tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post5538258339531509434..comments2023-10-30T06:31:05.501-07:00Comments on MilPub: Starry, Starry NightFDChiefhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10607785969510234092noreply@blogger.comBlogger72125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-74144950445678802452013-10-09T14:07:10.293-07:002013-10-09T14:07:10.293-07:00Al,
I figured you were talking assets usually trai...Al,<br />I figured you were talking assets usually trained by the OSS.<br />On the eastern front the partisan units were usu under soviet guidance. Usually.<br />jimjim at rangerhttp://rangeragainstwar.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-3086033746117389522013-10-09T12:55:43.761-07:002013-10-09T12:55:43.761-07:00jim-
Hell, we worked with Joe, The Communist, Sta...jim-<br /><br />Hell, we worked with Joe, The Communist, Stalin. The objective was the defeat of Nazi Germany. Without the Soviets, the outcome could have been quite different.<br /><br />When I speak of partisans in the ETO, I am referring to pre D-Day activities, which tied down significant German forces. Disproportionately so, as Herr Hitler liked to go Roman, and restless natives were met with increased occupation forces.Aviator47https://www.blogger.com/profile/05585964386930142907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-35649467890824624692013-10-09T06:40:07.334-07:002013-10-09T06:40:07.334-07:00Al,
Wasn't Stilwell nation building in China ,...Al,<br />Wasn't Stilwell nation building in China ,India and Burma?<br />You are correct , of course, but any point is arguable in these wars.<br />I've decided and started a 2nd art on the Starry Night thread.<br />I'm going to do the macro rather than the micro approach used in this thread.<br />I think the whole thing boils down to the dynamic tension between mil and pol imperatives. <br />The UW of the WW2 variety like the pwot did NOT benefit the longer range strategic interests of the USA. The OSS worked with Communists largely in the ETO which was a tactical imperative that later led to left wing gov'ts gaining ascendancy. In the pwot we did the same short sighted approach with local thugs.<br />If we had zero UW/GW /OSS/SOE/ETO efforts we still would have won the maneuver war. Germany was slap played out.If we grounded our USAF after 1Jan 45 we still would have won, napalm or not.<br />All the uw stuff just gave the post war communists street cred.<br />I've always doubted that the French resistance was anything as wide spread as post war writings try to convince us.<br />jimrangeragainstwarhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02126542922536584950noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-85286527875928291422013-10-09T06:13:06.443-07:002013-10-09T06:13:06.443-07:00"We're still pretending that, too, since ..."We're still pretending that, too, since to stop kidding ourselves and other people about how do-able these little imperial wars are without outright butchery, chicanery, and callous pragmatism would be to admit that we really only have two choices; go Full Roman, or get out of the imperial business (largely) altogether."<br /><br />Right, Chief. This is where I blame the civilian leadership. It is they who have all of the squishy ideas about how these things can be done and they who impose the squishy ROE and nation building type tactics on the military.<br /><br />I have a theory that I'm working on that the growth of the CIA plays a role in all of this as well. <br /><br />I see the thinking behind the plan to arm Syrian rebels even after it is known that a substantial % of them - a controlling % - are jihadists as a the sine quo non of this stupidity.<br /><br />Yes. Kill them all, raise their villages and plow their earth with salt or stay home (I prefer stay home). If this was understood then there would not be units left with their asses hanging in the wind at places like Keating or Lang Vie.<br />no onehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01354534884958815612noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-26642574324171848822013-10-08T22:45:34.556-07:002013-10-08T22:45:34.556-07:00jim- WW2 could also apply as OSS was the UW/GW ar...jim- <i><b>WW2 could also apply as OSS was the UW/GW arm of the conventional commanders campaign plan just as it was in RVN and PWOT although to a lesser degree.</b></i><br /><br />I would be hard pressed to compare the UW of WWII to PWOT, and for that matter, RVN. In WWII, we were primarily assisting "resistance" movements of indigenous populations that wanted to throw off the mantle of the foreign occupier PRIOR TO applying conventional forces on the ground. Far cry from the mix of conventional and unconventional forces we are using to accomplish internal regime change or nation building.<br /><br />There was another operational reason for supporting resistance movements, and that was the German maneuver forces that were tied up dealing with the pesky partisans, and thus unavailable at the conventional fronts.Aviator47https://www.blogger.com/profile/05585964386930142907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-77875706001051752132013-10-08T15:02:26.886-07:002013-10-08T15:02:26.886-07:00Chief,
