tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post4545298814361402899..comments2023-10-30T06:31:05.501-07:00Comments on MilPub: A Clausewitzian View of the Current Conscription Debate in the US - Part IIIFDChiefhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10607785969510234092noreply@blogger.comBlogger58125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-87702227035677669152014-01-23T16:17:37.405-08:002014-01-23T16:17:37.405-08:00Ran across this today, which is pretty interesting...Ran across this today, which is pretty interesting:<br /><br />http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/10/05/war-and-sacrifice-in-the-post-911-era/paul-taylor-slideshow/<br />Andynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-9952851423977243192014-01-22T05:04:48.840-08:002014-01-22T05:04:48.840-08:00Andy-
You're anticipating part of my conclusi...Andy-<br /><br />You're anticipating part of my conclusion well . . .<br /><br />In my view Plattsburg's really the key perspective which adequately explains everything else . . . "demise of the armory" included . . .seydlitz89https://www.blogger.com/profile/15431952900333460640noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-6289657193552800352014-01-22T04:28:45.599-08:002014-01-22T04:28:45.599-08:00Cont........
Am I saying BRAC was wrong? No, but ...Cont........<br /><br />Am I saying BRAC was wrong? No, but the "intangible" impacts of BRAC on Army RC recruiting and retention, for example, were not part of the formulas used. Similarly, the sociological impact of The Armory marching off into oblivion was never discussed. They are just buildings, after all, and at least for me, their status as social institutions didn’t fully register until they began to disappear. The Armory was as much a given as the local high school. Civilian economic impacts of closing, and mitigation/recovery plans received the higher level attention. Ask anyone over the age of 60 about “The Armory” and all that went on there, and you will hear tales of social function nowhere addressed in BRAC studies..<br /><br />Nor am I suggesting that the BRAC should have viewed this from a “social engineering” standpoint. I will, however, suggest that BRAC’s handling of The Armory resulted in an unintended form of social engineering, via the rapid and wide spread deconstruction of a somewhat significant element of social structure.<br /><br />Overall, we have 1) done a lousy job of separating causes from effects, 2) failed to realize that some effects can become unanticipated downstream causes, 3) focused more on "answers" without rigorously identifying the appropriate questions, 4) assumed that numbers are the answers to all questions.<br /><br />Exactly why American society began to reject military service as a civil responsibility can be debated ad nauseum. However, in an effort to avoid inconveniencing those who held such beliefs, including increasing "efficiency", I would offer that the military and national policy makers unwittingly went out of their way to reinforce the notion that an insular, volunteer, non-representative military "works".<br /><br />As you noted, <i><b>“Along those lines, with respect to moving the Army and Air Force to the reserve component, I think there would need to be significant reforms in how the reserves are managed to make that happen.” </b></i>Even more profound an issue, IMHO, would be the magnitude of the task of getting the civilian population to accept the massive encroachment on land now in their domain to accommodate such a shift, as I doubt the current “insular” Reserve training center approach could support this structure shift for the Army side of the house, even with massive financial incentives. We don’t build Armories in “silk stocking neighborhoods” any more, nor do we even recruit from those neighborhoods. Further, since “The Armory’s” retreat into history’s dust bin, new brick and mortar facilities arose to house the sociological functions that were performed by them, so they have no social “need” to return. It will be pure and simple exercise in <b>NIMBY.</b>Aviator47https://www.blogger.com/profile/05585964386930142907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-85343628118473211282014-01-22T02:23:14.199-08:002014-01-22T02:23:14.199-08:00Andy-
I tend to agree that the societal issues ca...Andy-<br /><br />I tend to agree that the societal issues cannot be "fixed", as people do not change until they face a compelling reason to do so. The general tendency is that societies, as do people, do what they perceive "works". The sociologically confounding factor is determining the definition of "works". <br /><br />The "demise of the Armory" would make a great sociological study. BTW, some of the grandest of them, such as the 7th Regiment Armory in NYC, were constructed totally with private funds and were not only architecturally exquisite, but functionally so as well. And, whether "grand" or not, as I said above, "The Armory" was ubiquitous and a joint military-community venture. While discussing this series of threads with my wife, she agreed that “The Armory” was a significant element of her home town of Spokane, WA. <br /><br />Whether or not The Armory as a local societal institution could have survived is impossible to determine. The number crunching of BRAC determined that the "cost/benefit ratio" of the ubiquitous Armories was inefficient, so consolidation began, and of course, the larger troop populations to support per Armory influenced location, typically placing them more and more remote from the general population. All that was required to maintain strength was to offset the economic costs of longer distances to drill periods was money, in the form of higher pay, mileage to drills being a tax