to realign our interests and our values," a senior administration official said at the meeting, telling the experts this sentence came from Obama himself. The president was referring to the broader change going on in the Middle East and the need to rebalance U.S. foreign policy toward a greater focus on democracy and human rights.


The opportunity for a new direction in US Middle East policy is well taken, this sends a "mixed signal" - as I commented on FDChief's Desert Rats post - to the various Arab autocrats now dealing with domestic protest. Essentially it tells them we can go the other way, and if you go beyond a certain point in using force, our support is unlikely, at the least.

So why intervene in Libya and not elsewhere? Continued turmoil in Libya destabilizes the entire Mediterranean and exposes our NATO Allies to the backlash of this instability. We have had a significant presence in the Med for a long time and stability in the region is of prime US interest. This in addition to the UNSC resolution, statements from the Arab League and requests directly for support from our ally France. Military intervention rests on specifics and not all cases bring the same result, to expect that would be to expect too much. What is required is a specific constellation of interests/events/contingencies which set the stage for a specific intervention to take place. To argue that we cannot intervene here because we have not intervened someplace else assumes that all conditions are exactly alike which is obviously not the case and precludes intervention at all.

While many rightfully have problems with military operations in support of "humanitarian goals", this intervention has been conducted also to prevent a bloodbath, or "Srbrenica on steroids" as it has been described. MQ's tanks were on the verge of turning Benghazi into a slaughter house with tens of thousands of people killed - a whole different level of repression and done with heavy weapons which we have yet to see even talked about elsewhere in the current Arab countries undergoing protest. The Rebels estimate that MQ has killed 8,000 in Tripoli alone in the areas he has retaken in the capital city. To have sat by and allowed this to happen - while the people in the rebel cities were begging for our help - would have been something I personally and I think many other Americans would not have tolerated. There are times when military intervention becomes a necessity.

So a political decision made "on the turn of a dime" and under tremendous time pressures required quick action. That the command arrangements were chaotic reflects this reality, along with the conflicting interests of the various Allies involved. The Turks for instance had a good relationship with MQ and were not happy about the prospect of France expanding her influence in the region. The Norwegians were willing to participate, but only under NATO command, whereas the French and the Arabs saw NATO has too implicated in the policy disaster of Afghanistan and saw a Franco-British command as preferable. While these conditions have influenced the command structure, the air operations have been adequate to support the main center of gravity which is taking place on the ground.

Third, and following on this, I would like to address the nature of this intervention. Our goal is the neutralization of MQ's regime. The best way to do this would be the removal - either voluntary of forced of MQ and his family. What comes next is not up to us and should be left to the various Libyan interest groups to decide for themselves. Concern about "what happens next" is part of our current "bushed" attitude. We could not positively influence to any significant degree what has happened in Af-Pak or Iraq, and in fact many of the outcomes there have been counter to our interests, so why should we suppose that we can or should enjoy this influence in Libya where our level of commitment is much less extensive? Instead our goals should reflect the purpose of this operation, that is to allow the Libyan people to decide their own future without the mortal threat of a tyrant using the weapons of war against his own people.

In my comments on the earlier thread, I mentioned that the French most likely had a plan of operations for this intervention and we should see how it works out. Surprisingly the French were assumed by many to be incompetent, which is simply another aspect of our "bushed" reality? It would fit that pattern.

The French have a long history of military intervention in Africa, have conducted at least 37 major military interventions there (not counting Algeria) since 1960. The vast majority of these have been successful in terms of supporting French national policy, that is they do know something about the use of the military instrument in support of policy, something that the US has been unable achieve consistently since 1965 (the Dominican Republic). The French are avid students of strategic theory and have their own school of Clausewitzian thought based on the approach of the great theorist Raymond Aron. It is also interesting to note that the most successful foreign commander in North Africa, that is in dealing with the North Africans with a combination of limited military action supported by well-thought out policy is a Frenchman, Marshall Lyautey who pacified Morocco for France from 1912-1925. His influence on French military thinking is great and his approach is still studied by thoughtful military officers, although perhaps not in the US.