I disagree that the VN war does not apply t...Chief,<br />I disagree that the VN war does not apply to PWOT.<br />WE had nation building, containment of Commies or Islamists,conbined with conventional fights backed up by UW/GW campaigns. This seems pretty simple to me.<br />WW2 could also apply as OSS was the UW/GW arm of the conventional commanders campaign plan just as it was in RVN and PWOT although to a lesser degree. The template was there.<br />jimrangeragainstwarhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02126542922536584950noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-39485010707606924322013-10-08T14:32:11.871-07:002013-10-08T14:32:11.871-07:00"That's not to say that the only thing to...<i>"That's not to say that the only thing to consider is that Afghans/Somalis/Vietnamese/Iraqis/whoever all hate us more than life itself. But given the right conditions, they might just try to take your head off. And the right conditions involve a large cadre of militants and the perception that there is an opportunity to make the Americans pay."</i><br /><br />That's been the dilemma of imperial troops since the Athenians tried to bushwhack Syracuse, PFK, and, I would add, the story of imperial adventures since the first Sumerian god-king marched his troops through the mud-brick walls to add some "barbarian" province to his little empire.<br /><br />We miss the point here talking about Normandy and the "big wars". It didn't and doesn't matter what we did in Europe in '44 or even in Vietnam in '68; these wars weren't like those wars. The recent venues for the "war on terror", phony or otherwise, are all in the style of the older, earlier "little wars", the sort the U.S. used to fight in places like the Philippines, Haiti, and Guatemala. Read about those and you'll be amazed by two things:<br /><br />1) The degree to which they, too, were fought "on a shoestring" just as underfunded and under-analyzed as the current ones, and <br /><br />2) The degree to which they were fought with unremitting savagery. We're talking about all the old Roman methods; butchery, burning, "making a wasteland and calling it peace" combined with new bright ideas like concentration camps (for the PI).<br /><br />The thing was that, repugnant as those little wars were, they "worked" in the sense that they accomplished the U.S. objectives. And for the same reasons that those methods "worked" for the British, and before them every other successful imperialists like the Russians, the Spanish, and the Romans themselves; the lesson of guerrilla wars is if you are brutal enough, long enough, and are strong enough, you win.<br /><br />So I'd argue, rather, that "America's sin" was in beginning by pretending that rebellion suppression could be done and HAD been done using less-than-brutal methods. <br /><br />It wasn't that we didn't change course once that our "COIN" tactics/techniques had been <i>proven</i> to fail; it was that we knew before starting out that there was only one sure way to suppress a rebellion...and pretending otherwise.<br /><br />We're still pretending that, too, since to stop kidding ourselves and other people about how do-able these little imperial wars are without outright butchery, chicanery, and callous pragmatism would be to admit that we really only have two choices; go Full Roman, or get out of the imperial business (largely) altogether.<br /><br />We don't want to do the first (at least, nobody outside Dick Cheney's gun club does...) and we seem unwilling or unable to do the second. So...WASF.FDChiefhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10607785969510234092noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-50338946495233423822013-10-08T11:01:54.589-07:002013-10-08T11:01:54.589-07:00no one,
The thing you are forgetting is that in S...no one,<br /><br />The thing you are forgetting is that in Somalia and Afghanistan, our mission was not to "win" through war but to "win" by nation building. You cannot win that fight through planning for a total break.<br /><br />Just imagine if our police force behaved as though their precinct buildings might at any point in time might get besieged. You can't actually police under those conditions.<br /><br />As I see it, jim is very right in how the gwot is the pwot. We can't conduct nation building because we are/were besieged/in conflict/fighting hordes, but we are still committed to that model. America's sin here was not trying and failing. It was not changing course once it was obvious we had failed. <br /><br />PF KhansPF Khansnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-86458697863889163492013-10-08T10:55:13.903-07:002013-10-08T10:55:13.903-07:00I stand corrected, Allied bombers did use napalm i...I stand corrected, Allied bombers did use napalm in the ETO once during the siege of La Rochelle, two weeks prior to the end of the war.Aviator47https://www.blogger.com/profile/05585964386930142907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-50944519618967224792013-10-08T10:39:51.926-07:002013-10-08T10:39:51.926-07:00no one
