Bateman says that this is a good idea tactically; battalion-level assvice will help the Iraqi "Army" operate more effectively, and the fire support elements will, too.
He's not so sure whether this is as good an idea at echelons above reality:
"This decision to allow American trainers to operate at lower levels may well put more Americans in more danger, but at the same time, it also capitalizes on our forces' real strengths and directly helps the Iraqis succeed on the ground. The political wisdom of this decision is another thing entirely." (emphasis mine)I'll go further than that; this is the military equivalent of pushing on a fucking string.
I don't see the "Iraqi Army" as having a military problem killing raggedy-assed Islamic State gomers. Hell, back in Saddam's day they had a fine old time slaughtering Shia militiamen and Kurdish rebels. The thug-armies of Third World despotisms are usually terrific at slaughtering their own people and local rebellious groups. Ask any Sri Lankan Tamil...no, wait...you can't, they're mostly all dead.
The "Iraqi Army" has a problem because "Iraq" is a political fiction. There is no "Iraq" worth fighting and dying for, nothing that a man or woman could point to as worthy of that great a sacrifice. There are factions in Iraq, certainly, but the whole point of fighting for a faction is to get the largesse that faction dispenses as a reward for loyalty, and you have to be alive to get that.
The "Iraqi Army" doesn't have trouble against the Islamic State because the "Iraqi Army" has trouble executing simple fire-and-maneuver actions, or because it can't effectively call for supporting fire, the sorts of things that U.S. Army advisors could help it learn.
Well, it probably does have trouble, but that's not why it doesn't do well against the IS fighters.
The "Iraqi Army" has trouble against the Islamic State because "Iraq" is a goddamn fiction and a dumpster-fire of a failed state. The "Iraqi Army" is a shitshow of corruption and patronage like any number of Third World failed-state "armies" where officers pocket soldiers' pay and factional loyalty is more important than technical or tactical proficiency.
I'm not going to tell you that technical and tactical proficiency don't matter. Hell yes, they do. But when it comes down to bloody war "the moral is to the physical as three is to one" as a former military savant once wrote. There is no moral center to Iraq anymore; not even the evil sort of anti-morality that comes with fighting for a rapacious thug like Saddam Hussein.
So, short of re-invading and taking over this ridiculous attempt to make a desert in Sunnistan and call it peace is there any likelihood that trying to add bullets to the jello that is the "Iraqi Army" will provide even a medium-term solution to the sociopolitical problems of Mesopotamia?
Hell, no.
But it'll make the idiot rubes think their political "leaders" are "doing something about ISIS" and the cost is a handful of millions and maybe a couple of throwaway GIs or five, so it's all good, right?
It's one of the supreme examples of stubbornness that so many Americans still believe that their armed forces are competent at training foreign armed forces, or even developing world armed forces.
ReplyDeleteThe actual track record indicates a supreme level of incompetence as trainers (with Green Berets being hardly better than other troops), and did so for decades already.
Hell, Sven, I don't think that Joshua could make the Iraqi mud into bricks at this point.
ReplyDeleteBut on the specific issue of the U.S. Army as trainers-of-indigenous-troops, yes. The old AT of the Sixties was good w the mountain peoples of Vietnam and the organization has lived on that for 55 years even as Iraq and A'stan have shown how bad Charlie Beckwith & Co. have turned them into overpaid door-kickers. And they're probably an order of magnitude BETTER than the rest of the Army with foreign troops.
One of the more irritating aspects of the current "support-the-troops" yellow ribbon "patriotism" here in the U.S. is the complete inability (or unwillingness) to call bullshit on the armed services when they're clearly fucked up. It's as clear to me as it is to you that the Army - having had years and millions to spend trying - couldn't train four Iraqis to dig a latrine. But nobody wants to SAY that and be a big ol' not-supporting-the-troops meanie...
That half century old story about the Montagnards is the only real success story, and it should be embarrassing how often it's being mentioned for want of newer examples. It's like the IDF still enjoying Yom Kippur War fame and Marines still living off their Pacific War and Inchon past.
DeleteBy the way, I disagree. SOME people DO point out the failures; the notorious POGO guys, the CBO, Glenn Greenwald, some satirists. The failure is in giving hours of airtime to idiotic always-wrong pundits instead of to people with real insights every sunday. Or even better, give airtime to people when they get it right. POGO ain't always right, for example.
"AT" = SF. Damn autocorrect...
ReplyDeleteThis is not an actual attempt to do anything real in Iraq.
ReplyDeleteNo one is pushing on anything.
Rather it is simple theatre. The "tell" is the equipment being deployed.
Apaches and HIMARS can produce cool youtube videos (suitable for arms sale commercials and war porn) without putting Americans at (much) risk.