deduction, paid “Admin drills” and "Living in Kind" facilities (billets and mess). Some of the "human costs" of Reservists being further removed from their unit was offset by higher levels of full time manning, but this was defined as a "readiness" issue. Thus, a more and more insular Reserve Component could be justified in terms of “cost efficiency”. We cannot quantify the loss of that "hometown identity and bonding" that was a long standing element of "The Armory”, no less personnel costs of leaders not being able to “swing by” on the way home from work to attend to simple matters, thus leaving them frustrated and overloaded. After all, the Air and Naval Reserve Components (albeit significantly smaller) had successfully used “consolidated” training centers quite well, although they tended to be quite convenient to urban populations. What was important was that numbers could be generated to say the insular RC training center “works”, as personnel costs are accounted for independent of operating costs, and social costs are not able to be expressed on a balance sheet. And, the non-military, sociological roles of The Armory were now housed elsewhere, or in the now locally owned former armory building, and thus completely absent from the ledgers.<br /><br />To be continued<br />Aviator47https://www.blogger.com/profile/05585964386930142907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-37771967388790620152014-01-21T17:44:09.510-08:002014-01-21T17:44:09.510-08:00Al and Chief,
That's a good overview of some ...Al and Chief,<br /><br />That's a good overview of some of the issues facing the reserve component and they are just a few of the areas that need reform in order to make the RC sustainable long-term, particularly a larger RC force. <br /><br />Back to the original post for a minute, I neglected to point out the ongoing theme in the post is thematically similar to many other posts and comments. I still have this one bookmarked:<br /><br />http://milpubblog.blogspot.com/2010/11/hot-for-teacher-ii-hakkaa-paalle.html<br /><br />...which has one has one of my favorite Seydlitz quotes in the comments:<br /><br />"The second set concerns specific American problems which are closely tied with changes in American society and especially imo with the collapse of both Liberalism/Progressivism and Conservativism as political ideologies. From the "Left", a lot of the good intentions of mass education or more broadly, the Square, New and Fair "Deals" as well as the "Great Society" coupled with modern notions of "progress" have eroded traditional authority - be it parents, churches, teachers and communities, and replaced it with . . . well nothing really. The state as in bureaucratic control, be it education or social services or whatever, has been unable to fill the void.<br /><br />The less said about what has become of Conservativism in America the better. Any practical view of politics or of state responsibility has been sunk in a morass of corruption, self-interest, racism and blind ideology which sees the state as simply the steel fist of the elite to enforce their version of "order" or as a milk cow for their narrow interests."<br /><br />Elsewhere Seydlitz mentions American society as a "mass of atomized and propagandized pulp" which I think is an accurate description.<br /><br />So, seen in that context, the problems Al describes regarding society's view toward military service (as contrasted with earlier generations) is a symptom of this larger problem. It can't be fixed, as Dana Milbank and so many others suggest, through conscription or compulsory national service. As I said before, these people have the causality backwards and their ideas are little more than wishful thinking.Andynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-54545785417509876022014-01-20T13:19:05.716-08:002014-01-20T13:19:05.716-08:00Here's another aspect that may play into this;...Here's another aspect that may play into this; the almost simultaneous change in the nature of the wars the U.S. has fought since 1952 and the nature of the way that most Western kids are being brought up to think about Western history.<br /><br />Since Korea the Atlantic powers - and I include the northern Europeans here, too - have fought mostly "little wars" and many of those wars have been for lack of a better word straight-out, old-fashioned Imperial wog-bashing. The closest any of them came to a "real" war (in the sense that most of the first-world participant residents thought of as "real war" seen through their WW2-memory-hole) was the Second Gulf War in '91 - which, of course, turned out to be just a little more mechanized wog-bashing.<br /><br />The simple fact is that the polities and organizations that the U.S. and the NATO powers have been fighting have been at best some pretty run-down Second World nations and at worst little more than tribes with flags or raggedy-assed jihadis.<br /><br />At the same time pretty much every Westerner outside the Cheney household has been brought up without the old-fashioned enjoyment of "Western Conquest". I know my kids get taught the contradictions of the European wog-bashing that produced the U.S., Mexico, etc. as well as the wider issues of Western invasions of various parts of Asia and Africa that have produced the complex issues there.<br /><br />There's not much "glory" seen in bashing wogs anymore - again, outside of the usual suspects. It's seen pretty much as baby-killing on an adult scale, not much better than working in a slaughterhouse or clubbing feral dogs for a living. <br /><br />Nasty, brutal, - you can get killed doing it - but not really a fair fight. Nothing "glorious" or "honorable" about it; it's just too one-sided to celebrate.