I am well aware of the record of the Marin...no one<br /><br />I am well aware of the record of the Marine Air/Ground operations in WWII. I am also aware that there were days when the weather precluded air operations. Comparing 6 Jun 44 to every USMC landing and or total campaign in the Pacific, without looking at the weather is simply a non-starter. Air delivered napalm at Peleliu, BTW, did not commence until several days after the landings. <br /><br />As to inland clouds and ceilings on D-Day, the fighters were equally hindered until later in the day, as were the bombers.<br /><br />CAS was included in the plans for the D-Day landings. However, as is the case with all battles, actual circumstances sometimes trump plans. <br /><br />And, yes, USAAF forces in the ETO did not use napalm. At any time. I cannot provide an answer for that, other than there not having been a need prior to 6 Jun 44, so it was not a "normal" weapon in their arsenal. Napalm became common in the Pacific primarily due to the nature of the terrain, the Japanese defensive positions and the tenacity of Japanese defenders, who neither retreated nor surrendered.Aviator47https://www.blogger.com/profile/05585964386930142907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-3133178561340294982013-10-08T08:50:52.541-07:002013-10-08T08:50:52.541-07:00Aviator, I don't know the first thing about pi...Aviator, I don't know the first thing about piloting an aircraft. Also, I don't want to argue a tangent. I would just point out that CAS was used extensively in the Pacific going back as far as Tarawa, where strafing and bombing runs were conducted with some success danger close to Marines pinned down on the beach. By Peleliu, napalm was being dropped from a few hundred feet elevation on Jap caves a couple hundred yards to Marine assault troops' front. These are facts of the historic record. I have always wondered why, if Marine and Navy pilots could accomplish this, Army pilots supporting Overlord could not. Especially when Army pilots were busting up German columns inland with strafing, rocket and 100lb bomb attacks, on D-Day and, presumably with the same cloud cover/weather conditions. I always attributed the failure of CAS for the troops on the beach to the topics of this thread. Maybe I have missed some technical aspect.no onehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01354534884958815612noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-72536293789488259072013-10-08T07:24:12.439-07:002013-10-08T07:24:12.439-07:00jim- "The pwot was a shoestring opn from day...jim- <i><b>"The pwot was a shoestring opn from day 1 and was based on pie in the sky assumptions and mission planning. War on the cheap and all that bloviation."</b></i><br /><br />This is probably very close to the heart of the current day problem. Not just strategic and operational ignorance a la Westy, but the very limiting nature of "war on the cheap". In a mindset where contingency is heresy, everything that can go wrong will. Sadly, that mindset was doctrine throughout the Rumsnamara years, and lingers on. In his case, he was far too arrogant to consider that things may not go exactly as he planned, to include the actions of the opposing forces or indigenous population. In other players' cases, that has been the prevalent notion long enough to have become institutionalized.<br /><br />There is a big difference between thinking you have planned for every possible contingency, and being alert to respond to emerging and unexpected changes.Aviator47https://www.blogger.com/profile/05585964386930142907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-1153775659430831092013-10-08T05:56:50.903-07:002013-10-08T05:56:50.903-07:00PFK,
I think that you are touching a key point of ...PFK,<br />I think that you are touching a key point of all mil opns, and of personal life as well, which is missing in our present opns.<br />The pwot was a shoestring opn from day 1 and was based on pie in the sky assumptions and mission planning. War on the cheap and all that bloviation.<br /> I cite Tillmans death and the cowboy way that op was run as a fine example.<br />WE as milmen (thats a new word i just minted) should ALWAYS WORSE CASE PLAN. To discuss Als and no 1's discussion even OVERLORD was a worse case plan.<br />WE have lost that ability because we actually believe that we are exceptional and that god is on our side.Also we believe the sole superpower crap when a bunch of NVA/Somalis/Bandits or what ever atk'd Keating knock our d--ks in the dirt.<br />The first thing i ALWAYS look at is my escape plan if and when things go wrong. This is another way of saying contingency but we forget what the words mean.<br />I appreciate your input , all of you.<br />Just don't bunch up.