I suspect that the diplomats desired America to show its increased "commitment" to Iraq but insisted that nobody important be killed. This was the Pentagon's response.
Apaches make no sense, though. Too big a logistical tail. Even the AH-1Z (which is less suitable for the overhead flying artillery job at night due to the way its gun is mounted) needs too much support. A sensible method would be to base a few small gnships at Baghdad airport, and use the facilities and some of the ground personnel there. The AC-27J would have been optimal, but the USAF in its wisdom had an allergic reaction to the "NIH" C-27 (G.222) series and that undermined the AC-27J concept.
DeleteOn the other hand, the very idea that the U.S. needs to fight Daesh is nonsense. Daesh has displayed a greater talent at accumulating enemies than hitler, they're doomed anyway.
Americans really should get rid of the idea that they "need to do something". Often times problems solve themselves or won't get solved (but instead exacerbated!) by American involvement.
Look at the Israelis. They don't do anything about Daesh, and it's their enighbourhood. They sure would prefer an Assad regime over a Daesh regime controlling Syria. On the other hand, a democratic, Western-leaning Syria is their (top politicians') nightmare; they would be forced to evacuate the Golan Heights in such a case. So don't count on them supporting Western proxies in Syria.
Apaches are replacing the Kiowa scout helicopter. They are there to look around and look cool. They might launch a hellfire or two, but they won't actually do anything else. Too great a chance for some American to get killed.
DeleteMy sad thought is that the units being deployed are determined more by which companies need more profits than by any military or political rationale.
ReplyDeleteProblem w that theory, Ael, is the complete lack of publicity for this. I posted a link to this on my Facebook page and the reaction was massive indifference. Dunno who's supposed to be excited by this but it sure as hell ain't the Public, who don't even know about it...
ReplyDeleteMy guess is that this is a case of "sunk costs" at CENTCOM; guys unwillingness to accept that all their efforts have been worthless.
All those regional commands are massive mistakes. Their commanders are effectively lobbyists for the arms industry through their "requests" for forces, (such as "requests" for more warships being deployed forward in their region).
DeleteFurthermore, once you establish a bureaucracy, it wants prestige, attention, career opportunities, respect, growth - and in the case of the regional commands this means they want to play war or at the very least conduct as many "show the flag", "freedom of navigation patrol", "emergency assistance" and other missions as possible.
A multinational Western Pacific HQ, a North America/Carribbean HQ and participation in SHAPE (NATO in Europe HQ) should suffice for national defence.
And Sven makes a good point; the last US troop KIA in Iraq was a Fobbit hit by a mortar round. More tail = more targets.
ReplyDeleteAnd in what to me is an even more incoherent move the U.S. is deploying what looks like what at least used to be called a reinforced "B" team (a Special Forces company-sized element plus attachments) to assist...someone...in Syria. The "smart money" people are speculating that most of these guys will be tasked to the Kurdish YPG, although the fig leaf for this as "fighting ISIS" will be the token Arab units in this ramshackle coalition.
ReplyDeleteProblem being...that the YPG is a lot less bugged by their IS buddies to the south than they are with the remnant Wahhabi and regime fighters to the west preventing them from uniting the whole of NE Syria into a Kurdish region. So there's a fairly good reason to believe that the Kurdish proxies are planning to use their new Yankee pals to fight people the U.S. government would just as soon they don't fight instead of the scary bad eeeeevil IS mooks the U.S. government is sending these green beanies to make them fight.
Which is, in a nutshell, the whole problem with U.S. "foreign policy" in the Middle East. Most of the people there don't like U.S. "foreign policy". They don't want what we want them to want. So giving them weapons and sending people to teach them to use them just makes it more, not less, difficult to get "what we want".
We're trying to push string. And we all know how well that's gonna work...
Make a ball of it and you can push it just about anywhere.
ReplyDeleteChief,
ReplyDeletethe fobbitt kia was a marine gunner assigned to a group of 4 large caliber guns(type un noted in press releases). these guns are firing ds for the forces of freedom.
The marine was kia reportedly by katusha counter battery fire.
heres my question-who is adjusting this US fire? also if its large caliber shouldn't it be self propelled and able to protect the crew from counter fire ? i read that he was killed running to a bunker.
this has been on my mind, but i didn't write about it. Since u mention it i posit my question.
theres more here than meets the eye. what else is new.
jim hruska
The Marines are using that condescending M777 POS of a howitzer that's got no advantage over 1970's howitzers other than the (nowadays ordinary) muzzle velocity radar and lighter weight.
DeleteBoth USMC and 82nd, 101st have next to no artillery capability in face of a counterfire threat.
Sven is generally correct on the lack of real FA support for the light units. The DIVARTY in the Army units is still armed with the M119A3 towed systems. The maximum range of the RAP round is only about 40km (conventional about 30km) compared to, say, the South African G5 with a conventional range of about 39km or the G5-52 which extends that to over 50km.
