Persistent.

Persistent is a word we should all be very familiar with.
Persistence in Excellence is always a good thing, even though it is not a low hanging fruit easily grabbed...:::cough:::Oakland-Raiders:::cough:::

Persistent is something a college student should be familiar with because it is the primary factor that keeps them going back to lecture hall to study a subject that is more for a wage than their primary passion...:::cough:::myself:::cough:::

Persistent is something to be admired when a runner finishes a marathon even though their body is screaming at them, "What the hell are we doing?!?"...:::cough:::my-wife:::cough:::

And there is the kind of persistence we can all do with out...say, a cough, a runny nose, or more seriously, A FREAKING OBVIOUS INSURRECTION THAT ISN'T LETTING UP NO MATTER HOW MUCH THE MILITARY AND THE GOVERMENT CLICK THEIR HEALS TOGETHER AND WISH UPON THE NORTH STAR!!!

Sorry, had to get that off my chest...so here is the key graf...

"The incident is the latest in a series of killings of NATO troops by Afghan security forces and demonstrates the risks involved in the intense effort to recruit and field tens of thousands of new Afghan soldiers and police officers. U.S. and Afghan officials have regularly said they do not believe insurgent infiltration is widespread in the Afghan security forces, but these killings have persisted."

Really?
We recruit, and for some unknown reason that no one can fathom why, Afghani police officers are routinely opening up on American Soldiers for...oh don't why...let's explore...
"WOW, did you see that Sarge, Omar just greased six of our guys...what do you make of that?"
"Well Private, I'm not sure, perhaps it is one of those intangible things that is above our pay-grade. Lets continue to be run of the mill drones, and I'm sure the Officers and the gov's will get to it after they're done humping the oil can."

WTF?!?
Persisted means persistence, means continuing at a steady pace regardless of outcome...holy shit, how can we be so freaking stupid????
How I ask?
HOW?
When it is a one time thing, and it never happens again, yes, we can call that a rare event hardly worht noting, but when it becomes a routine event...it's time not to say, "do not believe insurgent infiltration is widespread in the Afghan security forces" because you look stupid next to the facts contradicting you.
The US Military better start saying, "look, we have a problem here, and that problem is that the Afghan police force has been penetrated by hostiles."
Progress begins with honestly looking at the situation, and calling a spade a spade. The Afghan national police have been penetrated and many of it's officers turned, or were plants to begin with.
But saying it's not widespread when the facts scream "LIAR!"...thats a big neon sign saying, "We're hiding the truth of how utterly fucked up it is here."

When "Strategy" Is Not Strategy . . .

If you wish to follow this post entirely, you'll have to read, or be roughly familiar with a series of recent posts on strategy. Following Admiral JC Wylie's challenge, I'm attempting here to initiate a dynamic in terms of strategy discussion with the view of developing in time a general theory of strategy . . .

This is a follow up to an earlier post, which concerned Admiral JC Wylie's classic Military Strategy of 1967. That post in turn - as is normal among those who write about this type of stuff - got a mention from Zenpundit. Zen had found himself in strong agreement with my definition of strategy, as a necessary element of a larger theory of strategy:

Focused adaptation of divergent sources of power assisted by control over time in pursuit of a political purpose through methodological theoretical construct (strategic theory) with the aim of creating strategic effect/a strategic dynamic greater than the sum of the individual power sources. For the strong political community, strategy can be an option, for the weak it is a necessity.


Please refer to my above post for my reasons for emphasizing this very specific and limited definition of "strategy".

The actual subject of Zen's post was in part this post from Kings of War. In "Is Politics the Enemy of Strategy?" the Faceless Bureaucrat argues that "politics" being the larger range of social activity that war operates within makes avoiding political "interference" impossible. This was well known to Clausewitz as well btw:

when people talk, as they often do, about harmful political influence on the management of war, they are not really saying what they mean. Their quarrel should be with the policy itself, not with its influence. If the policy is right - that is, successful - any intentional effect is has on the conduct of the war can only be to the good. If it has the opposite effect the policy itself is wrong.
On War, Book VIII, Chapter 6

OK, you follow me so far probably, but why the picture of the Trojan Horse? I'll get to that . . .

