tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post3998211931522850914..comments2023-10-30T06:31:05.501-07:00Comments on MilPub: A Broad, Sound View of War . . .FDChiefhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10607785969510234092noreply@blogger.comBlogger96125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-66909510040945308962009-11-29T14:38:28.162-08:002009-11-29T14:38:28.162-08:00Al-
Agree.
I guess I should have made it clear...Al-<br /><br />Agree. <br /><br />I guess I should have made it clearer. <br /><br />I've said what I wish to concerning strategy for now. Expect a comment concerning force structure on your thread, but I gotta think about it . . . Cold and wet in the North of Portugal. Home provides a happy sanctuary as the wind outside howls . . . <br /><br />Tough times ahead.<br /><br />Andy-<br /><br />Thanks for your response.seydlitz89https://www.blogger.com/profile/15431952900333460640noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-22377055356068882052009-11-29T08:40:19.033-08:002009-11-29T08:40:19.033-08:00Hey, guys, the new thread has nothing to do with s...Hey, guys, the new thread has nothing to do with strategy (the objective of this thread) but has to do with force structure, the reasons behind one player's force structure actions and how that force structure philosophy effected the execution of a policy decision. Let's not get off topic on the new thread if we can help it.Aviator47https://www.blogger.com/profile/05585964386930142907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-29751653237217571472009-11-29T08:23:47.891-08:002009-11-29T08:23:47.891-08:00PS,
Just saw the request to move the discussion. ...PS,<br /><br />Just saw the request to move the discussion. I'll start reading over in the new thread.Andynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-43870335848472823222009-11-29T08:22:48.844-08:002009-11-29T08:22:48.844-08:00part 2:
Public pressure?
The pressure was to qui...part 2:<br /><br /><em>Public pressure?</em><br /><br />The pressure was to quickly and decisively finish AQ once and for all after years of escalating attacks and what were perceived as impotent American responses. The pressure was for vengeance and reciprocity. Because of past failures I think the pressure was for a military solution. Addressing “root causes” and covert/police actions would, in my judgment, take too long to satisfy the American public, particularly since previous attempts had failed. <br /><br />In hindsight, it’s difficult for me to imagine military alternatives that would succeed in targeting AQ and leave the Taliban in control at the same time. After all, the Taliban, AQ and other foreign fighters were fighting together in most places in October and the first half of November 2001. Additionally, the Taliban were not so much overthrown since they fled the field and abandoned Kabul without a fight at all in mid-November – a move which surprised almost everyone. Ironically, it was this Taliban abandonment/rout/overthrow (whatever one wants to call it) that forced AQ to concentrate its forces in several areas (like Tora Bora), thereby allowing us to single them out and go after them – an effort that failed to get the leadership.<br /><br /><em> And even this does not exhaust the other options, since the full range of military responses - falling short of overthrowing the Taliban - were still possible as well. What you argue as the "only practical" was actually the least practical option.</em><br /><br />Ok, at the risk of repeating myself, I’ll ask again, what were these other options? How would those other options materially improve the chance to dismantle AQ’s Taliban-sponsored training capability and kill/capture its leadership? Again, if, with the benefit of hindsight, other options were so clearly superior, it should be easy to describe them and explain why they would have been more successful.Andynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-64151003842481256782009-11-29T08:21:45.699-08:002009-11-29T08:21:45.699-08:00Seydlitz,
Thanks again for the reply.