<br /><br />When you look at it that way there's more "honor" in defeating the top-level opponents in your XBOX game; at least they come at you with equal or better technical and tactical wherewithal!<br /><br />Jim at RAW every so often talks about how we (U.S. society "we") no longer bother with individual heroism from these little wars; nobody outside of a small self-selected group knows or cares who is decorated. Medal of Honor winners are practically anonymous outside the services themselves.<br /><br />And I think that ties into this. I think that the general public - for all it idolizes servicepeople in the abstract - has the sense that this is the Seattle Seahawks playing West Jipip High School. The guys from the big industrial nations are just punching the clock, just putting in another day at work killing wogs like slaughtering beef cattle or clubbing feral dogs.FDChiefhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10607785969510234092noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-69898304863208208542014-01-20T08:07:32.660-08:002014-01-20T08:07:32.660-08:00seydlitz-
I would still offer that the sea change...seydlitz-<br /><br />I would still offer that the sea change in attitude between Plattsburg and today towards military service and conscription received a boost from public policy makers in politically responding to the general objections towards the Viet Nam War which gave rise to our being, amongst other things, "baby killers" in the public discourse. It was a great enough societal "significant emotional experience" to have a major impact on values in a variety of ways. Similar to how the Great Depression reshaped American values.<br /><br />I wonder if the resulting change in values is, in part, that the Plattsburg "generation" valued military service, while today's population simply idolizes it. Participatory versus vicarious, and it will only get more vicarious with xBox, smart phones and iPads capturing a major portion of the society's "interactive" attention. <a href="http://archive.ncsa.illinois.edu/prajlich/forster.html" rel="nofollow">E.M. Forster told a chilling and prescient tale</a> of such dependency in 1909. One of my favorites.Aviator47https://www.blogger.com/profile/05585964386930142907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-24161047097395883402014-01-20T07:43:24.907-08:002014-01-20T07:43:24.907-08:00A little interesting diversion to manpower managem...A little interesting diversion to manpower management. After Pearl Harbor conscription terms of service were "For the duration plus 6 months", or effectively indefinite, and volunteers enlisted for the contractual length or "duration plus six", whichever was greater.<br /><br />As a byproduct of the Air Corps' requirement for a high proportion of higher mental level accessions to handle the higher technical level of their maintenance and operations tasks, the Ground Forces, who also had billets requiring higher mental category accessions came up with an even more specialized notion, The Army Technical Specialists Program, which is mentioned in the paper about the 106th Div linked above. This was going to be the Army's enlisted technical "creme de la creme", and several thousand soldiers, volunteer and conscript were entered into it. One such soldier was a fellow I knew, who, in late 1942, at age 18 enlisted, tested high and was sent of to be an ATSP "Master Ordnance Technician".<br /><br />Now, the story is best told by Nick, himself, a 5 ft 6 inch, exuberant, quick witted, first generation Lebanese-American from Jersey City, NJ. But I will give it a go.<br /><br />No one was more surprised than Nick when he was told he was selected to attend one of the Army's most technically challenging programs. He did quite well in high school, but he was raised to think that such was simply what he was required to do, and after the War, he was hoping to go to college, if he had the financial ability. He was a bit disappointed that he would spend two years in training before he could kill some bad guys, and even more so doing it indirectly, rather than in the more glorious manner shown in recruiting posters and movies, but his mom had told him to "be obedient", and off he went.<br /><br />Now, at the time Nick told me the story, he was a successful graduate chemist, so he had a civilian educational experience from which to describe his Army training. He said it was the equivalent of a "Bachelors and Masters Plus" in the theory, fabrication, calibration, trouble shooting and repair of anything that launched a deadly object at the enemy. "I became a one man depot level of knowledge and hands-on skill for virtually every projectile firing weapon in the Army. I haven't been so smart about any one thing since". <br /><br />Nick graduated in Fall 1944 as a T-SSGT and was sent to the European Theater. I don't remember which Division he was sent to, but as he said, the last thing they needed in terms of a replacement was a one man depot level master ordnance man. So he ended up in DIV Arty as a fire direction NCO, a skill he had to gain on the job, which, thanks to a good mentor and his native ability, he did. <br /><br />As the 106th Div paper noted, this was the fate of many ATSP grads, but at least in Nick's case, not as an under trained for the job, front line grunt.Aviator47https://www.blogger.com/profile/05585964386930142907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-75896090978639221942014-01-20T03:43:20.043-08:002014-01-20T03:43:20.043-08:00Al-