But first, this comment I made on Zen's post, in response to the KoW post above:

If the "war of choice" in question is so hamstrung - or rather becomes so hamstrung - by domestic political considerations, maybe that’s a good reason not to get involved in such a conflict in the first place . . . I would add that both Afghanistan and Iraq were more than just "wars of choice", they were essentially unlimited wars since we overthrew the governments in question and took over responsibility for their replacements, ensuring a long-term and open-ended commitment which obviously we were not really interested in fulfilling . . . or am I reading it wrong? Also I would argue that Bush’s war in Iraq didn’t really involve any "strategy" at all, at least as how I have defined it on the post you link. "Politics" loves a strategic vacuum . . .

The "war of choice" refers to actually two wars: Afghanistan and Iraq. In both we, or rather Bush/US government at the time decided to incur unlimited benefits/costs in regards to these two conflicts. In both, as in with our demand of unconditional surrender in 1943, we had taken on responsibility for establishing the follow-on government of (by us) defeated states. Germany in 1943, Japan in 1945, followed by Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. These are all such by-war-created-new-government states the US has taken on in our history, with the exception of perhaps the Philippines in 1899-1949 . . .

So, both wars of choice were taken on in a rather cavalier fashion since our leaders at the time thought of themselves as "history's actors", or as reflected in a quote by Paul Bremer to US State Department officials in 2003, "All you people know about is history - we are making history, we are making the future." What gave us this role and ability, was who "we were" in the eyes of the actors themselves and the amount of raw power at our disposal.

Enter the Trojan Horse. At the time that Homer's Iliad opens the Greeks have been fighting to overthrow Troy for ten years. The "strategy" they had followed relied simply on the personalities involved (especially the heroes like Achilles, Ajax and others) and the use of raw force to physically annihilate/subdue the Trojans. From the point of view of this post, there was actually no strategy at all, simply "history's actors" using brute force to attain their goal. The result was potential defeat or at the least stalemate which for the Greeks was the same thing. With their hopes sinking, the Greeks in desperation try instead to draw upon other sources of power at their disposal to create a strategic dynamic which will play to Trojan weaknesses and allow the Greeks to militarily defeat Troy. Personalities do not enter in to it, by now Achilles is dead, and force will not be used until the last moment and then very effectively. What we have here is a transition from a plan using raw force wielded by "history's actors" to a strategy using a wide range of sources of power with the intention of creating strategic effect far beyond the sum total of the inputed elements. We can look at the two (use of raw force & strategy) also in terms of linearity/non-linearity, with raw force as more linear and strategy as more non-linear in their effects.

One could argue, that this was not a strategy at all, but simply a ruse (thanks FDChief), but that would be forgetting my definition above. The intention is to use a wide range of power to achieve strategic effect. The idea of using a wooden horse to trick the Trojans was a ruse, but that would have hardly worked on its own. What was required was a strategy using a wide range of power available to the Greeks, in this case the intercession of the various gods in support of the Greeks in addition to the distraction of the various gods in support of the Trojans. If you recall, the Trojans were divided as to how to proceed with the horse. The Trojan priest Laocoön threw a spear into the horse to show that it had nothing to do with the gods and that the Trojans would be better off setting it ablaze. But the gods intervene here and Laocoön and his sons are killed by giant snakes sent by Athena. Obviously the unfortunate priest of Neptune had angered the gods by throwing that spear, but was that actually the case? The Greeks had also left behind a spy, Sinon, who feigned opposition to the Greeks, and told the right version of events to the Trojans.

We see here a very clear distinction between the tactical nature of a ruse, and the strategic nature of the effect of the overall Greek strategy. The fact that the political purpose was the same in the case of the use of personality and force and in the use of strategy does not matter, since strategy is not an end in itself, but a means.

What was key for this strategy to work was excellent intelligence, a clear view of how the enemy would react to the situation and clear political goals which could be achieved through military action, that is the destruction/looting of Troy, not the establishment of a new Trojan state controlled by the Greeks.

Compare the Greek experience before Troy with America's recent wars of choice and the similarities are clear. It was not a bad strategy, or too many strategies that got us to the situation we are in now in both Iraq and Afghanistan, but no strategy at all in the terms I have defined it. Instead was an assumption of American exceptionalism linked with reliance on a great use of force. Understanding of the area or its history were discounted since both the exceptionalism of being history's actors and the nature of our tremendous available force would sweep all before us. This was tied as well to notions in regards to the "magic of the market", especially in regards to post-invasion Iraq. Paul Bremer was instrumental as head of the CPA in instituting a whole series of sweeping laws which reflected neo-liberal ideological assumptions. Contrary to many critics, there was a plan, as Naomi Klein described it, "to lay out as much honey as possible, then sit back and wait for the flies", that is the "market" or rather US corporate interests to come in and turn everything around.