So, in the...Seydlitz,<br /><br />Thanks again for the reply.<br /><br /><em>So, in the administrations own directives, "additional means" would be "considered" if diplomacy failed. How exactly could the most radical policy option have been the only option both practically and politically when their own documents don't indicate it?</em><br /><br />Except for two things: First, the NSPD was not specifically about the Taliban. Secondly, as I have pointed out numerous times, diplomatic efforts had, in fact, failed for several years and the Taliban showed no outward signs that their policy regarding AQ would change as a result of 9/11.<br /><br /><em>Given Afghanistan's history as "the graveyard of empires" there was opposition to the policy of overthrowing the Taliban from the start, as Bearden's piece indicates. This due to the simple fact that overthrow required long-term commitment (which Bush promptly ignored with his quick refocus on Iraq).</em><br /><br />Opposition to a COA doesn't automatically mean that other options are superior. Additionally, overthrow doesn’t automatically require a long-term commitment – particularly since the Northern Alliance was all too willing to try to fill any power vacuum. I think the commitment was not intended to be long-term, but became long term due to the failure to get UBL and most of his principle lieutenants. Rember that NATO originally signed on to do the DDR work on the Northern alliance and other militias, provide reconstruction and the UN was going to setup a transitional government. The US was going to primarily focus on AQ. There was certainly a lot of wishful thinking on our part, but I think if UBL and Zawahiri has been killed/captured, we probably wouldn't be in Afghanistan today.<br /><br /><em>William R. Polk was saying at the time that we should deal with this as a criminal act . . . that is before the Afghan campaign had begun.</em><br /><br />Ok, let’s look at what Polk says. He asks, “what can be done?” <em> First, on Usama bin Ladin. We should require that the Afghan government turn him over, as Qadafi did the suspects in the Lockerbie case, to the International Court of Justice in the Hague.</em><br /><br />We tried that for several years. It’s worth pointing out that most people at the time didn’t know we tried. The diplomatic history between the Taliban and the Bush and Clinton administrations was not reported in the press until Nov. 2001, IIRC, and then only in general terms. The primary source documents were not released until a few years ago. One wonders if any of these early analyses you cite that place so much emphasis on negotiation and extradition would be any different had the authors known about the previous diplomatic efforts aimed at doing just that.<br /><br />More Polk:<br /><em>Then, why not kidnap him and bring him to America as we did Noreiga?</em><br /><br />Interesting example for Polk to cite considering that getting Noreiga involved a military invasion and regime change!<br /><br />Those were Polk’s two alternatives. Michael Howard did not provide any alternatives in the piece you linked beyond the kind of general “root cause,” “hearts and minds” arguments.Andynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-63489145783287343202009-11-29T07:15:45.230-08:002009-11-29T07:15:45.230-08:00Charley-
Great news, my best regards on your cont...Charley-<br /><br />Great news, my best regards on your continuing recovery.<br /><br />To all:<br /><br />This has been a great thread, but since Al has been so kind as to start a new one, let's carry the discussion on over there with his indulgence . . .seydlitz89https://www.blogger.com/profile/15431952900333460640noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-4967949304925289992009-11-29T02:35:15.735-08:002009-11-29T02:35:15.735-08:00Now, as to Rumsnamara's objectives in reducing...Now, as to Rumsnamara's objectives in reducing the manning level of the military, I'm going to start a new thread, as even a brief explanation exceeds the size limits of the "Comments" section.<br /><br />STANDBY!Aviator47https://www.blogger.com/profile/05585964386930142907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-58935568904700382622009-11-29T02:33:26.185-08:002009-11-29T02:33:26.185-08:00Part 2-
Now, the confounding factor is that when ...Part 2-<br /><br />Now, the confounding factor is that when all is said and done, "Executive Policy" is the sole responsibility of the President. With a President who cannot think for himself, the next best bet is that he will select one of his better adviser's decision as his own and then that becomes the sole "sheet of music" for the execution of the affairs of state. Clearly, this did not happen, as Rummy's actions clearly supported no articulated objective that has surfaced, be they expressed, implied, or alleged. So, at least in the case of the subordinate responsible for the military means to achieving the "objective" not only was he not on the same sheet of music, he continued to march to the beat of his own fiddle for six years. In orchestral terms, the percussion section was ignoring the conductor and playing their favorite sections of the 1812 Overture while everyone else was performing Handel's Water Music.