Monday, March 3, 2014

The Ukrainian Crisis, Some Questions from a Clausewitzian Perspective

Over the last week, I have been contemplating a post on the the crisis in Ukraine. Recent events have brought up the possibility of Russian military intervention in the Crimea and elsewhere in Ukraine, so perhaps it is time to take a step back from it all for a moment and attempt to see the entire complexus of political relations regarding Ukraine and Eastern Europe and even beyond as an interlocking "system". In that way I hope to formulate some questions which may lead to a better appreciation of the situation from a Clausewitzian strategic theory perspective.
Let's consider a couple of quotes from On War and another from Alexandre Svechin's Strategy which in my view provide a good place to start. All On War extracts are from the Jolles translation.
Clausewitz writes in Chapter 3 of Book III:
the moral qualities are among the most important subjects in war. They are the spirits which permeate the whole sphere of war. They attach themselves sooner or later with greater affinity to the will which sets in motion the guides the whole mass of forces, and they unite so to speak with it in one whole, because it is itself a moral quantity. Unfortunately, they seek to withdraw from all book knowledge, for they can neither be measured in figures nor grouped into classes, and require to be both seen and felt. . The spirit and other moral qualities of an army, a general or a government, public opinion in provinces in which the war is proceeding, the moral effect of a victory or of a defeat - these are things which in themselves very greatly in their nature, and which, according as they stand with regard to our object and our circumstances, may also have a very different kind of influence.
Included in these moral qualities would be pre-modern and modern moral cohesion as well as material cohesion connected to the state. Consider that it is in terms of theory these three forces that allow political communities to develop which of course assumes that a state would provide the administrative apparatus of a single political community. In practice however there exist states whose territories are comprised of more than one political community and/or where the political community lacks the shared identity of a political community (higher levels of pre-modern moral cohesion, but low levels of modern moral and material cohesion). Here we can imagine situations where a state lacks even the cohesion necessary to keep it from falling apart, dividing up into separate political entities which may or may not be viable as states. Consider the case of Yugoslavia during 1991-99 in this regard. "Will" here regards the political purpose of the trinity of each political community or communities in question to defend or expand their interests vis a vis other political communities. Consider this first quote as regarding the internal dynamics of the state/political community in question. For the external dynamics, let us consider this On War quote from Book VI, Chapter 6:
we speak of those essentially interested in maintaining a country's integrity. If, for instance, we look at the various states composing Europe at the present time, we find - without speaking of a systematically regulated balance of power and interests such as does not exist and therefore is often with justice disputed - that still unquestionably the interests, great and small, of states and nations are interwoven with one another in a most complicated and changeable manner. Each point at which they cross forms a strengthening knot, for in it the tendency of the one counterbalances the tendency of the other. By means of all these knots, therefore, a more or less close inter-connection of the whole is created and for any change to take place this inter-connection must be partially overcome. In this way the sum total of the relations of all states to one another serves rather to maintain the status quo of the whole than to introduce changes in it, that is to say, that in general the course of events tends to the maintenance of the status quo. Thus, we believe, must the idea of a balance of power be conceived, and in this sense such a balance will always spontaneously arise wherever several civilized states have many points of contact. How effective the tendency of these collective interests toward the maintenance of the existing condition may be is another question. We can, indeed, conceive changes in the relations of individual states to one another which promote this effectiveness of the whole, and others which obstruct it. In the former case they are efforts to strengthen the political balance, and as these have the same tendency as the collective interests, they will also have the majority of these interests on their side. In the latter case, however, they are abnormalities, excessive activity of individual parts, real diseases. That these should occur in a whole so feebly bound together as the multitude of greater and smaller states is not to be wondered at. After all, they occur in the marvelously ordered organic whole of all living nature. If therefore, we are reminded of the cases in history in which single states have been able to effect important changes solely for their own advantage, without even so much as an attempt having been made by the whole to prevent them, and, indeed, of cases in which a single state has been in the position to raise itself so much above the rest as to become the almost absolute arbiter of the whole, our answer is that these cases in no way prove that the tendency of the collective interests to the maintenance of the status quo does not exist, but only that their effectiveness at the moment was inadequate. Effort toward an object is not the same thing as motion toward it. But it is by no means a nullity on that account, a truth of which the dynamics of the heavens afford the best illustration. When we say that the tendency of equilibrium is the maintenance of the existing condition, we certainly assume that in this condition rest, that is, equilibrium, existed. For where this has already been disturbed and a tension already introduced, the tendency of equilibrium may also, certainly, be directed toward a change. But if we regard the nature of the thing, this change can never affect more than a few single states, and never, therefore, the majority of them. It is certain then that this majority sees its maintenance always represented and assured by the collective interests of all, certain also that each single state, which is not in the position of finding itself already in tension against it in defending itself. Whoever laughs at these reflections as utopian dreams does so at the expense of philosophical truth. Although the latter teaches us to recognize the relations in which the essential component parts of things stand to one another, it would certainly be rash to expect to deduce from them any accidental disturbing influences. But when a person, in the words of a great writer, 'never rises above anecdote', built all history on it, begins always with the most individual points, with the climaxes of events; when he never goes deeper that just so far as he has cause, and thus never reachers the deepest foundation of existing general relations - such a person's opinion will never have value beyond a single case, and for him, certainly what philosophy settles for the generality of cases will only appear a dream.
Emphasis is original to Clausewitz. We see here the cycle of rest, tension and movement that characterize all political relations (see Clausewitz's dynamic law of war in Book III, Chapter 18). Since political relations are power relations a certain amount of tension within/among/between political communities is unavoidable. Much of the work of day to day international relations is dealing with this element of normal tension between states and/or political communities. When tension reaches a certain point and a policy decision follows or politics itself forces a decision to apply military force we have a period of movement which culminates at the point where the momentum achieved/released has reached its culmination point and a new state of balance is the result. Part of this state of balance is the status quo of existing political relationships between states/political communities. Say a state is in crisis and its future existence within the currently recognized borders comes into question. Say that one neighbor is causing much of this tension with the aim of gaining territory at the expense of the state in crisis. The other neighboring states would see it more in their interest that the status quo remain instead of the aggressing state becoming more powerful. In effect these other states become "allies" of the state defending with their eventual responses (if any) unknown to the aggressor.