The French are thus assumed competent in terms of linking military action to their policy objectives. They are aware of what a center gravity is and is not, and also of the limits and/or lack of applicability of the military instrument, which is why they did not support Bush's war in Iraq in 2003, but did support Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1991. They also see this intervention as being all about MQ's political base and dissolving that. This, not the destruction of his military, is the center of gravity of French policy in this intervention imo. Success here will decide the success of the intervention and given the nature of tribal loyalties MQ's support could collapse rapidly given the right set of conditions.

Fourth, and finally, there seems to be a good bit of confusion over my claim that the president could reap "political capital" from a successful military intervention and then use this capital to make some necessary policy changes:

Obama has to win back his base. Ending both of Bush's wars would not only save needed funds, but end two strategic setbacks/disasters (however you wish to describe them). This could be possible given the prestige, political capital such a triumph would bring. This is after all how our republic is expected to function, the mass popular leader waging successful and righteous war in our name and claiming democratic support. This was afterall the message of 2003 when George W Bush went into Iraq.

Why so different now? Could it have anything to do with that big propaganda machine?

So you get a feel for our situation. Currently strategic paralysis, caused in part by two lost wars we're stuck in. We need to get out and to do that we need a shock, or metaphorically another throw of the international and domestic political dice. War does that. (my last comment on the Desert Rats thread)


This view is based on Weberian political theory. I am a strategic theorist after all so it should come as no surprise. Still a more extensive explanation is clearly necessary.

Max Weber sees all states as being based on the monopoly of legitimate violence within a specific territory. This is the basis of the state, everything else rests on this. Now, the key word here is "legitimate". If the people see the state (actually simply the administrative apparatus of rule) as legitimate they will accept this monopoly. As we see in Libya a significant number of its people - probably the majority - do not accept MQ's legitimacy and are acting accordingly and he is forced to use raw violence to subdue them. His lack of legitimacy in turn encourages intervention.

But what of the other end of the equation? Instead of little of no legitimacy, what of increasing legitimacy and what would that achieve?

As Randal Collins writes in his classic Weberian Sociological Theory:
"The most important factor is the interests of political leaders in stirring up domestic legitimacy through success in the external military competition with other states. Internal legitimation is the good to be sought though engaging in the prestige game in the international arena; the prize for the rulers of the 'Great Power' is paid in the coin of internal politics." page 162.


In other words political leaders gain prestige at home by conducting military action abroad. This is nothing new and as old as civilization and states themselves. Bush was well aware of it, but then today, our nation being "bushed" is unable to conceive it, instead see all such things as potential disasters no matter what the specifics?

To conclude this point then, a successful military action in the Libyan intervention (which is of very limited objectives as described above) would provide the president with domestic political capital which he could then use for domestic policy choices. The withdrawal from Af-Pak and Iraq are both domestic political decisions since the strategic rationale for both wars ended some time ago.

Part II is here . . .

Sunday, July 18, 2010

Torture as Stalking Horse



It never seems to go away. Just when you think the whole "issue" or "debate" has been resolved, you realize that, no, it hasn't, and we are still at square one . . . that is attempting to figure out whether torture "works". Or rather we are confronted yet once again with that same threadbare stalking horse of "torture as US state policy", since supposedly we as Americans are only driven by fear of the "existential threat" we are told exists.

The stalking horse of torture doesn't go away since the actual goal remains. If the American people are willing to allow people to be tortured, maybe to death, as a matter of state policy, then the establishment of a police state cannot be far behind imo. Thus torture - which is not a means of intelligence collection, but a method of brutal domination - is a stalking horse for a police state.

In fact that is why police states use torture. It is all about domination - not "Tell me what you know", but rather "Tell me what I want to hear".

Barry Gewen, an editor for the New York Times Book Review, penned this article for World Affairs Journal's May-June issue. Gewen claims to be presenting a "balanced" argument, but his conclusion, (surprise! surprise!) is that "torture works" and that we need to establish some mechanism for "harsh interrogations" when the situation arises, as it will given the existential threat we face. This of course, the realistic view as opposed to "anti-torture absolutists".

While reading the piece, you come to realize, that Gewen is actually from a different planet, let's call it "planet Cheney", since the things that he claims as fact are simply laughably false and crude falsehoods, at least on this planet Earth.