<br /><br />I'll close with my personal evaluation of what went on. Having been a life long pleasure boater, from a family of boaters, and a Marine, I offer the term "The Helm" for consideration. Even on a vessel with multiple helm stations, only one Helm station is "The Helm" as designated by the Captain and directly controlled by the Captain. Even a helmsman executes his duties under the express and implied orders of the Captain. Further, the engine room, navigator, signal room, galley and other departments take their orders from "The Helm". Thus, you will never hear a seasoned mariner refer to "A Helm". The definite article is used for good reason. A ship that is being directed from multiple helms will go onto the rocks. If someone can show me that our nation had one, and only one helm and or Captain during the eight years of the Bush administration, especially as it pertained to war policy, I'll eat my hat.Aviator47https://www.blogger.com/profile/05585964386930142907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-6001837884066947752009-11-29T02:15:50.056-08:002009-11-29T02:15:50.056-08:00Sven-
You are simply stating my case in different...Sven-<br /><br />You are simply stating my case in different terms. I'll probably need to put this in separate parts (the comments space constraints) so here is Part 1:<br /><br />My #1 point above was, "<i>Of the key players in the decision making process, few held the same motives and geopolitical objectives for initiating either war.</i>". I'll focus on Iraq, as it is the more clearly and rapidly developed egregious example. <br /><br />Let's first identify Rummy's Constitutional role as defense minister, as we would say in Europe. His was not to establish the strategic geopolitical objective, but to prosecute the war in a manner that maximized the probability of achieving the Executive's (and hopefully the Congress') strategic geopolitical objective. Let's just say that the most cynical alleged Cheney objective, the overthrow of Saddam's regime and replacement with a puppet regime that would allow US business interests to exploit Iraqi oil, was the "real" geopolitical objective. Nowhere in the halls of military doctrine and history would you find a "quick in and out" as the military means to that geopolitical objective. Further, honest military officers, assuming that their civilian leadership did not want chaos to arise out of the invasion, tried to put forward a Phase IV plan (the politically correct term for "Occupation") and were told by Rummy that he would fire the next guy who brought it up. From the standpoint of the military ethos when I served, Mr Rumsnamara, by his refusal to entertain executing a war plan that had any possibility of meeting even this cynical objective, was simply insubordinate, and more accurately mutinous, by having chosen not to fully obey a lawful order. Yes, he gloriously initiated a war, but he did so only to the extent, and in the manner, that he wished to to do so, not to achieve his leaders' express extent.<br /><br />Now, having pointed out that Constitutionally, there is no provision for the Secretary of Defense to unilaterally establish strategic geopolitical objectives for our country, we could now search for any articulated objective by an appropriate member of the Executive that could be supported by an "in and out" invasion. GWB did indeed speak in terms of "regime change", "toppling an evil dictator" and "liberating the people of Iraq". One would be hard pressed to find a clear statement of a strategic geopolitical end state (achievable or not) from his words. Those who have read my writings over the past few years know that I suspect that Mr Bush suffers from a form of arrested development. Thus, I do not think he is intellectually capable of establishing strategic geopolitical objectives, no less determining if they are achievable or not. Thus, in addition to whatever Mr Cheney may have had in mind, it is doubtful to me that GWB had anything of enduring practical value in mind to guide our nation in this endeavor. And, we could explore the objectives of other operatives like Condi Rice, Paul Wolfowitz and the like, but space dictates that we simply say that they do seem to be diverse.Aviator47https://www.blogger.com/profile/05585964386930142907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-55938193402961472802009-11-28T21:21:29.225-08:002009-11-28T21:21:29.225-08:00Charyly-
I would like to add my pleasure with you...Charyly-<br /><br />I would like to add my pleasure with your news as well. Welcome back.Aviator47https://www.blogger.com/profile/05585964386930142907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-67203791285795626972009-11-28T18:26:42.044-08:002009-11-28T18:26:42.044-08:00Publius,