There are a few other points which need to mentioned here. First, a hegemonic state is more the nature of an anomaly, a state that enjoys such a level of power that it can effectively dictate to all others is probably a very disrupting and even dangerous state and this "hyperactivity" can be seen as a social malady, or "disease". Having peer states to the most powerful is thus a stabilizing element to international relations. Second, while theory provides us with a starting point we need to delve in deeply to the history of the political relations between the states in question. Far too often commentators are blinded by their own political community's interests or assumed interests as well as seeing one side as "good" and the other as "evil". Both labels are inevitably heavily influenced by culture and interest. Third and finally, looks can be deceiving and sometimes it takes a bit of digging to understand the actual nature of the conflict in question. Is a decision for military action the result of aggressive or preventive action? That is, it is very important to understand the underlying causes of the tension since only in this way is an effective resolution possible. This of course assumes that the interest of the international community is stability and not a continuous state of instability.
The final quote I will list is from the Russian Clausewitzian strategic theorist Alexandre Svechin who imo is the greatest Clausewitzian theorist of the first half of the 20th Century. His theoretical approach spans the whole strategic spectrum from grand strategy to tactics and his development of the theoretical underpinnings of operational art and the broad nature of attritional warfare are fundamental to understanding Russian Soviet strategy during World War II. Svechin did not live to think through the actual operational requirements, but his concept of the operational level itself provided the conceptual framework for what followed. This extract deals with negative/positive purpose and exception to the rule of status quo stability (which Clausewitz had also mentioned elsewhere):
In general, the pursuit of negative goals, that is, fighting for the complete or partial maintenance of the status quo, requires less expenditure of forces or resources than the pursuit of positive goals, namely fighting for conquest and forward movement. It is easier to keep what you have than to get something new. The weaker side will naturally go on the defensive. These principles are obvious in both politics and the art of war, but only on the condition that the sides have a certain amount of stability and defensive capability in the status quo. In the same way that ocean waves grind the rocks on the shore against one another, historical conflict rounds off amorphous political formations, erodes boundaries with are too sinuous and gives rise to the stability required for defensive capabilities. However, sometimes this condition is absent. The Treaty of Versailles has filled the map of Europe with historical oddities. The class struggle has created a layer cake of different interests and factions on this map. In these conditions the pursuit of the negative goal of maintaining the status quo may be the weakest rather than the strongest form of waging war: sometimes a superiority of forces will be required for a defensive rather than for an offensive, depriving the defensive of any meaning. This was the situation in the war of 1866 in the German theater of operations. Moltke considered this theater of war secondary to the Bohemian theater and left only three divisions there against middle German forces three times their size. The fragmentation of the German states and the open field system of the Prussian domains resulting form the peace treaties of Westphalia and Vienna made defense incomparably more difficult for the Prussians than offense. The Prussians were fully capable of going on the offense despite the superiority of the enemy's forces. The same conditions are often encountered in a civil war; civil war breaks out over a vast area and definite fronts form only gradually. But given the intensity of the class struggle, these definite fronts do not express the entire heart of the matter: in advancing from the Volga to the Urals the Red forces did not get separated from their base, which is usually a significant disadvantage of an offensive, but approached new and wealthier sources of food and class and economic energy. If the political situation is right, why even think of a defensive? To put down armed uprisings in one's rear? The downfall of the Paris Commune in 1871 can partially be explained by its failure to consider the need for an offensive in order to establish communications with the provinces; Paris alone against all of France was an indefensible position in any case. For centuries, since the time of Cardinal Richelieu, French diplomatic thinking has been nurtured on the idea of creating conditions of fragmentation, open fields, and weaknesses in Europe. As a result of the work of French policy, whose ideas are expressed in the Versailles 'Peace' Treaty, all of Central Europe - Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and so forth - has been placed in a situation which completely rules out the possibility of defense and positional warfare. The French vassals have been skillfully placed in the position of a squirrel compelled to turn the treadmill of militarism. The art of French policy lies in the skillful creation of unstable situations. This is the reason for the impermanence of this creation. The idea behind the Treaty of Versailles, putting Germany in an indefensible position, has made it physically necessary for Germany to prepare for offensive operations. Poland will still have the opportunity to ponder how it should thank France for the gift of the Polish Corridor, which has put Poland first in line for a German attack. Strategy, pp 250-51, 1927
Two points here: First, the current state system may actually require force to maintain, that is the moral/material cohesion of the state in question may be so weak as to require outside force to keep the entity together within its current boundaries. Second, for the attacker, the attack might be the stronger form of warfare, unlike most situations where it is the defense that has this advantage. Simply put the political conditions are the dominating factor regarding the resort to force.
With these concepts in mind, I have produced a list of questions regarding the current Ukrainian crisis which I think require relatively clear answers in order to understand what is going on. The level of propaganda coming from all sides is at such a level, particularly in the West, must be taken into consideration as well.
The first question would be basically what has happened in Ukraine? Was it a coup against a democratically elected President? Was it a revolution? Or is it the beginning of the break-up of the country as a whole, something that could turn into a civil war?
Is Ukraine, as it was constituted prior to the crisis a viable state or a hollow shell? Is being Ukrainian distinct from being Russian and if so for how many of the people living in Ukraine?
This leads us to the next question, which is simply who are the various sides? Who are the revolutionaries if a revolution has in fact taken place? Why did they see the need for violence and the need to overthrow the former government?
Is there any coherent plan to deal with Ukraine's financial crisis, this seen as independent, but obviously closely linked with the political crisis.
What are Russia's goals here? The destruction of Ukraine as an independent state? Annexation of Russian populated areas and strategic points in Ukraine important to Russia (the Russian naval base as Sevastopol)? Or simply the protection of Russians in a deteriorating polity? Simply are the Russians orchestrating events or simply more reacting to them?
How do Ukraine's other neighbors see this crisis? Is it in the interests of Poland, Slovakia, Belarus, Moldova and Romania that Ukraine continue to exist within its current borders? How would they see a partition of Ukraine?
Did the actions of the European Community in November 2013 precipitate this crisis? Why were the Ukrainians presented with the stark choice of choosing either "Europe" or Russia? Why was Russia's proposal for a tripartite agreement instead rejected by the US/EU?
What were the actions of the US government and various agents of the US government (including contractors) during the crisis, that is after October 2013? Did the US spend $billions to ferment trouble for the Ukrainian government? Did the US assist in a coup overthrowing a legitimate Ukrainian government?
So here are my questions . . . should you have any answers, or simply wish to comment, then please do so.