Sound familiar? It should, since that is the same rhetoric we have heard in regards to the current financial crisis: "just wait for the market to do its magic". That is the current political situation in the US has fundamentally affected the nature of not only how we approach our wars and our inability to identify the limits of military power, but also many serious problems at home. Notions of American exceptionalism - unquestioningly promoted by those with the most to gain from the current situation - are used to explain away what should be indicators of crisis: lower life expectancy, lower educational results, increasing gap between what is left of our middle class and the working classes and those at the top. It is of particular interest that the recently triumphant GOP is using this very notion of exceptionalism to once again bamboozle the American people, as if we have learned nothing from the last nine years . . .

The inability to think in strategic terms not only limits our military/economic/political effectiveness abroad, but endangers our social/political existence at home.

Postscript:

Thanks for the comments on this post. As we can see it was a good interaction and some of the comments added to clarify specific points.

There are two points I would like to make. First, the narrow definition of strategy I have proposed is illustrated well by the history of the Trojan War. The lack of strategy and the use of strategy show the clear distinctions between the two. Strategy is a force multiplier. But it need not be present to create strategic effect, since if the targeted population does not resist, or cannot resist effectively, the stronger side can impose their will by force alone. I think Al has made a good argument in regards to the Morgenthau Plan being a strategy, albeit a poor one. Still, given the lack of resistance from the German people, it need not have been a strategy in order to have succeeded. Force alone would have sufficed.

Second, let's look again at Wylie's quote that I added in the comments, that being: "I would suggest that a primary fault in the last war in Europe was that we brilliantly fought and implemented what turned out to be an obscure, contradictory, and finally nonexistent strategic end. Peace, in and of itself, is not necessarily a proper objective . . .p15".

To understand this we have to go back to Wylie's very broad definition of strategy: "A plan of action designed in order to achieve some end; a purpose together with a system of measures for its accomplishment."

Wylie's saying that we can judge a strategy in terms of both its purpose and the means used and come up with quite different conclusions. The means for instance can be applied effectively, while the purpose itself might not be achieved in the way it was intended. It's when you put both together that you get the full picture and that may indeed be mixed.

There is also another element in judging the effectiveness of a particular strategy that is implied by this quote. Wylie was writing over 20 years after the fact. In 1945 what looked like a resounding success looked more like still success, but with missed opportunities 20 years later. The way that a particular strategy plays out over time can vary much. Consider how the First Gulf War of 1990-91 is perceived today, or compare how it was perceived in 2003 with how it was seen in mid 1991.

As Clausewitz wrote in the first chapter of Book I of On War, In War the result is never final.

Spy vs. Spy: Beaver State Fathead Edition

So it turns out that I now know a total of something like a dozen people who were in Pioneer Square in downtown Portland when this fucking idiot thought he was committing an act of guerilla violence.

The following couple of days my Facebook page was littered with posts to the effect of "OMG! I was there! Thank you, FBI!" and appended with comments praising God and the solder (or FBI agent) whom we adore.

Perhaps it was because I hadn't the slightest interest is watching the lights go on a big fir tree so I was at home playing Jenga. Or perhaps its because I'm a nasty, cynical SOB by nature. But you'll excuse me if I beg off the universal congratulations to my government for catching the next Khalid Sheik Mohammad.

Because from what I understand;

1. This idiot did everything but wander around Corvallis wearing a T-shirt with a picture of Osama and the legend "I'm With Stupid".

2. Ignoring the First Rule of Internet Hookups ("The chance that the hot sixteen-year-old soliciting for no-holds-barred wild monkey sex over the Internet is actually either a vice cop trolling for morons or a 42-year-old pervert looking to get you to post pictures of your pecker approaches unity the longer you keep searching the Net for loli-porn") the idiot splattered the Web with his jihadi spam until the FBI was unable to continue to ignore him.

