tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post4243486237499398343..comments2023-10-30T06:31:05.501-07:00Comments on MilPub: When "Strategy" Is Not Strategy . . .FDChiefhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10607785969510234092noreply@blogger.comBlogger34125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-72907926589260028092013-11-23T09:50:13.465-08:002013-11-23T09:50:13.465-08:00"Focused adaptation of divergent sources of p..."Focused adaptation of divergent sources of power" <br />I am not sure a strategist would actually want to use focused adaptation. <br />Not being a military person myself I may be wrong, but it seems to me that the enemy tends to see things if some sort of focus is being used. I understand sometimes (perhaps when your strategy is to use nukes) it's good for the enemy to understand your strategy, but not addaptations when focusing power.<br />I think it is correct to say one should stay focused to the fact that some sort of strategy is being used, but it may also be good strategy to use some sort of dynamic strategy where focus is purposefully keep obscure. <br />Perhaps a focus of vision would be a much better thought, i.e. when the vision of the strategist becomes clear, his/her strategy has already been judged winning or losing.<br />"assisted by control over time in pursuit of a political purpose"<br />I think adaptation of divergent sources of power could be better assisted with control in the "changing" of both distance and time, as control over divergent sources of power has to be either self-control or under command of a force. <br />In that case, self-control should be the better, as it seems to me that force gets us back to just brute force, which as a strategy maybe an option, but, as you suggest, not a very good option.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-53425639199234307082010-12-06T08:16:57.599-08:002010-12-06T08:16:57.599-08:00Postscript added.
Thanks to all those who comment...Postscript added.<br /><br />Thanks to all those who commented and/or read this thread. There was a nice interaction here, with ya'll not only keeping me on track but adding valuable insights to the subject. It achieved my expectations.seydlitz89https://www.blogger.com/profile/15431952900333460640noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-3788400112862678872010-12-01T13:44:15.245-08:002010-12-01T13:44:15.245-08:00Al-
Actually, the distinction IS the ability to r...Al-<br /><br />Actually, the distinction IS the ability to resist . . .seydlitz89https://www.blogger.com/profile/15431952900333460640noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-53632942848661936952010-12-01T13:17:44.342-08:002010-12-01T13:17:44.342-08:00Seydlitz: "does that qualify as an additiona...Seydlitz: <i>"does that qualify as an additional source of power applied to gain this dynamic of strategy?"</i><br /><br />Well, you have a totally defeated nation that has surrendered its ability to resist the conquering powers. Withholding the basics of life, for example, would strike me as an additional source of power being applied to achieve the aim of creating <i>a country primarily agricultural and pastoral in its character.</i> Not military power, but political/economic power.<br /><br />So yes, I would consider the Morganthau Plan, later implemented in a slightly weaker, but fully effective form (JCS 1607), as strategic effect.<br /><br />Not the prettiest 2 years of American history.Aviator47https://www.blogger.com/profile/05585964386930142907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-5226028173212338532010-12-01T11:18:01.510-08:002010-12-01T11:18:01.510-08:00Al-
Agree, coercion and punishment are also appli...Al-<br /><br />Agree, coercion and punishment are also applications of military power as well as is destruction/brute force, but does that qualify as an additional source of power applied to gain this dynamic of strategy? I suppose one could argue that the cumulative effect of these actions does translate into strategic effect, but I can't help but see a lot of "exceptionalism" and brute force in this whole project. <br /><br />Which brings up the question of whether the notion of personality/exceptionalism wielding brute force cannot indeed achieve strategic effect if the political purpose is negative, that is simply destruction/starvation/subjugation of an essentially non-resisting population.seydlitz89https://www.blogger.com/profile/15431952900333460640noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-39516629681775794872010-12-01T10:53:32.008-08:002010-12-01T10:53:32.008-08:00seydlitz-