47 comments:

  1. Hmm. Interesting analysis, but here's my take on your questions and how they relate to what appears (and I agree with you that there is a real problem for Westerners trying to figure out what's actually happening on the ground as opposed to what both sides (and various observers) SAY is happening...

    "...what has happened in Ukraine? Was it a coup against a democratically elected President?" Yes, legally. Was it a revolution? If by that you mean "an act of popular will against a formal government" then, also yes. "Revolution" is one of those terms that tend to mean what you want it to mean; Tokugawa Ieyesu is said to have once remarked that the only justification for rebellion against the soveriegn is success. Or is it the beginning of the break-up of the country as a whole, something that could turn into a civil war? Very possibly but it's too early to tell. At the very least this points up the sociopolitical fragility of Ukraine and, by inference, at least some of the other post-Soviet Republics.

    "Is Ukraine, as it was constituted prior to the crisis a viable state or a hollow shell?" How do you define "viable"? Was Ukraine a "failed state"? But the typical definition of such entities, no. Was it a politically, socially, and economically robust polity? Obviously not. My question would be: why is this an important question for this case? Obviously Ukraine is "legally" a sovereign state from the standpoint of having a neighboring soverign state moving troops into its borders without it giving even the legal fig leaf of permission. Is being Ukrainian distinct from being Russian and if so for how many of the people living in Ukraine? Based on the 2001 census, a total of 17% of the residents of Ukraine identified themselves as "Russian" either by background or by affiliation. This distribution is widely variant, from between 1 to 4 percent in the western portions of the country to almost 60% in Crimea, the highest proportion of Russian-identifiers in the census. And, clearly, given the current political situation there IS a genuine difference between "Ukrainians" and "Russians".

    The south and east are have been part of Russia since the Cossack revolt from the Polish-Lithuanian Empire in the 1600s. Western Ukraine was part of the Polish-Lithuanian Empire until the partition of Poland in 1700. After that, it was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

    During the Russian civil war, the wester part of the present Ukraine declared itself independent and allied with the Central Powers. The east almost immediately attached itself to the Soviets. The Poles then took the western Ukraine in 1919, and the area west of Kiev remained Polish until 1939.

    After 1941 a "Ukrainian Insurgent Army" based in western Ukraine fought first the Nazis and then the Soviets up until the mid-1950s.

    (con't)

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  2. (Continued from above)

    ...who are the various sides? Who are the revolutionaries if a revolution has in fact taken place? Why did they see the need for violence and the need to overthrow the former government? See above; this appears to be largely an extension of the sociopolitical division of Ukraine, with the western, "Ukrainian" portion rebelling against the south-eastern "Russian" portion as represented by the Yanukovych government.

    Is there any coherent plan to deal with Ukraine's financial crisis, this seen as independent, but obviously closely linked with the political crisis. I'd argue that there's a more important question; how the hell did the Ukraine GET to be an economic basket-case, and is there a solution that is workable in the present Ukraine?

    Ukraine was seen at the time of the breakup of the Soviet Union as one of the most "viable" of the post-Soviet economics. Somehow it has managed to become one of the poorest; something like 40% of the Ukrainian economy is "black". That clearly has to change for this place to be stable in the long run.

