MythBusters - Part I

OK, seydlitz started the “Clausewitzian” (strategic) discussion of the Draft, and I said I had some technocratic force structure thoughts to add on the subject of conscription in the US.  The more I pondered and made notes, the more I realized that, like seydlitz’s treatise, mine would have to be multi-part, and would be best handled as individual threads, to allow focused comment.  The various parts to follow were not necessarily developed in that order, but rather, have evolved from my first thoughts as I tackled the deeply imbedded myths, misconceptions and false assumptions about the Draft vs the AVF.

In American culture, Viet Nam demonized the Draft.  The negative “halo effect” of the “immorality” of  a highly unpopular war, generalized that “immorality” to all aspects of military service and accession means.   Most notably demonized was the Draft, which was doubly immoral for involuntarily conscripting our youth to die in immoral political pursuits.  This demonization was aided and abetted by politicians all the way to Richard Nixon, who was more than willing to be an “End the Draft” candidate.  Thus, all kinds of inaccurate condemnations of the Draft and how it misfunctioned went unchallenged, as the Draft was the Devil Incarnate and “guilty until proven innocent”, even among some key members of the Armed Forces who were happy to allow the Draft to divert attention from strategic and operational incompetency.

I am only going to address the “mechanics” of the draft, not the myths about draftees or certain ethnic groups serving and dying in greater proportion.  I think one will find that the “mechanics” were quite sound, and actually could and did deliver the appropriate “quality” and “quantity” of enlisted personnel into all the Armed Forces, either directly or indirectly.  Whether this sound and effective delivery system was politically acceptable is another story.

So here were go with MythBusters – Part I

Let’s start with looking how the draft worked in the US after Korea, and more specifically the 1958 to 1973 Draft, with which I had first hand experience.

How did the general male population “respond” to the draft?

Basically, at that time, every able-bodied, mentally qualified American youth faced the “risk” of service, unless granted a deferment for school attendance, marital status, dependents, critical civilian occupation, religious grounds or criminal record.   Consequently, if in the fully eligible pool, one could choose to:

1) Sweat it out and not know whether the “risk” was real until making it through to about age 25.  If you are selected, you simply take what you get.  If not selected, then carry on.
1.b) A variation on 1, is where, upon receiving an induction notice, you scramble trying to find a more desirable enlistment option from the Air Force, Navy or Marines, assuming you can find a recruiter willing to process an inductee for enlistment (a bit of a no-no) in the 10-15 days you had to pull this one off.  Not a high probability of success, but some did pull it off.
2) Postpone the “risk” by college deferment.  The reality of this was that when a college deferment expired, either by graduation or even more surely by dropping out, you tended to be next in line for conscription.
3) “Manage” the risk” by volunteering.  This could be enlistment in the Active or Reserve component, enrollment as a college student in an Officer Accession program (ROTC, Marine PLC, etc) or even “volunteering for the draft” through your local draft board.  Effectively, these options enabled the individual a fair amount of choice over the timing and duration of their service, the branch of service, as well as some control over the occupational field and a choice of enlisted or officer service.
4) Face the “risk” of prosecution or virtual exile for resisting and or evading the Draft.

The realities and myths of the each of the Services tended to skew how people executed choice number 3.  There is little doubt that the Army could not offer the “prestige” of the Corps, the “advanced training” of the Air Force or the “adventure” of the Navy.  Not only was the Army the primary “user” of the draft, but the idea abounded that the Army needed draftees because all the “better candidates got into the better Services”, further diminished the view of the quality of the population in the Army.  I can tell you, both anecdotally from personal experience, as well as from the actual standards and functioning of the accessions system back then, a fair number of Navy “deck apes” (those sailors who chip paint, swab decks, mend canvas and create ornamental rope work) were far from “better candidates” in any sense of the word other than being able to handle mindless, arduous tasks necessary to the function of the ship.

Thus, the Air Force, Marines, Navy and Coast Guard tended to get “first shot” at the available “volunteering” manpower, and could claim to be enforcing “higher standards” for enlistment, even though not always doing so, other than for the lowest skill level jobs.  Little hoopla was made of the Army employing virtually the same standards for equivalent higher skill MOSes.


How did the Services employ the workings of the draft?

Military accessions basically fell into three general motive categories:

1. Real volunteers, who would have served whether or not conscription was in play.
2. Draft motivated volunteers, who were exercising the “Manage the Risk” approach given above.
3. Actual conscripts, who simply acquiesced to the draft.

Keep in mind that the Services had mental and physical standards for accessions, be they draftees or “volunteers”, and not just in general, but of varying stringency for various MOS billets to be filled.  A radio repairman, hospital corpsman or intel specialist had to meet the same qualifications regardless of method of accession.  If anything, conscripts tended to be “overqualified” rather than “underqualified”.

From the viewpoint of the Military Services, the draft gave them guaranteed accession rates with the ability to manage the “quality” of the people being accessed.  All the Services could choose from qualified applicants in “motive groups 1 & 2” to get the numbers of personnel of the appropriate mental and physical qualities to fill the MOS vacancies anticipated, and then, if necessary, access to the remaining general draft eligible population to meet those needs not filled by “volunteers”.  The draft eligible population still had sufficient numbers of men with the range of mental and physical qualities to properly staff the various MOS billets. 

As said above, the Army was simply the victim of a lesser image, and thus tended to need some conscripts.  The Army simply provided the Induction Centers with their conscript personnel needs in both “quality” and “quantity”, and the pool of available personnel was culled via Pre-Induction physicals and testing to meet those personnel needs.  In fact, in 1964, to make the system even more responsive, the Selective Service System began performing Pre-Induction physical and mental testing shortly after each male registered for the draft, rather than 60-90 days before anticipated induction age of 21-22.  This allowed the “pack to be culled” to meet physical and mental category needs a couple of years before the induction process, not during it, saving everyone, to include draft aged males, time and effort.  It also provided higher mental category men an incentive to look at various enlistment options well in advance to exercise the “Manage the Risk” option, as high mental category could generally get you a choice of a better “volunteer” billet, but did not necessarily ensure a high mental category billet if drafted.

In summary, the Post Korea Draft provided the Services, both directly and indirectly, with their manpower needs in both “quality” and “quantity”.  Even when the demographics were a bit skewed by men “gaming the system” through deferments, the Draft continued to meet the Services’ valid enlisted accession needs without lowering standards.  From a technocratic standpoint, the Draft’s mission was delivering properly qualified troops.  Demographics were a political issue.  As said in the beginning, let’s leave the politics for another day.  Force structure needs are objective, politics are subjective.

P.S.  Note that I did not address other "positive" post induction personnel management benefits of conscription.  Having "overqualified" conscripts had several pluses.  For example, once in the Army, higher quality conscripts were often offered opportunities, either enlisted or OCS in return for a voluntary lengthening of service obligation.  Thus, an excess of initial accession "quality troops" could and was used to address more than just "Pvt Snuffy" requirements.