The political purpose of the plan was t...seydlitz-<br /><br />The political purpose of the plan was to eliminate Germany's ability to ever again wage war by "<i>converting Germany into a country primarily agricultural and pastoral in its character.</i>"<br /><br />Methodology, construct or application of power? Among the circumstances to be <b>imposed</b><br /><br /><i> * Germany was to be partitioned into two independent states.<br /> * Germany's main centers of mining and industry, including the Saar area, the Ruhr area and Upper Silesia were to be internationalized or annexed by neighboring nations.<br /> * All heavy industry was to be dismantled or otherwise destroyed.<br /><br /> * Germany was to be reduced to the standard of life it had known at the height of the Great Depression (1932)</i><br /><br />Where post war German capabilities exceeded the non-industrial end state, the facilities were to be destroyed to dismantled and shipped to other countries.<br /><br />And the list goes on.<br /><br />Power can be applied as a denial as well as a force. The original Occupation Document (JCS 1607) prohibited .S. occupation authorities from providing any economic or reconstruction assistance of any kind to the German people, not even to maintain the current economic levels. The German Red Cross was disbanded and the International Red Cross was denied access. Won't even go into the millions of POWs employed in forced labor in Allied countries through 1947, when the Allies realized the wrong headedness of this approach.<br /><br />And, JCS 1607 was a kinder, gentler version of the original Morganthau plan. The toning down into 1607 was a result of American public outrage at the severity of Morganthau's proposal.<br /><br />While "converting Germany into a country primarily agricultural and pastoral in its character" was not a sound strategic objective, it was, indeed, until late 1947, the Allies' objective end state, with severe steps taken to reach this objective.<br /><br />It's one of the things that Patton railed against, contributing to his ultimate relief. His objections to de-Nazification" are what have been popularized, but his personal writing decry the barbarity of the official Occupation objectives and methods applied to get there. I doubt folks would want to dwell on 1945-7 in Germany and the worsening fate of the populace we ensured, especially when we pin so many roses on ourselves for the Marshall Plan, Berlin Airlift and other more humane treatment that did not begin until 1948.Aviator47https://www.blogger.com/profile/05585964386930142907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-21639865221313902742010-12-01T10:14:56.473-08:002010-12-01T10:14:56.473-08:00Al-
"I just am not convinced that it is wort...Al-<br /><br />"I just am not convinced that it is worthwhile to call bad strategy, non-strategy."<br /><br />Agree, and that is not my purpose here. Rather I wish to indicate the specific nature of strategy as opposed to operating under the notion of personality (the ancient Greeks) or exceptionalism (the US today) using unlimited force. The one is strategy, the second is not, although both are in pursuit of a political purpose. Of course strategy would include both bad and good.<br /><br />That's the main point of this thread, and we can use WWII as an example for . . . and that's where Wylie's quote comes in. He argues that we lacked a "clear appreciation for [the] purpose" of our strategy in World War II. So, if the "strategic end"/result is "obscure, contradictory, and finally nonexistent" can it be said to have been a strategy at all? I still haven't quite figured out Wylie's quote.<br /><br />So, the Morgenthau Plan? How does it fit in with my intentionally narrow definition of strategy: Focused adaptation of divergent sources of power assisted by control over time in pursuit of a political purpose through methodological theoretical construct (strategic theory) with the aim of creating strategic effect/a strategic dynamic greater than the sum of the individual power sources. ???seydlitz89https://www.blogger.com/profile/15431952900333460640noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-90027783135557004562010-12-01T09:28:59.629-08:002010-12-01T09:28:59.629-08:00sheer & jim-
You're right, WWII is an exc...sheer & jim-<br /><br />You're right, WWII is an excellent example for discussing strategy. Right after I had posted that, I thought, that's not really what I wanted to say . . .seydlitz89https://www.blogger.com/profile/15431952900333460640noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-23110075942765976932010-12-01T08:59:42.313-08:002010-12-01T08:59:42.313-08:00Jim,