    I honestly don't know how you do that because I honestly don't know how Ukraine managed to run its economy into such a hole. But clearly if the political situation is dependent on economic stability Ukraine must craft some serious changes in its economy to gain any hope of political stability...

    What are Russia's goals here? The destruction of Ukraine as an independent state? Annexation of Russian populated areas and strategic points in Ukraine important to Russia (the Russian naval base as Sevastopol)? Or simply the protection of Russians in a deteriorating polity? Are the Russians orchestrating events or simply more reacting to them? I'd argue that 1) it's nearly impossible to tell and 2) it's also probably not as simple as one-or-the-other. Russia is likely hoping to gain what it can in Ukraine while (possibly) using this to send a message to the other post-Soviet republics in its near abroad. Does it really want to absorb Kiev? Probably not. Would it, if the opportunity offered itself? Perhaps - Putin himself has publicly bemoaned the breakup of the Soviet Union. Would Moscow try to pull the entire entity back in, if it could? Why not? Aren't the same imperatives - assembling a buffer around the central Russian core - that created the Tsarist and maintained the Soviet empire still there?

    The only thing I'd reject is the trope of "protecting Russians". There does not appear to have been any genuine anti-Russian progroms prior to the troop movements. That, in this case, appears to be a maskirova.

    (Con't)

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  3. My second question is in the present tense . . . as in now . . . following that, what will Ukraine look like after the crisis?

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  4. FD Chief-

    I don't think either of us have a clue what's going on in Ukraine . . . still theory provides a system and I wouldn't be surprised if some Russians right now were thinking a lot about strategy and stuff.

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  5. (Continued from above)

    How do Ukraine's other neighbors see this crisis? Probably with everything from mild interest to extreme concern, depending on how threatened they feel by the possibility that Russia may use a similar pretext to invite them back into the benevolent arms of the Rodina... Is it in the interests of Poland, Slovakia, Belarus, Moldova and Romania that Ukraine continue to exist within its current borders? How would they see a partition of Ukraine? Almost certainly the same way that the present post-colonial nations of Africa and Asia see any attempt to adjust the colonial borders; with deep reservations. As the history of "Ukraine" above notes, a lot of the current national borders are pretty recent, many of these polities have extranational groups - and especially Russians in Moldova, Georgia, the Baltic states, and Belarus - within their borders. So if they WANT to remain intact (and the most logical conclusion is that they do) their best interests are that Ukraine is not partitioned.

    Did the actions of the European Community in November 2013 precipitate this crisis? Only in the sense that, as you point out, the tripartite agreement was rejected. The current military actions appear designed to secure the Crimea; until the Russian troops moved Ukraine did not appear poised to act against the Russian fleet base in Sevastopol, the only real immediate Russian "interest" in Crimea. This appears to be a pretty straightforward Russian attempt to establish physical control of a portion of eastern Ukraine as well as - possibly - the political upper hand over the remainder of the country.

    What were the actions of the US government and various agents of the US government (including contractors) during the crisis, that is after October 2013? Did the US spend $billions to ferment trouble for the Ukrainian government? Did the US assist in a coup overthrowing a legitimate Ukrainian government?

    Well, the Western skulduggery in Ukraine is pretty well documented. Berezovsky (the late pro-Western oligarch) poured big $$ into the “Orange Revolution”. Ukrainska Pravda (an opposition paper) is openly funded by the “National Endowment for Democracy,” supposedly a U.S. State-directed and US-funded NGO, while another opposition paper, the Kyiv Post was a project of Jed Sunden (an American funder of the protest group FEMEN) now owned by Brit-Ukranian oligarch Mohammad Zahoor. The US State Department openly solicits Ukrainian journalists who want to further American interests in Ukraine on their website. So, yes.

    That said, sending cash isn't like sending troops. Whatever the US/EU dirty work it appears to have stopped short of a Mossadegh-style coup.

    Frankly, this whole business seems pretty simple; the Russian leadership is taking advantage of turmoil on their borders to send in the troops, an act that the U.S. should applaud, given that we send in the troops eleven years ago to prevent that smoking gun from becoming a mushroom cloud!

    But apparently sauce for the American goose isn't sauce for the Russian gander...

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  6. ...what will Ukraine look like after the crisis?

    I think that depends a great deal on whether the Ukrainian government bows to the current Russian surrender demand, and we won't really know until then.

    If they do, this entire business may be resolved quietly, with a diplomatic "solution" that lets the Crimean plebiscite - the Crimean regional government already had one scheduled for March over gaining separatist status and, presumably, an eventual reunion with Russia - go forward. That also likely means that Ukraine is accepting "Finlandization" of its politics and aquiesence with Russian leadership.

    What happens if shooting starts?

    I have no idea, but I can't imagine anything good.

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  7. "I wouldn't be surprised if some Russians right now were thinking a lot about strategy and stuff."

    I also wouldn't be surprised. I ALSO wouldn't be surprised if a bunch of Russians were doing the same sort of thing that a bunch of Americans were doing in 2003 - talking out their ass like they knew exactly what they were doing while, in fact, not having a damn clue; I think we sometimes kid ourselves about how much foreign policy is the result of deep geopolitical and strategic thought and how much is some character sitting around musing "Hmmm...I wonder if THIS'll work..?"

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  8. I wonder how much history can be put down to some diplomat or prince or premier or field marshall doing the equivalent of shouting "Hey! Watch THIS!"

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  9. "What are Russia's goals here?"

    1] Protect their only warm water naval base.