DeleteThat said, I think Sven is being pedantic about this. Most potential realistic US opponents - that is, a non-Great-Power - will have the same problem the Serbs or the Iraqis had, that is, even if they had these better cannons they will be vulnerable to degradation of their targeting and fire control systems. And a Great Power war...well, that ain't gonna happen for the same reason that no nuclear powers have EVER gone to war.
OK. So, as for your questions;
1. Probably SF or "advisor" types attached to the locals, or local FOs trained by same, would be my guess.
2. SP artillery is an order of magnitude more complicated to supply and sustain. Towed cannon are just that much simpler.
And as an aside; rocket artillery is a pain in the ass. Rockets don't act like conventional projos in flight and my understanding from the countermortar and counterbattery radar guys was that they're really hard to track back. Plus they don't have to be all that accurate; they're an area weapon, and the guys just pull up, point the truck in the general direction of their target, let fly, and drive away. Crude, but effective as hell if you don't care about accuracy.
Don't think there's much here other than the usual "WTF is the point" problem that has bedeviled this nonsense since 1991...
Chief,
ReplyDeletethe fobbitt kia was a marine gunner assigned to a group of 4 large caliber guns(type un noted in press releases). these guns are firing ds for the forces of freedom.
The marine was kia reportedly by katusha counter battery fire.
heres my question-who is adjusting this US fire? also if its large caliber shouldn't it be self propelled and able to protect the crew from counter fire ? i read that he was killed running to a bunker.
this has been on my mind, but i didn't write about it. Since u mention it i posit my question.
theres more here than meets the eye. what else is new.
jim hruska
Jim -
ReplyDeleteMarine units have no self-propelled arty that I know of. And as far as I can find out the battery in question were part of the 26th MEU afloat. Which suggests to me they had no counterbattery radar with them??? And they had arrived at that base just days before the rocket attack.
See my comment above. My understanding is that rocket artillery is difficult to deal with using standard counterfire systems. It may be very possible that the battery had their AN/TPQ-39 or -49 up and running and still might have had a hard time fixing the firing unit.
DeleteOne problem with counterbattery radars is the frontline mindset. Most such radar aren't capable of 360° search. There was a dedicated 360° mortar warning radar deployed during the Afghanistan occupation so the real countermortar radar could be turned to look into the right direction to measure follow-on shots at least.
DeleteMost counter-mortar/-artillery/-battery radars have an AESA antenna these days, with about 100-110° field of view. Usually they can be turned for about 300° coverage, nbut no more than those ~110° at a time.
Thsi is important because these radars still depend on picking up the echo of a munitiona s it crosses the horizon. It's much slower, later and more difficult to detect these small and distant objects by a more general air search as done for aircraft. So a radar that's not staring at the direction of the incoming munition when it rises above the horizon it likely not going to detect it at all. And those radars stare at only 110°, a mechanically rotating search as with ships' air search radars would miss the crucial moment 2/3rds of the time.
All this was suitable for frontline service as in Korea (where the first counter-mortar radar experience was made), not really suitable for Fulda Gap and certainly not suitable for 360° base security in a war of occupation.
@FDChief; rockets have ballistic trajectories and save for their slightly greater dispersion they should mean no special problems. The spin-stabilised ones have short ranges, so the lower RCS due to no fins doesn't matter all that much.
Guided missiles can be deceiving if programmed accordingly.
Besides, the man was likely warned if he was really killed while running for cover. Most artillery rockets arrive still at supersonic speed and cannot be heard before impact (though the launch may be visible to the targets with those 107 mm short range MRLs, for example).
I'll buy your assessment, Sven; I was on the outgoing end of the FA production line and had to take the low-level radar operator's word for the problems they supposedly had with rockets. If I had to guess it may have had something to do with the relatively flat trajectory of rocket projectiles versus ballistic projectiles? Dunno.
DeleteBut your other point is well taken; the counter-battery/counter-mortar radars were designed with a "the enemy is thataway" basis, and I do know that in practice if the Angle T was too great our own radars had trouble tracking our rounds even when they knew when we fired as well as the location of the firing position and the (at least notional) location of our targets...
Svenn -
ReplyDeleteFor current US counterbattery radars (if they even had one with them), 1600 mils (90 degrees) seems to be the norm, but I understood they can rotate to a full 6400 (360 degrees).
AN/TPQ-49 has 360°, but is limited to counter-mortar apparently, and isn't very accurate.
Deletehttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/an-tpq-49.htm
The mechanical rotation of the -36/-37/-47 models doesn't satisfy for the reason I described above.
As I noted to Sven above; our radar operators had real problems tracking the flight of our outgoing rounds if they were more than a couple of hundred mils left or right of the gun-target line.
Delete