My feeling is yes, economic reasons were part...Jim,<br />My feeling is yes, economic reasons were part and parcel for the decision to knock Germany out first.<br />We had very limited trade with Japan, in fact, most of our trade was scrap metal, which fits since Japan had a need for raw materials.<br />Also, if you look at the situation, Japan was still a militaristic society, and for them, they had not achieved a social evolution where forty years later they could conduct warfare by business transactions (Go Rin No Sho, Book of Five Rings, the go to book for Japan's 1980's Business model who viewed Business as another form of War.)<br />So yes, Japan painted itself into the corner. Ask the women in the Philipines, China, and Korea...in fact, Nanking, imo, pretty much sealed Japan's fate as far as their attitude goes about humanity.<br /><br />Which brings me to an amusing exchange between one of the ladies at my work aunt who was traveling in Japan with her niece and nephew.<br />A tour guide, guiding their group through Hiroshima was regaling them with the tales of humiliation, and horror of the nuclear blast finishing with, "And the United States has never apologized for this horrendous act of inhumanity!"<br />To which, the aunt replied, <i>"you'll get your apology as soon as my Grandmother and her sisters gets their's for being made sex slaves to your copuntry's soldiers during WWII!"</i><br />The tour guide, this lady said her aunt described, was quite flabbergasted, shocked, but no apology was forth-coming from him; Or, for that matter from any Japanese government official. In fact, a lot that information is not taught in Japanese schools. The Japanese talk about carrying shame, but carrying shame and seeking forgiveness and reconciliation are two different things...something the Japanese will not do, or are incapable of doing.<br /><br />I suspect, with limited proof, that a society that has buttressed it's ego with rationalizations by acting cruelly to others is a society that won't change until it's head has been beaten by it's own hand, or by the hand of another. QED<br /><br />Just my opinionsheerahkahnhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16694622087244891222noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-63692779021947442702010-12-01T08:54:00.775-08:002010-12-01T08:54:00.775-08:00Sheer-
I agree fully.Sheer-<br /><br />I agree fully.Aviator47https://www.blogger.com/profile/05585964386930142907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-4514071797097245582010-12-01T08:52:46.002-08:002010-12-01T08:52:46.002-08:00Seylitz-
Yes, Morganthau's plan was ill advis...Seylitz-<br /><br />Yes, Morganthau's plan was ill advised for the long run, but still "strategic" in nature in that it had a geopolitical end objective that he and others thought could be sustained.<br /><br />We discussed this at great length at Naval War College. Strategic thought can be bad and still be strategic. Erroneous assumptions and/or objectives do not disqualify it from being strategic in nature.<br /><br />Compare the existence of the Morganthau Plan with our approach to Iraq, where there was no plan of any sort for the period following the collapse of the Iraq government. Rather, a make it up as you go along, everything will magically sort itself out approach. Morganthau envisioned a specific end state for Germany and the Europe that it would be a part of, along with the actions to get there. That it was misguided is a separate issue.<br /><br />We can discuss good versus bad strategic thought and action, and we can discuss whether a given situation was subject to a strategic level of thinking or not. I just am not convinced that it is worthwhile to call bad strategy, non-strategy.Aviator47https://www.blogger.com/profile/05585964386930142907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-85555547756009407182010-12-01T08:42:37.136-08:002010-12-01T08:42:37.136-08:00Forgive me Seydlitz, but I think us discussing the...Forgive me Seydlitz, but I think us discussing the beginning's of WWII falls within your discussion of Strategy.<br />For example, our trade with Europe, especially with England, prompted our government to send "help" in various forms, including "volunteers" to help the English stave off the German attack.<br />And when the US did hop into the war, the first phase of the American warfare was to knock Germany out of the fight.<br />Now, a good question could be asked, "why did Germany get picked first instead of Japan?"<br />What was the reasoning behind that decision?<br />Was it grand strategy, or was it economic?<br />or was it a combination of both?<br /><br />Jim Bakker III said in a PBS interview in a review of George H.W. Bush's first gulf war that part of U.S. Foreign policy, and one could assume grand strategy, was that we were willing to go to war to protect the Oil flow to the world...specifically, us, the US.<br /><br />You see, me thinks you are limiting your view of what strategy is, and I'm going to assume you are focusing on Military, but for me, discussing any form of strategy means we must discuss all aspects of that Nations' methodology, social/legal connections, and above all else, it's economic setting in regards to itself, and with the world.<br /><br />It's a huge subject.sheerahkahnhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16694622087244891222noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-47730945301453290152010-12-01T07:02:14.050-08:002010-12-01T07:02:14.050-08:00Seydlitz,