    2] Internal politics! Which is the same as ours has been in many of our overseas transgressions.

    The danger is that Putin, Medvedyev, and the Russian Parliament will start believing their own propaganda. Especially if some modern-day Ukrainian Princip wanna-be takes matters into his own hands and blows up a Russky gas pipeline - or worse.

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  10. Here's some insights by a career State Dept professional who did several tours of duty in Moscow, to include Ambassador in 1987-91.

    Keep in mind that Ukraine was a charter member of the Soviet Union, within which all was directly run from Moscow. The world recognized the sovereign as the USSR, not the component states.

    My take is that Khrushchev put the Crimea in the Ukranian Socialist Republic for administrative simplicity. Since Ukraine had no real autonomy, why not let them take care of public services in the area for the Soviets. There was no idea of a "nation" in the move. Since the Soviet Union would last forever, did it really matter who ran the roads, utilities and public safety for the area, as long as they were totally subordinate to Moscow?

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  11. FD Chief-

    For me the questions are still open and I think leaving them open is important to be able to accept new information as well as being able to question what we have heard so far.

    Yours is far the more moderate view of what I've been hearing, but I wonder if you misjudge the makeup of the "revolutionaries" and the extent of US involvement and how this plays into Russian actions. Wonder about the current attitudes of Ukrainian versus Russian as compared to 2001. There's been a lot of water down the Dniepr since then with large numbers of "Ukrainians" coming to Portugal and other places looking for work. Inevitably one finds that many of the "Ukrainians" and "Moldovans" are actually Russians when asked. Don't see the connection with Iraq in 2003 at all, this is something quite different from Cheney's imperial fantasies . . .

    After receiving an email from a friend I'll include Turkey in the mix of interested neighbors regarding the future of Ukraine's present status. I would add that I agree with your view of the various neighbors being leery of any re-drawing of borders, but it is not limited to that, but rather, and more importantly, involves their willingness to take a stand on the present composition of Ukraine in effect defending the status quo . . .

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  12. Seyditz,
    Fine recap and comments.
    We don't know and that's what is so scary. We do seem to accept the unknown unknowns and form policy with disregard of this fact.
    Is it safe to say that the region is still a powder keg.? Wasn't the crimean war over some of the same ideas as we see in the present scenario?The area has been of consequence to Britain and the Ottoman and Russia and the Austro -Hungarians for a while. I may be wrong on a few details, but the word oil keeps popping up in my mind.
    OIL
    .Isn't that why Manstein was in the Crimean theater?
    Why don't we cut to the chase on this idea? Oil is more important than legitimacy.
    Again, great comments , and your questions are well thought out.
    My compliments.
    I read this after posting at chiefs article.
    jim hruska

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  13. To all,
    Is abu m out of business?
    jim

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  14. mike-

    Sevastopol is important . . .

    http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1f749b24-9f8c-11e3-b6c7-00144feab7de.html#axzz2v0gDf25w

    Personally, I doubt these Russians will catch the American disease of believing their own propaganda . . .

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  15. Al-

    Nice link. I thought his latest very interesting as well . . .

    http://jackmatlock.com/2014/03/obama’s-confrontation-over-ukraine-has-increased-putin’s-support-at-home/

    BHO's going to get his azz handed to him in this. He doesn't really seem to understand the weakness of his/our position which includes 12 years of neocon idiocy, a continuation of a highly questionable NATO expansion policy, dissension with the EU rather than solidarity and last but not least the perception that the US is a power in decline . . . Expanding on the first point, was Nuland off the reservation in her taped comments to the US ambassador in Kiev, or was she (who did a tour in the Cheney bunker) following instructions from BHO? Not that you would get any Ministry of Popular Enlightenment coverage of that . . .

    This goes back to the old discussion we're had regarding strategy. The US seemingly doesn't think in strategic terms at all, but rather in terms of simply power (actually more violence) and exceptionalism. "We're the lone superpower" following Cheney's 1992 Defense Planning Guidance and must do everything to subvert the rise of any power that could possibly become a peer competitor of the US.

    Russia made us look silly regarding Syria and exercises an undue influence over our vassals in Europe . . . so why not stoke up a revolt in Kiev and swing Ukraine over to "our side" (regardless of the actual chances of success or who we pay to wield the axe handles in the streets) . . .

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  16. jim-

    Thanks for the kind words.

    The oil was in the Caucasus back in 1941-43 which is what von List's Army Group A was heading for. Manstein got his marshall's baton for capturing Sevastopol in 1942 and requested that his 11th Army be retained intact as a strategic reserve, but instead it was divvied up and was unable to respond to the disaster at Stalingrad . . .

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  17. Don't see the connection with Iraq in 2003 at all, this is something quite different from Cheney's imperial fantasies.

    Apparently young Master Putin does, however:

    "Putin seemed to place blame for the events in Ukraine on the United States, since Washington backed the protesters. He also said the recent volatility of European and Russian stock markets was the fault of the U.S. and implied that Washington was hypocritical in its criticism of Russia.

    "Let's remember what the U.S. did in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in Libya," he said. "We believe we are completely legitimate in what we are doing."


    And I want to differentiate between what I see as the political outlook of the bulk of the "Ukrainians", that is, the Ruthenian peoples in the west and central Ukraine who appear to largely support the "revolution"/coup/whathaveyou and the truly hardcore anti-Russian groups within that larger group.