For instance, he writes:

Eventually, every discussion of torture arrives at the question of the ticking bomb. We are all familiar with this scenario. Law enforcement or military officials capture a terrorist who knows that a nuclear bomb is about to go off in a major American city. Isn’t the president morally obligated to use torture against such a person in an effort to prevent mass murder?

The anti-torture camp hates the ticking bomb scenario. One law professor, Stephen Holmes, calls it “a utopian fantasy.” Another, David Luban, says it’s “an intellectual fraud.” But in truth it’s not that hard to imagine a situation in which the head of Homeland Security rushes into the Oval Office and tells the president that police are “pretty certain” a bomb is set to explode, and they’re “fairly confident” they have a man who knows where it is. And it’s probably the case that any president—whether George W. Bush or Barack Obama—confronted with such a choice would approve the use of torture rather than risk a catastrophe. And almost certainly a majority of Americans would support the decision.


People can imagine a lot of things, especially when they are told they are dealing with an existential threat, although how exactly Al Qaida's "crotch bomber" is an existential threat is never explained. In fact four of the most serious terrorist attacks - 9/11, London, Madrid and Mombai - all happened with no ticking bombs at all, but with the case of 9/11 intelligence reports which were ignored by the same people who later instituted state torture . . . In fact there are no ticking bomb instances in history of the type that Gewen imagines.

It is here that we get to the actual contradiction to Gewen's whole ticking bomb argument. If we ever do have a ticking bomb situation chances are it will be the result of someone on the inside volunteering the information to US authorities, that is just another of what historically has been our best source of human intelligence information: a "walk in". Here we see the conflict with torture, since if we torture our detainees, who is going to come in and take the risk of being tortured for their troubles?

The ticking bomb is only one of Gewen's dubious arguments. He also cites examples of Gestapo and French Algerian "successes" with torture without considering that both those sides lost the conflict they were involved in, and that in the case of the Gestapo the US executed Gestapo officers after the war who had been involved in torture. Gewen, with his planet Cheney perspective, furthermore has no problem with throwing in US successes in regards to torture in the very next paragraph:

Mark Bowden’s 2003 Atlantic Monthly article, “The Dark Art of Interrogation,” puts forth a veritable catalogue of examples of effective torture, provided by people Bowden interviewed personally. A Marine captain who had served in Vietnam told him of attaching electrical wires to the testicles of a Vietcong soldier to make him reveal possible ambush sites. “The minute the crank started to turn,” the captain said, “he was ready to talk.” After the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon, the CIA used torture to track down the perpetrators; an agent Bowden spoke to had no doubts about its effectiveness. And the former chief interrogator for Israel’s General Security Services told Bowden that with “sufficient duress” even the hard cases will likely break.


The first case is the infamous Vietcong testicles attached to a TA-1 field telephone story, which I heard as a young Marine Corps officer back in the early 1980s. First, this involves tactical interrogation of enemy/believed enemy troops before they have been turned over to any POW collection point. Second, these were the isolated and illegal actions of Marine Corps infantry in the field doing their own adhoc interrogation, not strategic interrogation where most of the horrendous instances have taken place. Was it effective in revealing possible ambush sites. Possibly, but it was a loser as in actual intelligence collection. Orrin DeForest, who ran a JIC in Vietnam and was probably our most successful Humint collection officer in Vietnam, not to mention recruiting and running our most successful spies, rejected torture as an option and reported any incidents he came across.

The argument that the CIA was successful in "tracking down the perpetrators" of the embassy and Marine barracks bombings due to their use of torture is unproven, at the least. If we consider the example of Ayatollah Fadlallah, the recently deceased Lebanese cleric, the CIA claimed he was connected with Hezbollah, but many experts think that his connection was complex and that his responsibility for Hezbollah's actions non-existent. Perhaps Gewen considers the CIA's reported involvement with a carbomb aimed to assassinate Fadlallah in 1985 that killed 80 people a torture "success". As to Israeli "success" with torture, I'll leave that particular rock unturned.

Gewen doesn't stop there in his pro-torture argument though, and goes back even further in American history to argue that we've a long history of turning the thumbscrews:

Ideals are one thing, the reality of American history quite another. There is, in fact, a well-established American tradition of torture. The definitive text on it is Torture and Democracy by Darius Rejali, himself an opponent of torture. He sees “a long, unbroken, though largely forgotten history of torture in democracies at home and abroad.” What the torture techniques of democracies have in common is that they leave no lasting marks on the victims, no proof. Rejali calls this “clean torture.”