Very much like the way the thread has develop...Al-<br /><br />Very much like the way the thread has developed . . .<br /><br />Plattsburg is quite different, but the same country, even the same elite more or less, waging war in pursuit of specific - if murky - political purposes . . . The background to both conflicts share some similarities, but then the contrasts really start to stand out . . . conscription supplies a very useful lens in order to distinguish the types of military seen as necessary both in 1917 and in 2001. It is also interesting to consider the close similarities in attitudes towards conscription between Prussia in 1813 and the US in 1917. <br /><br />I'll supply my own conclusions with a postscript maybe around the end of the week.<br /><br />A view from George Orwell (1939) . . .<br /><br />http://www.marxists.org/archive/orwell/1939/democracy-army.htm seydlitz89https://www.blogger.com/profile/15431952900333460640noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-79122912133601408712014-01-20T00:17:24.065-08:002014-01-20T00:17:24.065-08:00Chief-
There are several student papers from the ...Chief-<br /><br />There are several student papers from the Army War College addressing the issues you mention about the ORARNG. The general response of DOD/NGB to training centers moving further and further away from the population has been to throw more money to it. Enlistment bonuses in the Army RC have averaged higher than the AC, and soldiers live more than a certain distance from the reserve center are provided "room and board" in kind or cash. <br /><br />However, the billeting and meals do not compensate for the time spent in traveling long distances to drills and administrative or training prep chores, and as some studies have shown, LTs and CPTs are dropping out of the Army RC because the time demands of their unit, as well as required military education are excessive at that point in the development of their civilian careers and demands of family life. A Reservist's physical and/or mental involvement in his Reserve assignment is not confined to 0800 Saturday to 1700 the next Sunday once per month. And making training centers more removed from the individual has extended those hours for many to immediately following work on Friday through well after dinner time on Sunday to accommodate the long drive involved.<br /><br />However, these are simply impacts of trying to reign in the significantly increased personnel costs of a smaller and smaller AVF. Consolidated training centers provide economies of scale. Using military bases for Reserve Centers provides access to existing billeting and mess facilities. Unfortunately, decisions such as these come from cost accountants, not sociologists. <br /><br />There is another aspect of the old time ubiquitous "Armory". It was not just some place were people disappeared to attend drills. It was a social center for the surrounding community. It was where a multitude of non-military community organizations met and often the site for parties, dances and celebrations. Back in my day, colleges in NYC would have their larger social events in the huge halls of the 7th and 69th Regiment Armories. The Navy and Marine Corps Training Center in New Rochelle, NY also provided facilities for non-military use in the southeast corner of Westchester County. As teens, we went to dances, wrestling matches, concerts and fairs at "The Armory". "The Armory's" design and facilities often reflected the socio-economic fabric of the surrounding populace. Queen Elizabeth and Prince Phillip were received at a gala at the 7th Regiment Armory in NYC in 1957, for example. And that Armory was well equipped for the task. When I visited relatives in other parts of the country, "The Armory" served the same iconic function. Across the country, "The Armory" was a part of the fabric of every day life, in many ways, erasing the boundary between things military and things civilian. Those days and many of those Armories are long gone and the military is moving further and further away from society, or society is moving further and further away from the military. I am not sage enough to claim knowledge of what cause and effect relationships are at play, but the correlation is clear as day. However, I doubt that we have the remotest chance of an action similar to the late 1800's directive of the NY State government that every county build Armories sufficient to support their local militia formations.Aviator47https://www.blogger.com/profile/05585964386930142907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-33997975211779832552014-01-19T22:39:17.564-08:002014-01-19T22:39:17.564-08:00seydlitz-
Plattsburg is indicative of a very diff...seydlitz-<br /><br />Plattsburg is indicative of a very different cultural norm. At that same time Capt. William Moffett, Commander of Naval Training Station, Great Lakes, was able to form an Aviator Training Program and subsequent Aviation Machinist Mates School, at no expense to the government! He simply approached wealthy Chicagoans, such as William Wrigley, Jr, who provided an aircraft or two, paid the instructors, operating expense, etc and encouraged their offspring to participate in pilot training that would lead Moffett to commission them in the Naval Air Reserve. Once a squadron of pilots were trained, Moffet established, again without Navy funding, the Aviation Machinist Mates School, using the donated aircraft and civilian mechanics.<br /><br />But that was a different time, and the military not only had a different image, but was not claiming it was the "best trained, most powerful force in the world", without the need for everyone to participate. Upon thinking of Ael's "marketing" comments, perhaps the military's zeal to prove they could be successful with the AVF contributed to the diminution of general involvement?Aviator47https://www.blogger.com/profile/05585964386930142907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-38667360875040208062014-01-19T17:24:36.295-08:002014-01-19T17:24:36.295-08:00More on Plattsburg . . .