    These guys - and some of them truly ARE hardcore, neo-fascists and the like - are pretty much around the bend. I can see one of them, or a small group of them, doing a Prinzip as mike suggests to try and gin up a shooting war with Russia.

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  18. Oh, and here's the source for the Putin quote: http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/3/4/putin-says-russiahasrighttouseforceinukraine.html

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  19. "The US seemingly doesn't think in strategic terms at all, but rather in terms of simply power (actually more violence) and exceptionalism. "We're the lone superpower" following Cheney's 1992 Defense Planning Guidance and must do everything to subvert the rise of any power that could possibly become a peer competitor of the US."

    Well, I think that depends on what you consider the U.S. "strategic" goals to be. One was, at least since 1945, "containment" of the Soviet Union. The U.S. appears to have meddled in the Hungarian uprising of 1956, may have had some hand in the "Prague Spring in the Sixties, and certainly had contacts in Solidarity in Poland in the Nineties. I don't see this as vastly different in nature but agree with you that as in any real estate deal the thing that makes the big difference here is location, location, location. Ukraine is right in Russia's gut, and it shouldn't have surprised us that the Russians, and especially Putin - who sees as part of his brief to reassemble as much of Greater Russia as he can - would react with violent haste if we fiddle-fucked around in Ukraine. In fact, we knew he would, given that Russia worked its collective ass off to scuttle the "Orange Revolution"...

    "Russia ...exercises an undue influence over our vassals in Europe . . . so why not stoke up a revolt in Kiev and swing Ukraine over to "our side" (regardless of the actual chances of success or who we pay to wield the axe handles in the streets) . . . "

    A lot of Hungarian ghosts would nod sadly reading this. The U.S. has - hell, a lot of Great Powers of the past have, as well - not been cautious with the lives and safety of its tools.

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  20. And I'd like to observe that unless Putin is playing 12-dimension-chess here his own strategic thinking seems very "off" on this.

    Given the facts on the ground - the eastern and southern Ukraine's reaction to the coup in Kiev, the upcoming plebiscite in the Crimea, the lack of dynamic response from the new Kiev government - he could very well have played a cautious power politics game. Warned Kiev under the table about moving troops into Crimea. Waited until Crimea voted for separation, then reunion with Russia. Played the "open arms" card to all Russian expats in Ukraine...the Ukrainians get to see the claws and the teeth, just when the Western press isn't looking so to the outsiders Russia is still the big, fluffy bear.

    Instead he jumps in with both feet and ends up looking paranoid and hair-trigger and grabby, a sort of bare-chested Dubya, putting the backs up the other ex-Soviet republics and garnering a lot of bad press.

    So IMO this just says a lot about how this whole "lack of strategic thinking" thing is as often the rule as the exception...

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  21. Seydlitz -

    Sevastopol is important emotionally as well as militarily. It was designated the title "Hero City" and given the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal in 1945 for its spirited eight month long defense against von Manstein. It was one of only twelve cities so designated.

    You may be right about Putin and Medvedyev not catching the American disease. But a large chunk of Russians in both Russia and the Ukraine are infected.

    Many of the Russky-Ukrainian citizens believe that the far-right parties of the western Ukraine (SVOBODA for one) are reinstituting the Ukrainian SS Division from the 1940s and are going to start another bloodbath. BTW when first formed that Ukrainian SS unit had more than 100,000 volunteers according to Kurt Klietmann's book on the Waffen SS. Many Russians in the Ukraine have family members that were massacred back then. If not by Ukrainians in SS uniform then by the UPA, HiWis or by the Ukrainian police. The fear is real whether we downplay it or not. The Soviets lost how many - 10 million or so military KIA during their Great Patriotic War against the Axis and another 14 to 17 million civilians. They have not forgotten that history. They have a completely different view of neo-fascism than the average Joe Sixpack in America.

    See point 12 of the following link: 12-points-to-consider

    and

    Time Magazine

    On the other hand they tend to forget that many ethnic Russians also collaborated with Hitler: Vlasov's Army, von Pannwitz's Cossacks, Kaminski's Brigade, etc.

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  22. FD Chief-

    Putin's arguing the distinctions, not the similarities with the US invasion of Iraq, along with the hypocrisy of US pronouncements . . . which is part of my argument. Russia's actions so far follow the basics of the Svechin quote I provided in the post (sorry about the lack of lines between paragraphs). They sensed that given the political situation, the defensive was actually the weaker form regarding the Crimea and acted . . . there is yet to be any bloodshed btw . . .

    http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/04/ukraine-russia-warning-shots-military

    Putin is being painted as "paranoid, hair-triggered and grabby" by the Western press but I don't think he had much choice regarding standing up to what was seen in Russia as a US-engineered coup in Kiev. So preventive, not aggressive . . .

    All the war drum noise is wrecking havoc in the Western camp and I doubt if the Europeans have any desire to follow the US lead in sanctions. A British attempt to exclude the city of London from Russian deals sanctions has already compromised any UK action . . .

    From my perspective I wonder if the Russians are not playing the neocons like a cheap fiddle and getting them to go all crazy with the Euros . . . This could all end up backfiring terribly for the "empire" . . . in other words "strategy".

    Stay tuned, this could very well turn out to be a very valuable lesson . . .