Electroshock began in democracies, and it was in the United States that interrogators first used rubber hoses to administer beatings that left no bruises. Sleep deprivation and stress positions (the “third degree”) were once common practices of American police.

It’s not only the police who have tortured or used other harsh methods. The U.S. military has, too. During the war in the Philippines at the beginning of the twentieth century, American troops employed the “water cure,” a forerunner of waterboarding. During the Vietnam War, torture was probably even more extensive. Whatever its professed ideals, the United States has tortured in the past. It has tortured in the near-present. And should needs arise and circumstances dictate, it will probably torture in the future.


One could argue I suppose that lynching is an American national pastime, but that would be absurd, wouldn't it? As to police brutality, using attack dogs and high-pressure water hoses against civil rights demonstrators and the films showing it have been part of our national shame since the early 1960s and those images did much to end segregation in the South. Torture, when exposed has always been rejected and seen for what it is, brutal domination of the strong over the weak. The same holds for the instances of the Philippine War of 1899-1902, when the torture became known, the government attempted at least to hold the perpetrators accountable. Theodore Roosevelt rejected torture and promised to hold those who had implemented it accountable. In fact, "the US" has never "tortured in the past", rather prior to Bush, the incidents of torture were considered crimes or the actions of allies who didn't understand actual US interrogation methods. Actions of individuals do not make for national policy.

How did this all come about? According to Gewen:

The sense of panic that gripped the country after September 11 may have been even greater inside the White House. Threats of additional attacks were flooding in. No one knew anything. And because anything seemed possible, Bush administration officials promised to do whatever was necessary.

Their language became extreme, reflecting the extremity of the situation. All that mattered, as Attorney General John Ashcroft told Robert Mueller III, the head of the FBI, was stopping the next attack. In a meeting of intelligence officials in March 2002, George Tenet, the director of central intelligence, declared: “There’s nothing we won’t do, nothing we won’t try.” The president himself told Bob Woodward: “Whatever it takes.”

This crisis attitude continues to echo in Dick Cheney’s many comments in the current torture debate, and in the statements of other pro-torture absolutists. Where national security is concerned, all is permitted. Public safety trumps any other consideration.


Dick Cheney was hysterical! Planet Cheney was in horrible danger! Perhaps, but if he is referring to this planet, how does Gewen explain some simple facts:

1. If the source of all this danger was Al Qaida, how come more was not done to deal with Al Qaida? The Taliban government was overthrown, but bin Laden got away because we failed to close off his escape route at Tora bora, not to mention allowing the Pakistani ISI to fly out hundreds of their and Al Qaida's operatives from Kunduz before we captured the city.

2. After Afghanistan, the focus switched to Iraq which had no connection with 9/11 at all. Iraq was the main focus throughout the rest of the Bush administration.

3. Our policies only increased Al Qaida's appeal among certain Muslims.

4. Much of the panic in Washington in the fall of 2001 was the result of the Anthrax attacks which the administration attempted to pin on Iraq, not Al Qaida, but was actually the work of at least one American with access to US biowarfare labs.

Rather than hysteria, we have cold calculation and manipulation by Cheney/Bush.

Still, what's all this handwringing about waterboarding all about? Where not there limits in place? According to Gewen:

In fact, the Bush administration, even as it pushed for total freedom of action, did prescribe limits on interrogations. The CIA had precise—even punctilious—rules on how long a prisoner could be doused with water, how loud the noise could be that was piped into a prisoner’s cell, and exactly how long a detainee could be kept in a box. Waterboarding, although it has become central to the torture debate and rouses the strongest passions, was used on only three prisoners, and not at all after 2003.


Here Gewen implies that there were only three cases of torture. In fact government reports list at least 100 people died while being interrogated by us, some of them tortured to death, which would not include any of the three high-profile prisoners. From an intelligence perspective, the top four Al Qaida prisoners who were tortured all came up as a bust. As to the CIA's "rules" . . .