http://www.worldwar1.com...More on Plattsburg . . .<br /><br />http://www.worldwar1.com/tgws/rel011.htmseydlitz89https://www.blogger.com/profile/15431952900333460640noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-25410078367370004122014-01-19T16:02:55.550-08:002014-01-19T16:02:55.550-08:00And here's another thing to think about while ...And here's another thing to think about while we're talking about this.<br /><br />I don't know what's happening in other places, but in Oregon both the Guard and Reserve are disappearing from the civilian population areas.<br /><br />Here's just an example. When I was in the USAR I drilled at a reserve center in North Portland. It was home station to two USAR units; a battalion of 104th Division (Training) and a ribbon bridge company. Both units have been moved, the 104th to California, the ribbon bridge to Ft. Lewis. The reserve center is currently empty.<br /><br />The USAR had another unit in Multnomah Village; that unit has been moved in with another unit in Lake Oswego and the reserve center sold to Verizon Wireless.<br /><br />Meanwhile my old Guard artillery unit has folded one battery and centralized the other two with the HHSB way the hell out in Forest Grove.<br /><br />The WAARNG mech FA battalion that was stationed at Vancouver Barracks has been moved up to FLWA, the USAR hospital has, as well, and every time the BRAC meets Vancouver Barracks is proposed for closure.<br /><br />So what I'm saying is that a LOT of these little companies and batteries in the Guard and Reserve are disappearing from the communities that they used to be a part of. Yes, I understand that its more efficient for them to drill at Ft. Lewis, or all at one big armory or reserve center rather than dozens of little ones. But the cumulative effect is to further remove the regular day-to-day interactions of the reservists and guardsmen from the civilians around them...FDChiefhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10607785969510234092noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-63300128875970038072014-01-19T15:37:45.146-08:002014-01-19T15:37:45.146-08:00Ael: Here is something else to think about: Peopl...Ael: <i><b>Here is something else to think about: People live up to (and down to) expectations. They try hard to fit into social norms. Promoters of national cohesion exploit this behaviour by establishing nationalistic actions as socially accepted (and even desired) behaviour.</b></i><br /><br />In my more cynical moments, I think the "national norm" concerning military service is to let the other guy do it, especially amongst the higher socio-economic population. Our colleges and universities have not been producing sufficient volunteers to meet new Lieutenant needs of an Active and Reserve Army of continually decreasing size for about 15 years, to include several years of poor civilian employment opportunities. <br /><br />So, yes, something is going on in the US, and it doesn;t appear to be favorable to military recruitment.Aviator47https://www.blogger.com/profile/05585964386930142907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-19423916328395879492014-01-19T15:36:23.612-08:002014-01-19T15:36:23.612-08:00Seydlitz's "Plattsburg" is the sort ...Seydlitz's "Plattsburg" is the sort of thing I was talking about, and rather than a pure one-off sort of thing that occurred as a response to the mass mobilization of WW2 it was pretty much the given in the U.S. prior to (I'm guessing) about the Sixties.<br /><br />About that time the social elite stopped being a "social elite"; that is, the well-bred white people from the nice side of town (who, up to that point, had provided the U.S. version of the English "gentry"; justices of the peace, county commissioners, magistrates in peacetime, colonels and majors and captains in war) lost the automatic social acceptance as leaders. They didn't actually lose their political or social influence, just their accepted and traditional place in the social pyramid.<br /><br />That loss worked both ways, I think; without the automatic expectation of leadership the automatic <i>assumption</i> of the responsibilities of becoming leaders went bye-bye.<br /><br />The social upheaval ended up, bizarrely, throwing up a "greed is good" sort of "elite"; based purely on wealth. And, since all you needed to be in the 1% was money, you'd be a fool to risk your wealth getting shot in some pointless little fucking colonial war leading the sons of the 47%...