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  23. @FDChief: " - he could very well have played a cautious power politics game. Warned Kiev under the table about moving troops into Crimea. Waited until Crimea voted for separation, then reunion with Russia. Played the "open arms" card to all Russian expats in Ukraine...the Ukrainians get to see the claws and the teeth, just when the Western press isn't looking so to the outsiders Russia is still the big, fluffy bear."

    IMHO Putin does not want the the Russian expats to come back to Mother Russia. With a large Russian speaking minority in the Ukraine, he can influence Ukrainian politics and policy. And he does not want Crimea reunited. He likes the staus quo. Time will tell on that one.

    He does no care about the bad press internationally. He is getting good press at home and in the eastern Ukraine. And he has sent a message to the other former SSRs.

    So maybe his strategic thinking is way ahead of ours?

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  24. mike-

    Yes, it is a very important city for the Russians. I have an original Defense of Sevastopol medal in my collection of Soviet militaria, along with the awarding document. Has plenty of dings and scratches which is understandable given that it was awarded in 1943 and worn through the rest of the war. Similar to this one . . .

    http://collectrussia.com/DISPITEM.HTM?ITEM=27851

    Also agree with your comments on the World War II/SS history, since I have a lot of questions regarding these particular "revolutionaries", as indicated by this comment . . . "or who we pay to wield the axe handles in the streets) . . ."

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  25. mike-

    Agree, Putin is not an imperialist (like Cheney) and simply wishes to firmly reestablish Russia as a great power. He has been very consistent in this and has been very helpful to the US on various occasions. That of course doesn't seem to influence our actions, unfortunately . . .

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  26. "So maybe his strategic thinking is way ahead of ours?"

    Could be. OR not; he might be just responding to events opportunistically.

    Or he might even be thinking in ways that are too opaque for us sitting here - and I agree, again, with seydlitz that 1) it's very hard to suss out what's actually going on given the mutual level of propaganda and disinformation coming from both Ukraine and Russia - and his "strategy" is not what we think it is.

    I'd argue that at the moment things seem to be favoring the Russian "strategy", assuming it is what it looks like; the "West" is in disarray, the U.S. Right is largely utterly bugnuts making the U.S. government reaction - which so far has actually been fairly muted and rhetorical - seem more flailing and impotent that it actually is.

    But, again - one Ukrainian colonel losing his patience and this suddenly changes into something very different...

    I hate to sound like this - since there really IS a potential for people to get killed here - but I'm fascinated watching this play out as a living example of power politics.

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  27. "I don't think he had much choice regarding standing up to what was seen in Russia as a US-engineered coup in Kiev. So preventive, not aggressive."

    Sorry, but I gotta call bullshit on this one. He had lots of choices, including doing exactly what he did LAST time the Ukraine went through a "U.S.-engineered coup" in 2005; patiently waiting for the Orange crowd to fuck up, applying political and economic pressure, and pushing the Ruthenians out again.

    This time he did choose to go with "aggressive". Agressive-defensive, if you will, but a more openly forceful response. It may very well be a "two-strikes" response - I played nice with you the first time, now you bastards get to see the mailed fist. But I disagree completely that what happened this time was either 1) "defensive" in nature or 2) a "reaction". His treatment of the Orange Revolution was a defensive reaction. This one is good old Great Power threatening; this is in the school of the tanks rolling into Budapest in '56.

    The old Tsars and the Soviet leaderships would have approved.

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  28. And speaking of the old Soviet responses to upheavals in the Pact nations...

    One thing that is consistently frustrating about the public bloviating of the "great power" conservatives in the U.S. is the degree to which they either ignore or denegrate the degree to which Russia is invoking what is in effect their version of the Monroe Doctrine.

    Jim Hruska has consistently made this point in the comment section for the earlier Crimea open thread post and I think it's worth taking seriously.

    What would the U.S. do, for example, if what the federal government saw as a dangerous regime took power in a nearby polity? We don't even need to guess; it invaded Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1989, and spent most of the 80s supporting wars in El Salvador and Nicaragua on ground much the same as those which Russia is claming to be their rationale in this case.

    If you look even further back. one of the reasons the U.S. went to war in 1917 was evidence the Germany was canoodling with Mexico.

    So I understand WHY the "conservative" punditry is trying to gin up outrage about this. But ISTM that the most cursory look at U.S. history would show the massive fail in their "argument"...

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  29. Chief -

    Interesting re the Russky version of the Monroe Doctrine. Especially if you consider that our Monroe Doctrine was in a large part triggered by the Russian Tsar. He issued an Ukase in 1821 forbidding foreign ships from entering Alaskan waters and soon after an American merchant ship was seized.

    One of Kerry's predecessors as Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, stated at the time:

    "But what right has Russia to any colonial footing on the continent of North America? And is it not time for the American Nations to inform the sovereigns of Europe, that the American continents are no longer open to the settlement of new European colonies."

    Per Walter McDougall's book on the north Pacific, 'Let the Sea Make a Noise', this was the first ever official enunciation of the principle later made famous by the Monroe Doctrine.

    Perhaps the Russkies are reading American history?

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  30. FD Chief-

    "Sorry, but I gotta call bullshit on this one. He had lots of choices, including doing exactly what he did LAST time the Ukraine went through a "U.S.-engineered coup" in 2005 . . ."