3. The feds then:
a. contacted Mohamud in a June 2010 e-mail under the guise of being a jihadi.
b. met with the guy multiple times, where he pushed them to help him with his nefarious plans. Supposedly the agents "cautioned Mohamud several times about the seriousness of his plan, noting that there would be many people, including children, at the event"
c. pretended to help him with logistics, including "assembling" the bomb and testing a smaller version somewhere in backass Lincoln County, Oregon.
d. appeared in a video with him to record his "mission statement".
e. picked up Mohamud to travel to Portland to finalize details of the attack.
f. set him in the seat of his bomb-van with several fake drums of pretend explosives in the back (which the idiot failed to check, proving that he was a no-go at the first performance test of walking-while-breathing, "You need to be smarter than your equipment") which he dropped off near the tree-lighting spot
g. let him make the detonating phone call - twice - and then busted him.

So excuse me if I'm not celebrating the takedown of the greatest criminal mastermind since Professor Moriarty. This moron Mohamud sounds like he might have spent the next five years in his bedroom playing the jihadi version of "Call of Duty" and eating cheetos if the FBI hadn't pretty much handed him the color-by-numbers handbook for would-be jihadi truck bombers. This wasn't fucking Tim McVeigh. This wasn't even your basic Palestinian pay-for-kaboom suicide bomber. This was a fucking idiot who didn't have the basic common sense to check the equipment his suddenly confiding new "friends" procured, engineered, assembled, transported, and emplaced for him.

Don't get me wrong. I'm glad this guy didn't kill anyone. I'm GLAD he is a fucking idiot.

But I'm reading the skittish Facebook responses from the people who were in the square that evening, and wondering what will happen the next time someone proposes some sort of additional security theatre, or profiling the Somali immigrant community, or loosening the entrapment laws, or some other sort of exchange of liberty for "security".

And, of course, demands that all response to the nose-led idiot be based on panic fear and reflexive condemnation rather than skepticism and the Rule of Law.

Or, even better, turns into lynch mob counter-terror and attacks on American muslims because...well...because, y'know, they're terrists!

Because if the study of history and politics has taught me anything, it has taught me that there is no practical limit to the damage to a society that the society can do to itself when prodded by a single idiot.

Update 11/28 p.m.: Greenwald has more, including the vexing details that the FBI 1) may not have actual evidence that the moron chose his moron path and was not entrapped in some form, 2) paid him as part of smoothing his path to Pioneer Square, and that 3) "Here we find one of the great mysteries in American political culture: that the U.S. Government dispatches its military all over the world -- invading, occupying, and bombing multiple Muslim countries -- torturing them, imprisoning them without charges, shooting them up at checkpoints, sending remote-controlled drones to explode their homes, imposing sanctions that starve hundreds of thousands of children to death -- and Americans are then baffled when some Muslims -- an amazingly small percentage -- harbor anger and vengeance at them and want to return the violence. And here we also find the greatest myth in American political discourse: that engaging in all of that military aggression somehow constitutes Staying Safe and combating Terrorism -- rather than doing more than any single other cause to provoke, sustain and fuel Terrorism."

Friday Jukebox: 16 тонн Edition

Posted without further comment.(h/t to Lawyers, Guns & Money)

Friday Fails

Happy Post Thanksgiving everyone, I hope your day was better than mine. I "Failed" in my pie making by forgetting to put sugar into my pumpkin pies...it was more of a "side dish" than pie, though my wife says maple syrup may salvage this one.
/sigh
Ah well, it was busy yesterday so I'm laughing it off, and moving on to today.

This one has been around on the net for a bit, so I was looking for a different pic to actually highlight the issue of designations, but this pic seemed the more popular one. So here you go, this weeks Friday Fail.

What's the opposite of "Miracle"?

Just a brief note to celebrate our latest victory over the Soviets; "(o)n Friday, the U.S.-led coalition will have been fighting in this South Asian country for as long as the Soviets did in their humbling attempt to build up a socialist state."U.S.A.! U.S.A.! U.S...

Hunh?

The Man Who Wasn't There; A Cautionary Tale

As I was walking up the stairI met a man who wasn't therehe wasn't there again todayI wish, I wish he'd stay away“It’s not him,” said a Western diplomat in Kabul intimately involved in the discussions. “And we gave him a lot of money.”
Now it is not good for the Christian's health to hustle the Aryan
brown,
For the Christian riles, and the Aryan smiles and he weareth the
Christian down;
And the end of the fight is a tombstone white with the name of
the late deceased,And the epitaph drear: "A Fool lies here who tried to hustle the East."