Doctors, psychologists and other professionals assigned to monitor the C.I.A.’s use of waterboarding, sleep deprivation and other “enhanced” interrogation techniques gathered and collected data on the impact of the interrogations on the detainees in order to refine those techniques and ensure that they stayed within the limits established by the Bush Administration’s lawyers, the report found. But, by doing so, the medical professionals turned the detainees into research subjects, according to the report, which is scheduled to be published on Monday by Physicians for Human Rights.

The data collected by medical professionals from the interrogations of detainees allowed the C.I.A. to judge the emotional and physical impact of the techniques, helping the agency to “calibrate the level of pain experienced by detainees during interrogation, ostensibly to keep it from crossing the administration’s legal threshold of what it claimed constituted torture,” the report said. That meant that the medical professionals crossed the line from treating the detainees as patients to treating them as research subjects, the report asserted.


Medical personal were there to make the torture more effective, not really to implement "limits" which were seen as illegal in any case since the Bush administration revoked all the memos covering these actions before they left office.

What about Abu Ghraib?

Nevertheless, it’s important to note that the abuses of Abu Ghraib were not “the tip of the iceberg” (as Human Rights Watch has called them). No one approved of them; they had nothing to do with official American policy. The Pentagon lawyer who first promulgated the rules for harsh interrogations, which included nudity, stress positions, and the use of dogs—the very things we saw in the photographs—was horrified when she learned about Abu Ghraib and called it “anarchy.” No one defended what happened at Abu Ghraib then and no one defends it now—which is why it has no place in the torture debate, except as an illustration of how incompetent leaders can let matters get out of hand.

Conditions were different at Guantánamo Bay military prison, where oversight was firmer and rules closely followed. If the reports of government investigators can be believed, interrogators there adhered almost completely to the authorized guidelines. Of twenty-four thousand interrogations conducted there over a three-year period, only three cases of substantiated abuse were uncovered, and they involved only high-value detainees. In all three cases, the interrogators were disciplined for excesses. We have to be clear: Guantánamo is not Abu Ghraib.


The US Senate disagrees:

The abuse of detainees in US custody cannot simply be attributed to the actions of “a few bad apples” acting on their own. The fact is that senior officials in the United States government solicited information on how to use aggressive techniques, redefined the law to create the appearance of their legality, and authorized their use against detainees. Those efforts damaged our ability to collect accurate intelligence that could save lives, strengthened the hand of our enemies, and compromised our moral authority.


In all Gewen makes the Dick Cheney argument, stretching the truth here and avoiding unpleasant details there, putting the torture argument in as favorable a light as possible. The most important point though that Gewen misses is the intelligence perspective. He fails to quote even one intelligence officer on the record as statig that this is the way to go, that torture can save us from the ticking bomb. The reason for that is simple, no Humint intelligence collection officer I have ever met or heard or read has ever thought that torture worked.

Postscript:

I admit that in this post I failed to explain why torture has been used as a stalking horse and who or what is behind it. In the comments section I introduced three quotes: two from William Pfaff's recent The Irony of Manifest Destiny, and the final one from Carl Schmitt's The Concept of the Political.

These quotes introduce three elements which have come together since 2000 to bring us to this point in time in our nation's history. My intention here is not to provide a total picture of our current political reality, that would be beyond whas it humanly (at least for me) possible. The nature of our political reality, as part of the larger social reality, in the US is simply too complex to describe. Rather, as is my approach I present an ideal type consisting of three major trends/tendencies that for me adequately explain our situation. This does not mean that some ideal type could not explain it better.

My intention here is to provide readers with this ideal type and allow them to answer for themselves whether mine, or the "nothing really has changed" view better describes what we see going on around us. Ideal types are not expected to exist in reality, rather they are deliberately constructed to have sharp contrasts. The question then comes for the reader as to how well the ideal type corresponds to what they observe, using at least a couple of opposing ideal type provides the analyst with this ability, with one ideal explaining one situation better, while the other better explains something else.

If one of the ideal types that a group of "openminded" analysts are using is increasingly seen as far from the observed reality, then a radical change has in fact taken place.

It is my view that a radical change has taken place. It dates back to the 2000 election. To understand this change one can think of it in terms of three associated socio-political groups.