<br />jimrangeragainstwarhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02126542922536584950noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-5102031365377872032013-10-08T03:53:54.739-07:002013-10-08T03:53:54.739-07:00no one: "Low cloud ceiling and concerns abou...no one: <i><b>"Low cloud ceiling and concerns about own fire casualties would disallow use of the big bombers, but smaller birds acting in a dive bomber type role could have delivered close air support of the type I call for. </b></i><br /><br />When you have had a chance to fly at 175 kts with no more than 1,500 ft ceilings and 1/4 to 1/2 mile visibility (without the smoke of the naval bombardment) in the early dawn, come back and discuss this claim again. <br /><br />Might also visit the CEP (based on angle of dive) of WWII "dive bombers", normal release altitudes and the like. Kinda hard to "dive" from 1,500 ft clouds.<br /><br />A bomb 100 feet off to the seaward from those emplacements on the buff would have been devastating to any troops moving forward. For the low level bombers to be able to approach the targets, all naval gunfire would have to be ceased. It's called a tradeoff. Planners knew that naval gunfire was "all weather" and could deliver steel on target. The weather was known to be questionable from a long time in advance. They chose a "bird in hand", and it worked.Aviator47https://www.blogger.com/profile/05585964386930142907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-19460440973610173472013-10-08T02:38:39.052-07:002013-10-08T02:38:39.052-07:00One more, by June 1944 it should have been obvious...One more, by June 1944 it should have been obvious from ample prior experience that naval bombardment alone would not sufficiently disrupt well dug in beach defenses. Napalm, OTOH, would. <br /><br />Commanders thought little of spending infantry blood on the beaches as long as there was enough fresh meat in reserve to keep invasions moving inland. no onehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01354534884958815612noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-35481488183377900582013-10-08T02:29:48.857-07:002013-10-08T02:29:48.857-07:00"Additionally, the invasion was more than jus..."Additionally, the invasion was more than just the beach landings and was being fought in depth - the kind of depth only air assets could provide. Thus, after the initial air bombardment of the beaches, air assets were shifted inland to block and disrupt reinforcing the defending forces."<br /><br />Here you are making one of points for me. Brave men die for lack of assets. <br /><br />If you don't have enough airplanes to fight an in depth action and provide CAS for the men on the beach, then you don't jump off the invasion.no onehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01354534884958815612noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-33357908187893456612013-10-08T02:23:12.058-07:002013-10-08T02:23:12.058-07:00Aviator, Nonsense. There were 300 yards from the w...Aviator, Nonsense. There were 300 yards from the water's edge to the machine gun nests and pill boxes on the bluffs. Ample distance between friend and foe for close air support. Sectors on Omaha Beach were untouched by pre-landing prep. In fact there was little to no pre-landing prep on several sectors. Low cloud ceiling and concerns about own fire casualties would disallow use of the big bombers, but smaller birds acting in a dive bomber type role could have delivered close air support of the type I call for. They could have been - should have been - in the air and ready on a moment's notice and they would have been effective against the German positions. This didn't happen not b/c it wasn't feasible, but b/c commanders did not believe it possible that Omaha was strongly defended by crack German units. A lack of imagination. Imagination not shaped by concerns for the lives of the brave men going into harm's way. A point in common with Lang Vie, Mog and Keating.no onehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01354534884958815612noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-15505969751456908482013-10-07T23:44:13.307-07:002013-10-07T23:44:13.307-07:00no one - Why were the bluffs above Omaha beach not...no one - <i><b>Why were the bluffs above Omaha beach not napalmed and otherwise neutralized by close air support/naval gunnery as assault troops moved in? </b></i><br /><br /><a href="http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/comnaveu/comnaveu-8.htm" rel="nofollow">The naval and air bombardment of the Normandy Beaches</a> was extensive. Close air support of the beaches was <a href="http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/d-day-message/images/landing-in-france.gif" rel="nofollow">hampered by low ceilings and poor visibility</a>, not to mention the low max ord of the naval gunfire. A major concern of fire support planners was fratricide - CAS being shot down by naval gunfire, and troops on the beach being hit by CAS. With low ceilings and haze, the use of napalm "close in" on cliff situated point targets would have been excessively risky. Nape, at the time, was more appropriate for area targets, not point targets, and any "short rounds" would have cascaded down the cliff face onto the assault force. <br />Overall, there was insufficient daylight for fighter bomber napalm operations to take place in the AO before the landings, particularly with the low ceilings and haze, and too much risk after the landings began.