    Two thousand five is not 2014. Different set up now and after what happened in Georgia in 2008? The release of the Nuland tape should have been enough to get the neocons to reconsider, but obviously it wasn't . . . so political context allowing for a quite different contingency and an act of by US standards of light military power . . . The move into the Crimea allows the Russians lots more advantages over time (both domestically and with the international audience he wishes to influence). In my view, you're calling the game two minutes into play . . .

    They can howl all they want in Cheneyville, it won't make that much of a difference . . . which is the political context that the US has gotten itself into . . .

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  31. seydlitz: "Two thousand five is not 2014."

    In many more ways than one. You have to take into account that Russia is now much more of an economic power than in 2005. They are major investors in several countries. They are the principal source of natural gas for Europe. They are developing a significant middle class with significant discretionary income. For the past 4 years, Mediterranean tourist countries have been actively seeking Russian tourists. They spend 40 - 50% more per capita per day than cheap ass Western Europeans. It has become open public policy in the Maldives, for example, to try to replace Brit and German tourism with Russians.

    It ain't Russia's military power that is cowing Western Europe, it's their economic power.

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  32. Al-

    I would agree as to economic power doing most of the heavy lifting in their strategy. Establishing control over the Crimea given the fluid situation, offense was the stronger form in this case than defense. This action also tested the Ukrainian military in various ways and provided plenty of rope for the "revolutionaries" to tie themselves up with as the situation develops. Doing this at the beginning of the interaction heavily influences all that follows . . .

    Given the material cohesion of the Ukrainian state and without the threat of Russian T-90As rolling through Kiev, I suspect that the "revolutionaries" may have difficulty just holding together . . . Nuland's $$$ notwithstanding . . .

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  33. I think the blogosphere is starting to affect main street media. This from the goverment owned CBC.

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  34. I wonder if the "transgressions" of the US and NATO will stay under the microscope long enough for people to see them for what they really were? Hopefully, a lesson might be learned?

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  35. Another tape recording of a phone conversation has come out . . . Could the snipers have belonged to the "revolutionaries"?

    http://rt.com/news/ashton-maidan-snipers-estonia-946/

    Anybody else reminded of the Syrian gas attack back in August?

    http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/01/15/214656/new-analysis-of-rocket-used-in.html

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  36. I'm surprised Putin hasn't mentioned proposals for the partitioning of various states in the US over the past 10 - 20 years. While it is not necessarily a "sovereignty" issue, it does indicate an "American" predilection to drawing boundaries based on political party affiliation.

    Or perhaps he could mention the Koch Bros et. al., who spend millions to influence gubernatorial and other local elections in states where they are not legally resident nor entitled to vote.

    Wasn't something once said about "casting the first stone"?

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  37. @seydkitz - 'Could the snipers have belonged to the "revolutionaries"?'

    Maybe or maybe not. The right wing in the Ukraine is certainly capable enough and reprehensible enough to have committed this act. But 'Disinformatzia' was invented by the Russians. So I will keep my opinion open on this.

    And the Syrian gas attack being blamed on the rebels is open to interpretation. It is still considered 'disinformatzia by many.

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  38. mike-

    By all means keep an open mind. As to the Syrian gas attack and the link I provided . . . it didn't blame the rebels, but rather trashed US intel reporting . . .

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  39. Henry Kissinger's take on the subject

    Also some links to other analyst's views at the bottom of the page.

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  40. Al-

    Thanks . . . perhaps strategy is simply about following a simple thread, that one thread . . . that allows it to all come together.

    You in the East and me in the West . . . as the whole thing crumbles . . . more or less . . . I try to be positive . . . ever new ideas strung forward . . . hoping some will take off . . .

    "Putin is a serious strategist" . . .

    That I agree with . . .

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  41. seydlitz-

    Understanding the various "flavors" of "Rus" is complex. My maternal family is from Belorus. For quite a while, I used the term "Russian" loosely, at least in the eyes of others of Rus extraction. Then, after mixing with various Rus groups as an adult, I found that "Russian" is not a one size fits all term, even amongst those from "geographic" Russia. I remember being corrected by a Moscovite to be more specific when calling someone who was Carpatho-Russian simply "Russian".

    Kissinger is the first one I have seen who has at least addressed the tip of this iceberg.

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  42. Al-

    Interesting . . .

    "From the moment that Russians wearing ski masks and carrying automatic rifles arrived on Crimean streets, Putin alienated an entire generation of Ukrainians, the very people he needs to see the value of membership in a Russian-led political and economic union that might counterbalance the EU."

    I read this differently. It was the guys in ski masks in Kiev who made the initial and greatest error, or perhaps rather those who put up the $$$ behind them. Simply more political manipulation from "the deep state" . . .

    How do you think the Ukrainians will view the EU in the near future when austerity kicks in?

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  43. seydlitz-

    Europe is not going to impose austerity, but rather give billions in "no strngs attached" aid to Ukraine. Frau Merkel and Herr Schauble would never conscience making the general population suffer for the misdeeds of their government, would they?

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  44. Al-

    That's why I like Corbert Report over the other thingie . . .

    Still, scary times . . . where's this totally avoidable catastrophe going to end? . . . stay tuned.

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  45. More insight. Do follow the author's links. Interesting material.

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  46. In today's news:

    If Moscow does not begin to "deescalate" the situation then, Merkel said the 28 European Union nations, the United States and other trans-Atlantic partners were prepared to take even stronger measures that would hit Russia economically.

    Interesting how Frau Merkel is suddenly the spokesperson for the EU, the US and "other trans-Atlantic partners".

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