Ya, well, it was kind of a long and tedi...Publius,<br /><br />Ya, well, it was kind of a long and tedious grind of endless details and ever-changing symptoms, and you get to where you are tired of thinking about it, talking about it, worrying about it, and being it, so the notion of writing about it too just doesn't have much allure I guess. <br /><br />But I am feeling better and my weight is back up to 150 from a low of 134 or so. The radiation fatigue was the worst problem and that's almost gone now. The Radiation burns were unpleasant but healed in a couple of weeks.<br /><br />CharlyCharles Gittingshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14669296162762355112noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-10361798276662581662009-11-28T17:01:45.833-08:002009-11-28T17:01:45.833-08:00Just lurking here, folks. Y'all are way over m...Just lurking here, folks. Y'all are way over my head here. I did, however, want to take note of this: "The good news is that physically I feel better than I have since last year, and the results of the new MRI on my head were excellent according to my oncologist. Next they will do a PET scan to see how the rest of me is doing, but my blood work is normal and I'm feeling good, so I'm optimistic about that."<br /><br />That's the best news in this excellent thread. And, BTW, Mr. Gittings, I guess I've missed all of those progress reports you were going to send.<br /><br />Of course, the progress reports aren't needed if you post regularly.Publiushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06189226852559033120noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-51316877120196481712009-11-28T13:12:22.452-08:002009-11-28T13:12:22.452-08:00"Al, seydlitz, sven: I'm not sure that Ru..."Al, seydlitz, sven: I'm not sure that Rummy's objective was pure technology. Rummy was an old hard-liner, one of the Nixonian global interventionists, and he hated the "Powell Doctrine" with a white-hot fervor."<br /><br />Here's my understanding (to be honest: it was greatly influenced by a work of IIRC Fred Kaplan):<br /><br />Technology (the RMA dreams) was merely an enabler to the Neocon crowd. They wanted to re-shape certain parts of the world and RMA promised them quick, cheap and relatively unbloody wars. <br />Rummy wanted to smash Saddam and get out.<br /><br />Bush had derided nation-building and the Neocon crowd hated nation-building because Clinton had done it and they hated all that Clinton had done.<br /><br />So basically they did not expect any post-invasion phase other than victorious withdrawal (remember "Mission Accomplished"?).<br /><br />Reality caught up, and soon after Baghdad fell reality began to dictate their actions - and it differed a lot from their dreams.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-83504975511340923872009-11-28T12:38:49.562-08:002009-11-28T12:38:49.562-08:00FDC,
"Charles: All I meant was that whatever...FDC,<br /><br /><i>"Charles: All I meant was that whatever has been happening over the past year, Carter appears to have had little or no influence on the Obama Administration's POW / detainee policies. It must have been galling for him, to have had just enough pull to get inside but not enough to make any real difference."</i><br /><br />I got that FDC, I just don't see much evidence for your conclusion one way or the other. I'm not saying you're wrong, I'm just saying that speaking as someone who's had his head shoved deep into this stinking bucket of bullshit from day one, I'm not make any big assumptions. Phil has always been a bit enigmatic and overly-cautious from my perspective, and this whole thing is very opaque. I could read the Bush gang like a book, Obama is a very different guy, and he's delegated this stuff to a committee of subordinates that is heterogeneous where the Bush people were mostly Borg drones. Conditions for the detainees are substantially better, though still far from perfect. Equally, though I don't know him all that well, I do consider him a friend, so I'm going to reserve judgment until I know more. I mostly wish he'd come talk us here or restart Intel Dump and write about it there.<br /><br />But I'm having a terrible month. I've been trying to write a new amicus brief, ran into shit-storm of computer problems, got it almost ready to go, and finally decided to withdraw it because the attorney wasn't happy with some things and I don't want to be a distraction as his case is very important, and he's a very fine attorney. So I'm a little down and pessimistic right now. The good news is that physically I feel better than I have since last year, and the results of the new MRI on my head were excellent according to my oncologist. Next they will do a PET scan to see how the rest of me is doing, but my blood work is normal and I'm feeling good, so I'm optimistic about that.<br /><br />CharlyCharles Gittingshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14669296162762355112noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-71332035909139025152009-11-28T11:25:28.689-08:002009-11-28T11:25:28.689-08:00Al, seydlitz, sven: I'm not sure that Rummy...Al, seydlitz, sven: I'm not sure that Rummy's objective was pure technology. Rummy was an old hard-liner, one of the Nixonian global interventionists, and he hated the "Powell Doctrine" with a white-hot fervor. I believe his intent was to reduce the heavy footprint of the conventional force to reproduce the conditions of the 1930's, when Marine expeditionary forces could romp through the Caribbean and nobody would care.<br /><br />He was a fool: the old days of imperialism lite are dead, and no amount of "lightening" the force or "shock and awe" could change that. All it did was, as you point out, make a genuinely complete geopolitical solution impossible.