<br /><br />Additionally, the invasion was more than just the beach landings and was being fought in depth - the kind of depth only air assets could provide. Thus, after the initial air bombardment of the beaches, air assets were shifted inland to block and disrupt reinforcing the defending forces.Aviator47https://www.blogger.com/profile/05585964386930142907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-8233562395447795042013-10-07T19:46:32.994-07:002013-10-07T19:46:32.994-07:00PF Khans, " why should we expect a total brea...PF Khans, " why should we expect a total break?"<br /><br />I agree that, on any given day, I am wrong. However, in the long run, in the meta-analysis, I am right.<br /><br />I confess I have little appreciation for the strategic perspective of infantry types (OTOH, their courage and commitment, absolutely). To me they are just order following drones surfeit with displaced courage. Defend Lang Vie, Defend Keating, go into the city and grab a skinny.......aye aye Sir! Perhaps this is another way of saying what Jim has already stated.<br /><br />Your question is the exact reason for my own perspective. Commanders should expect - and prepare for - the "total break" you speak of b/c the total breaks always happen. Furthermore, The variables associated with such breaks are not not understood nor unobservable. <br /><br />Analysis/intelligence is not as "sexy" as the sands of Iwo Jima or, I suppose, the Army's equivalent, perhaps Bastogne or Normandy, so it tends to get ignored. <br /><br />Notice that actions with soldiers/Marines prevailing against almost impossible odds, with great casualties, is what's idolized by the mil/media establishment. There's a mindset there that needs to be called into question b/c it's insidious and pervasive.<br /><br />Why were the bluffs above Omaha beach not napalmed and otherwise neutralized by close air support/naval gunnery as assault troops moved in? Napalm, delivered by Thunderbolts and Mustangs, which was being used at that time in the Pacific would have effectively destroyed German defenses without risking Naval assets. Why were those troops left naked on the beach to be slaughtered by a few machine gun nests and gun emplacements? Why is this failure almost never mentioned? It's just another example. <br /><br />Commander are at least 50% politician and they and their 100% politician bedfellows just don't care about what kind of valor is wasted. <br /><br /><br />no onehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01354534884958815612noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-64193525866057047762013-10-07T10:56:55.996-07:002013-10-07T10:56:55.996-07:00So I think the really critical lack of understandi...So I think the really critical lack of understanding that afflicts US actions throughout the latest fights (not sure about Vietnam) is that we fail to understand that "no one" is both right and wrong simultaneously.<br /><br />We are at war with the entire Afghan or Somali or Iraqi population, but not always. The possibility exists at any of our bases that the locals are fed up and are willing to go to the mat over it.<br /><br />Who's expecting a mob of thousands of Somalis to come to the defense of a warlord? Why should we expect people to go up against gunships and artillery when they aren't really going to benefit from doing so?<br /><br />If I have "good" (read stable, non-hostile) relations with the locals, why should we expect a total break?<br /><br />I think that's what Black Hawk Down and Kamdesh really represented. A total bridge burn. We offered a hand (although really it was a mailed fist) and they attempted to bite it off.<br /><br />You don't win in those scenarios. The best you can do is remove yourself or kill the person. Neither of which wins a "hearts and minds"/"nation building" operation.<br /><br />But, the reality, is that these events are not "out of the blue" or surprising in their occurring, only in their fury. Threats of massed insurgents were very common. We knew that a big attack was coming, we all had intel suggesting an attack was imminent, but the biggest in the area had been 30-50 guys previously. <br />--<br />I think that as Americans we have a tendency to try and tackle a problem from a variety of view points. If an obstacle occurs, we attack it from one angle and then another in the hopes of overcoming it. We are taught to get back up if knocked down, always attempt to overcome. But we also are taught never to give into rage or to lash out against the obstacle. We forget that's an option. It surprises me because that's how the South used to act against blacks in the Jim Crow era. Lynch mobs are a poor approximation because of the vast difference in power that their victims had in comparison with the world's most powerful military. But the same rage fuels their actions. The same switch that holds society together gets switched off for some short bout of violent madness.