<br /><br />Again, not sure of this; just my personal suspicion and head-scratching...FDChiefhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10607785969510234092noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-63498187731095757302014-01-19T14:41:27.392-08:002014-01-19T14:41:27.392-08:00Conscription, whether it was "successful"...Conscription, whether it was "successful" or not is a dead issue until the US faces a real threat/mission that volunteerism cannot adequately respond to. <br /><br />As to increased reliance on the RC, in the ground forces arena there are three less than encouraging trends. <br /><br />1)The various state's National Guard per capita strength is far from equal. For example Alabama has 276 Guardsmen/100K population, Georgia has 140/100k and New York 83/100k. The allocation of troop units (and thus strength) has been made based on ability to fill units with volunteers, and that varies greatly across the country and totally depended on local trends on support. The RC can only draw from a relatively local population. <br /><br />2) The Guard and Reserve have had to lower standards to maintain strength, while studies in the 90's showed that unit readiness was directly related to quality of troops. <br /><br />3) Even with relaxed standards for accessions and professional military education requirements, the Army Reserve has not been able to fill their LT, CPT and MAJ billets. <br /><br />Will moving more of the force structure to the RC exacerbate these problems? After all, we are talking about "starting from scratch" to activate more RC structure.<br /><br />It's a complex issue, and we really haven't done a sterling job of it so far, and are totally dependent upon volunteerism to get the job done.Aviator47https://www.blogger.com/profile/05585964386930142907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-19338914521337443982014-01-19T11:26:13.213-08:002014-01-19T11:26:13.213-08:00My point about Prince Harry was not a British vs A...My point about Prince Harry was not a British vs American thing.<br /><br />I was merely trying to illustrate that there is a lot of internal variability within what is normally termed "elites" and that the analysis degrades when you lump them all into a single pot called "Elites".<br /><br />Here is something else to think about: People live up to (and down to) expectations. They try hard to fit into social norms. Promoters of national cohesion exploit this behaviour by establishing nationalistic actions as socially accepted (and even desired) behaviour.<br /><br />A couple of centuries ago, it was relatively rare to have people actively involved in monkeying with social norms. (there was the church, some nationalist revolutionaries and a few merchants.<br /><br />Today, we are constantly bombarded by all sorts of efforts to modify our social expectations. Marketing science has gotten very sophisticated and much effort is spent in psychological experiments to determine what works and does not work.<br /><br />How does living in an ocean of advertising impact our cohesion as a society? Certainly, the Iraq war was marketed very successfully, at least in the early stages. However, the marketing could not be maintained. <br /><br />I wonder if conscription could be sustainably marketed over the long haul, especially with so many other voices clamouring for attention.Aelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10788190394672505925noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-91687281818905901632014-01-19T10:15:54.437-08:002014-01-19T10:15:54.437-08:00Looking at the concept of political "elite&qu...Looking at the concept of political "elite" in regards to conscription in the US, I think the (de)evolution of any moral/material cohesion since 1917 of this group/attitude is significant. <br /><br />Plattsburg represents much more than simply mobilization since the well-to-do at the time paid their own expenses for the basic military officer training they received. Consider that Prescott Bush, typifying what is meant by "Plattsburg" and GWB's grandfather, volunteered for the Conn. National Guard in 1916 and served as an artillery captain in the AEF at the Meuse-Argonne. It is difficult to see much or any connection between Prescott Bush's attitude towards service and the country, let alone the elite he represented, and the attitude/antics of GWB in the Texas State Air Guard or his attempting to pass himself off as a semi-literate redneck . . . <br /><br />Plattsburg is of course not limited to conscription as I mentioned above and I link it as well with "Fordism" which was essentially the US corporate response to the Bolshevik challenge. Fordism had a distinct social element promoting "family values" and sobriety. Keep the workers happy and they wouldn't join the unions was part of the basic message. This or more widely, Stakeholder Capitalism (as William Pfaff has referred to it) was dominate from the 1930s to the 1970s . . . when it was replaced by the slash, burn, scam and cash in variety prevalent in the US today . . . seydlitz89https://www.blogger.com/profile/15431952900333460640noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-31084013289535900762014-01-19T08:33:05.915-08:002014-01-19T08:33:05.915-08:00BTW, interesting article on the Army's return ...BTW, interesting article on the Army's return to garrison life:<br /><br />http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/19/us/after-years-at-war-the-army-adapts-to-garrison-life.html?hp&_r=0<br />Andynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-209722841462799292014-01-19T08:30:28.029-08:002014-01-19T08:30:28.029-08:00Al,