<br /><br />But I think Sven has a good point: if the Thrones and Dominations in Washington had done any real IPB they would have realized that the PhIV of the Third Gulf War was both financially ruinous and politically impractical. Both "nations" they planned to thrash were so fragile, politically, socially and economically, that putting humpty dumpty together again would have been a challenge for the U.S. of 1945. For the U.S. of 2005, both internally softer and externally less appreciated? Inconceivable. <br /><br />But history pretty much shows that this sort of analysis never happens. BOTH sides think they will win - and on their own terms - or there would be no war. The Bushies were foolish to embark on a land war in Asia, but they weren't the first and probably won't be the last.<br /><br />Charles: All I meant was that whatever has been happening over the past year, Carter appears to have had little or no influence on the Obama Administration's POW/detainee policies. It must have been galling for him, to have had just enough pull to get inside but not enough to make any real difference.FDChiefhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10607785969510234092noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-74636929640315247082009-11-28T09:10:15.555-08:002009-11-28T09:10:15.555-08:00Sven-
Please do not read from my comments that I ...Sven-<br /><br />Please do not read from my comments that I am a proponent of waging war. That said, if a nation does initiate a war, or has to respond in self-defense to a war initiated by others, then failing to conduct that war in a manner consistent with well learned principles will only result in making what is by my definition, a tragic event even more tragic in the end.Aviator47https://www.blogger.com/profile/05585964386930142907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-69245528075311674312009-11-28T08:48:24.932-08:002009-11-28T08:48:24.932-08:00A basic fact of life is that if you properly appro...A basic fact of life is that if you properly approach the question of war and peace and anticipate realistically the advantages and disadvantages of war, you end up not beginning a war.<br /><br /><br />That's what we should strive for. And we should drop the idea that an exemplary preparation would end in a victorious war: No failure leads to peace, not war - no matter how victorious.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-47290747239643955772009-11-27T15:27:24.314-08:002009-11-27T15:27:24.314-08:00Al-
Agree with your three points. And there was ...Al-<br /><br />Agree with your three points. And there was absolutely no effort made to educate the American people as to the consequences of these long-term military/political commitments. If fact the assumption seemed to be that the various war interests would simply cash in on the endeavor while the American tax payer footed the bill.<br /><br />Strategic theory actually allows us to understand the extent of the whole outrage and who to hold accountable for it . . .seydlitz89https://www.blogger.com/profile/15431952900333460640noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-26285446396682986792009-11-27T09:56:45.998-08:002009-11-27T09:56:45.998-08:00Seydlitz-
You wrote" and there was little p...Seydlitz-<br /><br />You wrote" <i>and there was little public pressure on overthrowing the Taliban and taking on a long-term commitment of the sort the most radical policy decision entails . . .</i><br /><br />What did the public know about the ramifications of toppling a government. Most had not even been alive at the time of WWII, and the Occupation is probably the least taught item of history in our civilian schools.<br /><br />What the public did know was, perhaps Viet Nam and Desert Storm. And in terms of the latter, few if any understood that the objective was simply the liberation of Kuwait, not the toppling of the Iraqi government. Hell, every one of us in CentCom/3rd Army knew that the objective was not the fall of Iraq, and thus we were comfortable with the lack of a Phase IV plan. We also knew that the Muslim states that supported "liberating Kuwait" (and only liberating Kuwait) would have had severe reservations at best, and strong opposition at worst, to the conquest of Iraq. The public, however, was still baffled over our not "carrying the victory all the way to Baghdad" when we had decisively "defeated" the Iraqi forces.<br /><br />So, when we went into Afghanistan, with a "resounding victory" over Iraq under our belt, the public simply expected "A Victory of American Military Might, Part II". I doubt that most had an inking of the massive resources needed to "Seal the Victory" - Occupation Operations. And, I doubt if Mr Rumsnamara cared to entertain a doctrinally sound Phase IV, as that requires people, not electronic gadgets, and he desperately wanted to shed the former from the payroll to finance the latter.<br /><br />Of course from a public perception standpoint, as well as Mr Rumsnamara's quest for the low manpower Holy Grail, Iraq was equally conducted in a doctrinally wrong manner. Kick the crap out of the bad guys with American technological "Shock and Awe" and things will be just peachy. Sadly, solid state, very large scale integrated circuits and associated hardware built at great profit by war profiteers cannot conduct Phase IV operations or "Seal the Victory".