I apologise if i was ot, but my cmts are...Seydlitz,<br />I apologise if i was ot, but my cmts are aimed at the lack of strategic thinking in all our wars.<br />Propaganda and racism is not strategic thought.<br />I always enjoy your articles, as they are always solid.<br />jimjim at rangerhttp://rangeragainstwar.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-54696676394598026642010-12-01T06:25:42.047-08:002010-12-01T06:25:42.047-08:00Al-
Yes, but it wasn't really very objective ...Al-<br /><br />Yes, but it wasn't really very objective was it? more the nature of a reaction - a plan, but not a doable or effective strategy. Eliminating all heavy industry? and then there was the food policy, which was disastrous. But that's not what I think Wylie means - and that is definitely not what I mean - by "the nature of the following peace". Rather it would be the balance of power relationship in Europe, not just occupation policy, which was the opposite of the Morganthau Plan which would have created a power vacuum in the center of Europe . . .seydlitz89https://www.blogger.com/profile/15431952900333460640noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-86734044815734657572010-12-01T05:57:05.899-08:002010-12-01T05:57:05.899-08:00Seydlitz: Because imo there had been so little th...Seydlitz: <i>Because imo there had been so little thought by the US as to the actual nature of the following peace during the war.</i><br /><br />What would you call the Morganthau Plan? Putting it on the table in 1944, Henry definitely mapped out what Germany would look and act like following "Unconditional Surrender".Aviator47https://www.blogger.com/profile/05585964386930142907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-90924999669852159852010-11-30T15:27:42.510-08:002010-11-30T15:27:42.510-08:00The discussion has veered off into WWII which is o...The discussion has veered off into WWII which is off topic, but talking strategy. Plus this detour is also my fault . . . Mea culpa.<br /><br />I'll throw a few ideas out to stimulate this one and maybe we'll get back to the subject of strategy this way . . .<br /><br />Wylie obviously wasn't too impressed with our strategy in WWII and he was a war hero of that particular war. Why? Because imo there had been so little thought by the US as to the actual nature of the following peace during the war. The Soviets on the other hand were already talking to the Brits in 1941 of annexing Königsberg . . . . which tells you how much they were thinking about the aftermath even as Guderian's Panzers were nearing Tula.<br /><br />If Churchill's primary goal as to retain the British Empire, then he should have made a deal with Hitler in 1940. Otherwise his strategy was self-defeating.<br /><br />Allowing Poland to fall into Soviet orbit with its borders dictated by Stalin was counter the original reason that France and Britain had gone into the war in the first place.<br /><br />"Unconditional Surrender" in 1943 was a mistake, instead FDR should have appealed to the German people to overthrow the "madman Hitler who has led Germany to disaster".<br /><br />Instead of landing at Normandy, we should have seized the Danish straits/most of Denmark and then landed on Germany's Baltic coast threatening Berlin directly. The goal should have been to take control of as much of Germany as possible with the Soviets as far east as possible.seydlitz89https://www.blogger.com/profile/15431952900333460640noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-10721674729173775782010-11-30T15:10:25.685-08:002010-11-30T15:10:25.685-08:00basil-
I asked my advanced level English Portugue...basil-<br /><br />I asked my advanced level English Portuguese students your question this evening . . . they had no response. I think people here take it all as a bit too confusing . . . when you're in the middle of the storm it is difficult to see where you are exactly, let alone the way forward . . . <br /><br />My email is seydlitz89@web.deseydlitz89https://www.blogger.com/profile/15431952900333460640noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-86808133652952231502010-11-30T15:07:54.472-08:002010-11-30T15:07:54.472-08:00FDChief-