I understand about the elites from 75 years a...Al,<br /><br />I understand about the elites from 75 years ago, but society, not just elites, is fundamentally different today. While we certainly can and should look at that history, I think the those historical lessons are of limited utility simply because our circumstances and society are so much different. In short, there is no political support for conscription even if we needed it, which we don't....unless we plan to keep fighting long land wars in Asia.<br /><br />Note that I'm not against conscription per se, and I think it is a good tool should it become necessary. For me, however, the value of conscription is about military necessity and IMO our military manpower requirements will go down in the future, not up.<br /><br />We do not need a substantial active land force at home to defend the territory of United States, so it seems to the question is what kind of force do we need for overseas duty? Our standing requirements dropped dramatically and probably will continue to drop, so that leaves us with contingencies. What we need depends on our assumptions and how much risk we're willing to take. <br /><br />Along those lines, with respect to moving the Army and Air Force to the reserve component, I think there would need to be significant reforms in how the reserves are managed to make that happen. The reserve component is still organized as a strategic reserve even though it's been managed as an operational reserve force for many years. I think this mismatch is at the root of a lot of the reserve component's problems.<br /><br />More than that, I think the entire defense bureaucracy needs a good scrubbing - we are still organized on the late 1940's industrial model with 70 years of incremental change piled on top. As a DoD civilian who works for a reserve unit, I deal with the structural and organizational issues everyday.<br /><br />Unfortunately, "good government" and government reform, like so much else, has fallen out of fashion (unless it's rearranging pucks on an org chart) and it's another problem that our elites are not remotely interested in addressing....<br /><br />Andynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-90213728398255753922014-01-19T05:52:50.964-08:002014-01-19T05:52:50.964-08:00And, a look at how successful the AVF has been in ...And, a look at how successful the AVF has been in terms of Army Reserve officer ranks. Several papers to choose from<br /><br /><a href="http://lmgtfy.com/?q=usar+lieutenant+shortage" rel="nofollow"><b>CLICKY</b></a><br /><br />It ain't all milk and honeyAviator47https://www.blogger.com/profile/05585964386930142907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-39863033053599448612014-01-19T04:27:18.325-08:002014-01-19T04:27:18.325-08:00For a very interesting look at force generation st...For a very interesting look at force generation stumbles, The analysis of the "cadre" 106th Division is a very worthwhile read.<br /><br />http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a251307.pdfAviator47https://www.blogger.com/profile/05585964386930142907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-39174765782151233592014-01-19T03:26:39.550-08:002014-01-19T03:26:39.550-08:00Andy-
Not sure an RC maneuver division can be &qu...Andy-<br /><br />Not sure an RC maneuver division can be "mobilized" and then deployed in a year, as that has never really been done. WWII NG divisions did not enter combat in under two years, but then, there were no combat operations to enter at an earlier date. By the time many of these divisions shipped overseas, the personnel rolls hardly resembled that of M-Day. In Korea, the period between M-Day and arrival in Korea was also about 2 years, but the data on final personnel composition is not as easy to find.<br /><br />Could these deployments have been faster? Really hard to tell, as there was no "pressure" for it. However, in both wars, significant numbers of conscripts and non NG enlistees/officers were required to bring the divisions up to strength and readiness standards. The NG divisions "worked" because they had access to a broad pool of personnel from both within the divisions and outside, and from within the NG and outside. Each NG division was part of a collective NG, RA and conscript organism.<br /><br />Now, back to collective training. I would offer, from experience, that the magnitude and complexity of the task in manning, equipping and training maneuver forces from the squad level up to Division, increases at least geometrically, if not exponentially with each increasing echelon. You can't begin to successfully train a company until all its platoons are proficient, and so on. To the battalion level, it is primarily learning to move, shoot and communicate, a relatively focused skill set. At the brigade level, DS supporting fires, first echelon maintenance and logistics enter the equation. At the division level, add the full spectrum of divisional combat support, combat service support and the like, across a broad swath of areas - aviation, direct support maintenance, logistics, medical, engineer, signal, intel, etc, etc. To be proficient, a DIV HQ, DIV ARTY and Support Command need a lot of time in hands on employment and support of its subordinate maneuver brigades. NG divisions have never had the opportunity to even scratch the surface of the necessary experience. Thus, the historical lag between M-Day and operational readiness. I have evaluated some NG Division HQs manned with pretty sharp people struggle to effectively command and control a single brigade at Annual Training.