The first is a narrow foreign policy elite that has given up on internal democracy as expressing traditional American values and sees it as a impediment to the achievement of their policy goals. Public opinion is fickle and the people tired quickly of wars and expensive schemes. The American public is kept in place by a highly refined "total propaganda" system (in Ellul's terms) which transmits and reinforces the accepted narrative, but attacks or dismisses any competing narrative. This in spite of the fact that a competing radical right narrative is promoted to keep the public divided.

The second is the economic element, or rather what the economic element has become. I called this the "MBA view of the world" to emphasize the fact that all questions come down to that of efficiency. Torture, too, becomes basically a question of whether it "works", not one of ideals or values or cynically betraying both. What we have is the conquest of capitalism by finance. All questions come down to efficiency and the laws of the market which dominate life. Any action that does not break down to ends-means rationality, is by definition, irrational. This affects how we look at our wars - fighting against "democracy" and "the fruits of the market" are simply the actions of madmen, fanatics, "people who wish to change our way of life". Also, the US, like Goldman Sacs is simply too big to fail, no matter how many parasites it has to carry. Essentially we have this group seeing war as economic opportunity with the duration of the war influencing the ever growing ranks of interested economic parties feeding at the government trough.

What first comes to mind regarding these two groups is that they have been in development for some time. They date back to the Vietnam war in the first case and to the 1950s in the second (if the "MBA" film clip is any indication). Both would have remained containable but for the emergence of the last group which has been the radical catalyst.

The third group consists of two somewhat like-minded elements which share certain radical attitudes. The first is the elite associated with Cheney/Rumsfeld and other former Bush I, Reagan and Nixon/Ford officials. They saw Nixon's resignation as a personal defeat, supported Reagan's Iran-contra machinations and the 1992 Defence Planning Guidance initiatives. The second is the neo-conservative movement which equates Israeli interests as being unquestionably also US interests and sees the US as the best guarantee of Israeli security/ambitions. I used a Carl Schmitt quote to describe their view of the political. What we have are three very divergent groups who remain in unstable alliance due to a complexus of interests that are at the same time both contradictory and ambiguous. The confusion of their war aims is reflected by the confusion of their wars . . .

We have lost the ability to act strategically.

In strategic theory terms, wars are waged by states in line with policies/interests/political tensions of opposed political communities. While the total overthrow of an enemy state, the remaking of his political identity is theoretically possible, in reality very few such wars would be waged due to the resources (material, moral, time) necessary to achieve such radical goals. Prior to 2000, the only war of this type initiated by the US was our involvement in the First World War and we lacked the interest and resources to see it through to the achievement of its stated goals. The 1919 peace which followed became a continuation of the war by other means resulting in a fragile political realignment which lasted barely 20 years and plunged the world into an even bloodier conflict.

Schmitt, writing in 1932, defined the political as being able to make the friend/enemy distinction. Wars of this type would be by definition include the radical policy goals mentioned above. Schmitt was of course not only a political theorist, but also a lawyer with political ambitions, who served the Nazi government for a time after their coming to power. He is an unsavory character, but a very interesting theorist who accurately read the politics of his time. In fact his description of the political covers the ideological conflicts of the 20th Century to a large extent, explaining their unrelenting and violent nature.

So Cheney and the neocons reserve for themselves to right to designate who the enemy is. This is the source of their concept of sovereignty, what gives their political view meaning. There will be no compromise with this enemy. Since he is the negation of what they see themselves as, he will have to be either neutered or eradicated. Liberal democracies - following both Schmitt and Leo Strauss - are poorly equipped to deal with such an enemy, since "they are always too ready to compromise".

Obama wishes to see himself as "the great uniter", who was able to bring Cheney and the neocons "back into the fold", thus the constant whitewashing and legitimizing of the actions of 2000-2008. There is no chance of this of course, since Cheney and the rest know exactly who their friends are and who their enemy is . . .

Torture is simply the stalking horse for what is indeed our most profound political question . . .

Saturday, September 26, 2009

It's as least as good as most of the plans I've heard for COIN in Afghanistan...

Will Ferrel gets his Shrub on......and the suburb of Southern Pines will never be the same.

As a former 82nd paratrooper, I can only say that 2,000 wild monkeys would probably raise the cumulative GT score of, say, 2nd Brigade by 10%. At least. Fucking Falcon Brigade, like special ed only with more medals.