"I guess my only question would be;...FDChief-<br /><br />"I guess my only question would be; would it be legitimate to consider the Horse a "strategy" (since the political goal hadn't changed - punish Paris and the Trojans for the abduction of Helen, sack the city to pay for the expedition) or a "strategem"?"<br /><br />I've updated the post to respond to your very good point. I had thought of the question of ruse, before, but in my haste didn't include it in the post. I think the updated version deals with your question adequately.seydlitz89https://www.blogger.com/profile/15431952900333460640noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-12681982657245309672010-11-30T13:50:33.531-08:002010-11-30T13:50:33.531-08:00jim-
The US declared war on Japan on 8 Dec 1941. ...jim-<br /><br />The US declared war on Japan on 8 Dec 1941. On 11 Dec 1941, Hitler declared war on the US.<br /><br />There is not a lot of solid info as to Hitler's logic in issuing the declaration of war. He definitely was suffering the effects of our logistical support to England. Some scholars have offered that Hitler did not expect the US to be able to pursue the war in the Pacific as well as in Europe. While he was stupid enough to initiate a two front war, he figured America just wouldn't have the capacity for a two front that was across two oceans.Aviator47https://www.blogger.com/profile/05585964386930142907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-52008141862096739182010-11-30T13:33:15.478-08:002010-11-30T13:33:15.478-08:00Sheer,
I'm confused-didn't the US declare ...Sheer,<br />I'm confused-didn't the US declare war on Germany??Didn't we enter that war thru the back door?<br />Did US policy give the Japs many options?<br />Did the US reaction to the Jap-Russo War encourage their militarism?<br />So in your world if a country messes with our trade partners, then this is a reason for war.?<br />My bottom line is that the Japs had more reasons and rights to expansion in the region than did the US or Britain/France.<br />How did the Pacific become a US pond?<br />As always , it's nice discussing these issues with you.<br />jimjim at rangerhttp://rangeragainstwar.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-63249365238714377702010-11-30T13:32:03.558-08:002010-11-30T13:32:03.558-08:00Sheer,
I'm confused-didn't the US declare ...Sheer,<br />I'm confused-didn't the US declare war on Germany??Didn't we enter that war thru the back door?<br />Did US policy give the Japs many options?<br />Did the US reaction to the Jap-Russo War encourage their militarism?<br />So in your world if a country messes with our trade partners, then this is a reason for war.?<br />My bottom line is that the Japs had more reasons and rights to expansion in the region than did the US or Britain/France.<br />How did the Pacific become a US pond?<br />As always , it's nice discussing these issues with you.<br />jimjim at rangerhttp://rangeragainstwar.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-76962053950194397702010-11-30T11:30:20.436-08:002010-11-30T11:30:20.436-08:00Jim,
Germany got it because as far as the view of ...Jim,<br />Germany got it because as far as the view of which side of the pond America was sitting in the middle of the Alantic side had the trade partners...aka Britain, France, and other European markets...that, and Hitler declared war on America, America only returned the favor. <br />Japan got sacked because they didn't pull off their grand spectacle of a Pacific Empire by failing to kick our teeth all the way in.<br /><br />So, in part, yes, the US did have to fight in the war because Japan, after hitting the US, also, by limited action with surface subs, also shelled the Mainland. Pathetic results ensued, hilarity was had by all, but the gesture was more than enough that said Japan wanted the US out of the way. The US said no, and so voila, our quaint little disagreement in the Pacific.<br />Germany on the other hand could have said, "yep, the Japanese, you kicked that hornets nest all by your lonesome, good luck with that, let us know how it turns out for you." But alas, they didn't, and considering the condition of our military at the time...we should have told Germany and their declaration of war to go suck a wurst.<br />In all, the current of public opinion during the lead up to the America's involvment in WWII was more of, "Are we sure we want to get entangled in European affairs...again?" Which was pretty much how a lot of the isolationists/we're-quite-comfortable-here politico's were popping off about.<br />However, there were those who felt war with Japan and Germany was inevitable and we should hop to it.<br />That is why America, from the history books, looks double-minded during the pre-war, early war period.<br /><br />As for today, why can't North Korea have a nuke?<br />Well, for one, I'm of the mind that I don't want my country selling them one, and I'm thinking that China, and Russia are of the same mindset, of course, I'm just guessing at that.