<br /><br />With the :bulk of the Army Divisions in the RC, they would have all the mobilization handicaps of divisions since WWI, plus the additional MAJOR handicap of not having access to the RA experience pool. Chief has posted in the past of how his state had to cannibalize non-mobilizing Guard units to staff units that were mobilized. And that's at the Brigade level or lower.<br /><br />The NG "works". However it "works" because it is part of a "Total Force" of AC and RC. Without an AC, we are looking at a completely different set of readiness facts and assumptions.<br /><br />Lastly, I fully agree that conscription, or in that matter, military service itself, should not be a tool of "social engineering". IMHO, Project 100,000 was just slightly less abhorrent than the Tuskegee syphilis experiment. <br /><br />However, I do hold that the military exists only to protect the society's collective well being. The larger societal question if if those who are being protected have any personal obligation or liability in the provision of that protection. At present, at least in the US, while they say it's an important obligation (the AARP Survey), by their actions they do not.<br /><br /><b> ARRP Survey:<br /><br />Do you feel the following is a very important obligation, a somewhat important obligation, or not an<br />obligation that a citizen owes to the country? <br /><br /> Serving in the military is "very Important" <br />Age 40-57 - 62% <br />Age 58- 70- 74% <br />Age 71+ - 71%<br /></b><br />But then, all of these people are past the age of liability to live up to their answers.<br /><br />Interesting survey, Andy. Many thanks for bringing it to out attention.Aviator47https://www.blogger.com/profile/05585964386930142907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-22248782476350545102014-01-19T01:46:00.504-08:002014-01-19T01:46:00.504-08:00Andy- Not disagreeing, as such, but elucidating. ...Andy- Not disagreeing, as such, but elucidating. The "elites" were voluntarily in the military in disproportionately higher numbers before the US actually "mobilized" against what would become a perceived existential thread than they have been since the end of the draft. They were in the military in higher numbers during Korea, as well, and while many found ways to evade Viet Nam service, those that served still are proportionally greater than in post draft years. Today, the AVF Army is seriously short of Reserve Lieutenants, and Captains, even after lowering requirements and making significant numbers of "direct commissions" from blue collar RC enlisted ranks. ROTC is not filling the ranks, as it did during the conscription years.<br /><br />Actually, seydlitz was quite wise selecting WWI as the basis for evaluating the various aspects of conscription. It was a war of "general mobilization", and the personnel side worked fairly well, with a willing manpower pool about twice the accessions requirements. Industrial mobilization not quite so, for if you look at the weapons employed by the AEF, most were of European manufacture. For example, American Aero Squadrons flew British and French aircraft. For all intents and purposes, WWI was a "foreign entanglement". Wilson did employ some significant coercive legal force towards the population and industry as part of the overall war effort.<br /><br />WWII becomes more of a problem to evaluate, as we hit upon the "quality" limits of the available labor pool, and two resulting steps were taken. It was a war of full manpower and industrial mobilization. Personnel standards were lowered, and then force structure was limited. WWII was pretty much a war of "national defense". Coercive force was also applied to the population and industry.<br /><br />Mobilization for Korea was "low-partial" mobilization. Accession standards were maintained and personnel goals were readily met. The only "coercive force" was enforcement of the Selective Service Act.<br /><br />Viet Nam was a "medium-partial mobilization. Accession standards were lowered, not due to the available manpower, but as part of "Project 100,000". Thus the "quality" of the force was skewed downward intentionally. Again, the only "coercive force" was enforcement of the Selective Act and, one could.opine, the mandatory accession of a large minimum number of CAT-V troops.<br /><br />The three significant AVF wars have all been basically "non to low-partial". Accession standards (AC and RC) were lowered to meet accessions goals based upon a less and less willing qualified population. Accession goals for commissioned officers (especially Army RC) have continuously not been met since 2003.<br /><br />So, how do you compare all those apples and handgrenades in terms of "quality of the force" or impact of conscription on the force?Aviator47https://www.blogger.com/profile/05585964386930142907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-63520321830281146192014-01-18T22:48:39.261-08:002014-01-18T22:48:39.261-08:00Al,
I'm not sure what you disagree with.Al,<br /><br />I'm not sure what you disagree with. Andynoreply@blogger.com