<br /><br />It's hard to plan for that. But planning for that misses the point. Someone was going to die at that base even if it wasn't an overwhelming attack. No one was benefiting from us being their besides some generals and presidents, and since they were all claiming it was for the people, it was wrong to keep us there until someone died. Jim's right that there were huge breaking point in reality and the plan and truth be told, the aftermath of Keating is nauseatingly demonstrative of that fact. But anticipating that the guy who smiled at you one day will send his whole family to try and kill you the next day despite knowing you'll destroy it all is really really hard.<br /><br />That's not to say that the only thing to consider is that Afghans/Somalis/Vietnamese/Iraqis/whoever all hate us more than life itself. But given the right conditions, they might just try to take your head off. And the right conditions involve a large cadre of militants and the perception that there is an opportunity to make the Americans pay.<br /><br />PF KhansPF Khansnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-2858224111783062682013-10-07T05:59:51.894-07:002013-10-07T05:59:51.894-07:00jim- Where is the breaking point between reality ...jim- <i><b>Where is the breaking point between reality and illusion in staff planning at any level of command.?</b></i><br /><br />An old boating buddy of mine, the late RADM Jack Christiansen, might have offered the answer to your question.<br /><br /><i>"There is a world of difference in the skills and thinking required to charge into combat, lead troops into combat and ultimately <b>send</b> troops into combat. It is that last category where we seem to be losing the requisite mindset and skill. If those of us who send troops into combat merely think as we did when charging and leading into combat, our troops are going to suffer horribly."</i><br /><br />Jack was a Navy Enlisted Pilot in WWII, where he was awarded the Navy Cross. He never forgot his humble beginnings.Aviator47https://www.blogger.com/profile/05585964386930142907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-62076583368831655562013-10-05T12:52:58.882-07:002013-10-05T12:52:58.882-07:00True, since he's been talking so loud for so l...True, since he's been talking so loud for so long that sometimes he's hard to read, still not a bad analysis . . . to be taken with other stuff, other sources . . . along with the systems, limits, confusions, tangled interests and all the rest . . . in order to come to a hopelessly incomplete view of the political relations at this point in time. seydlitz89https://www.blogger.com/profile/15431952900333460640noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-4461128142110166482013-10-05T05:34:17.679-07:002013-10-05T05:34:17.679-07:00To all,
Heroism wasted is insanity. Going back to ...To all,<br />Heroism wasted is insanity. Going back to the ideas of KvC or prin of war.<br />I don't imagine that either system espouses wasting soldiers lives or energies pursuing unattainable objectives.<br />Maybe we need another prin stating this explicitly.<br />In my 3 examples all had a MOH recipient or double recipients.All that valor and for what?<br />The dead of both sides are the point of my essay.<br />What did we achieve?I know i'm a broken record but why or how does this longitudinal insanity and abject professionalism keep biting our soldiers on the ass?<br />Where is the breaking point between reality and illusion in staff planning at any level of command.?<br />In my early essays i discuss assumptions v reality.<br />jimrangeragainstwarhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02126542922536584950noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-74943640910831965012013-10-05T05:19:40.765-07:002013-10-05T05:19:40.765-07:00Aviator,
i used to call US mil policy in Nato-THE ...Aviator,<br />i used to call US mil policy in Nato-THE FIELD ARMY IN THE AMBUSH.<br />To my memory we used active defense in the ALB.<br />jimrangeragainstwarhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02126542922536584950noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-17967390572456763262013-10-04T22:35:05.786-07:002013-10-04T22:35:05.786-07:00no one: With AD the Soviets were NOT actually enga...no one: With AD the Soviets were NOT actually engaged in *combat* with us<br /><br />Not sure what notion of "Active Defense you are speaking of.<br /><br />The TRADOC doctrine of "Active Defense" that we were taught and trained to was the maneuver doctrine adopted to deal with a Soviet invasion of Europe. Mercifully, it was replaced by "AirLand Battle Doctrine" in the early 80's.Aviator47https://www.blogger.com/profile/05585964386930142907noreply@blogger.com