<br />Secondly, North Korea has shit for money, squat for resources, and motivation comes from "do it or die!" so in a way, I think North Korea has a lot of problems that preclude them building a nuke...but hey, if they want to build one go on ahead.<br />My thinking is that only good will come from them going totally stupid with a nuke, or if they don't use it, that they'll march parades around the damnable thing, get a hefty does of REM's pounding their sensitive tissues to jelly, and again, the whole problem takes care of itself.<br />Radiation has a way of making it's point even when it's not put to critical mass.sheerahkahnhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16694622087244891222noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-1461378915020393522010-11-30T06:37:35.984-08:002010-11-30T06:37:35.984-08:00Sheer,
Re Japan and destabilization of the region....Sheer,<br />Re Japan and destabilization of the region. Per your cmts.<br />What the key point of the Pacific war was - the white boys can fuck up the region to their hearts content, but little yellow fuckers were not allowed the same freedom. Korea is a fine example, the peninsula has always been a point of friction between larger players.<br />The south can be repressive b/c they are white boy surrogates, but the north is aggressive b/c it's a little yellow fucker causing the trouble.<br />All the while the white boys have nucs, and have fried yellow people with them, but NK can't join the club?<br />And pls tell me why Germany needed an ass kicking? What did they do that the allies didn't, at one time or another?<br />The US didn't need to fight any part of ww2- it wasn't our fight. That's my take.<br /> I think Pres. Monroe would agree.<br />jimjim at rangerhttp://rangeragainstwar.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-4071757572078339952010-11-30T01:26:34.377-08:002010-11-30T01:26:34.377-08:00FDC: But as far as the "big picture" be...FDC: <i>But as far as the "big picture" between 1945-1991...I think we did pretty decently.</i><br /><br />Or we were, at least, somewhat coherent. <br /><br />Richard Armitage, speaking at the Naval War College in about 1995, said that we didn't defeat the Soviet Union. We simply woke up one morning and it had toppled, as so sagely predicted by George Kennen, of it's own weight. This abrupt and radical change in the world left us without a strategic objective of any sort. We had invested nearly a half century being the "Good Guys" because we had a terrifying "Bad Guy" to oppose. Our self image was defined in terms of what we opposed, and the magnitude of that opponent was so huge, our self esteem was huge.<br /><br />Interestingly, the strategic geopolitical end state of the Cold War was actually the avoidance of something, not the achievement of something. Think about it. <br /><br />So there we were, with no serious "Bad Guy" to readily define us as the "Good Guy". We had "won" the Cold War, and there wasn't anything significant to oppose. We should be thankful for the rise of radical Islam. Without it, we wouldn't be "good".<br /><br />P.S. - Armitage was intellectually honest enough to admit that at the rate things were going, if the Soviets had been able to hold on, they could have awoken to a collapsed US.Aviator47https://www.blogger.com/profile/05585964386930142907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-73828584889570361112010-11-30T00:37:34.608-08:002010-11-30T00:37:34.608-08:00Al: Point well taken. The "Allies" incl...Al: Point well taken. The "Allies" included some pretty odd lots. You have to give the Big Three some credit for just holding thart herd of cats together long enough to get to VE/VJ Days.<br /><br />But once the Axis were history and Stalin went his way the internal pressures of the various Allied states - which had been deferred to finish the war - became more important again.<br /><br />Actually, when you think about it, the U.S. did a fairly decent job transitioning from a leader of the anti0Axis coalition to the leader of the anti-Soviet coalition. I can't see how anyone could have tossed Stalin out of eastern Germany, much less Eastern Europe. He left Iran, Korea, and much of Japan and that in itself is a sort of miracle - Stalin NEVER gave away anything he could avoid.<br /><br />I would, instead, opine that strategically the U.S. had been really adrift only since 1991 globally. I'd throw in our reaction to the anti- and post-colonial wars pre-91; we always seemed to get those wrong, lumping the nationalists in with the communists.<br /><br />But as far as the "big picture" between 1945-1991...I think we did pretty decently.FDChiefhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10607785969510234092noreply@blogger.com