<br /><br />So, Mr Rumsnamara proved that ignoring existing Phase IV doctrine was foolishness, and we have spend trillions of dollars as well as thousands of US and tens of thousands of innocent indigenous lives in delivering that proof.<br /><br />I have said before, and I will say it again, the reason for the failures in Afghanistan and Iraq is three fold:<br /><br />1. Of the key players in the decision making process, few held the same motives and geopolitical objectives for initiating either war. If you set out to make mankind's most radical policy decision, it must be for a specific reason with a clearly established political objective.<br /><br />2. Additionally, some of these objectives were not political end states achievable through military means. For example, I am convinced that Rummy's primary objective was a couple of quick and dirty campaigns that would prove his contention that "The Generals" wanted far more personnel in the military than necessary, taking precious dollars away from his desired "toys". That ain't why you go to war.<br /><br />3. No one in the decision making process understood the scope of responsibilities and necessary actions that a war of conquest requires. As you stated, some 50 years of "limited war" obscured the lessons of WWII. And, as in the case of Eric Shinseki, when someone in uniform would step forward to speak in doctrinally sound terms, they were marginalized and belittled as "weak". During the run up to Iraq, Rummy was able to squeeze out more generals into retirement than at any other time in recent history. You can bet your britches that most of then were supporters of the hard learned doctrine that calls for proper (and manpower intensive) Phase IV operations.<br /><br />You just don't attempt vast projects with half-vast ideas.Aviator47https://www.blogger.com/profile/05585964386930142907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-92226913494710319512009-11-27T02:40:23.583-08:002009-11-27T02:40:23.583-08:00Continued . . .
Sir Michael of course is a transl...Continued . . .<br /><br />Sir Michael of course is a translator of On War. I've met him, he signed my copy of On War, and he is someone who should be listened to in regards to the subject of war. He likened bombing Afghan cities in response to terrorist attacks to "going after cancer cells with a blowtorch". He also had a one on one with Condi Rice at this time where he strongly expressed his views, but to sadly no avail.<br /><br />So, three heavy hitters arguing and providing alternatives to Bush's radical policy. And even this does not exhaust the other options, since the full range of military responses - falling short of overthrowing the Taliban - were still possible as well. What you argue as the "only practical" was actually the least practical option.<br /><br />Public pressure? The Afghan campaign was taking place during the aftermath of 9/11 and at roughly the same time as the anthrax attacks and the passage of the Patriot Act. People were reeling, unable to focus to a large extent, so there wasn't much pressure from the public for overthrowing the Taliban since people had much more on their minds. In fact if you read the comments after 7 October and into November 2001, the connection with military action in Afghanistan was mostly whether it was or was not already a "quagmire".<br /><br />So, there were a variety of practical options available to overthrowing the Taliban - as indicated by not only Bush's own directives, but expert opinion at the time - and there was little public pressure on overthrowing the Taliban and taking on a long-term commitment of the sort the most radical policy decision entails . . .seydlitz89https://www.blogger.com/profile/15431952900333460640noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-63863515562947881022009-11-27T02:29:52.266-08:002009-11-27T02:29:52.266-08:00Andy-
Nice comments and you obviously took time a...Andy-<br /><br />Nice comments and you obviously took time and effort to formulate them. Thanks.<br /><br />But, oh how far have we strayed from the reservation, sorry about that.<br /><br />Getting back to your argument however we see that it's actually quite weak.<br /><br />"Ok, let me lay it out then: Overthrow of the Taliban was inevitable for political and practical reasons."<br /><br />That's it and whether Bush flip-flopped a hundred times after 2006 or whether Clinton called Mullah Omar every night in 1999 doesn't matter in this context, however interesting those items may be, since neither directly supports your argument. In strategic theory terms we'd say that you got too involved in "local battles" to the detriment of the larger campaign which was lost.<br /><br />First let's consider the nature of conducting a war for the overthrow of the enemy state, which is the most serious policy making decision - notice the emphasis on POLICY - that a government can make. Prior to Bush's two such wars, the US hadn't conducted such a war since 1943 (Roosevelt's declaration at the Casablanca Conference). In fact most of the wars in US history have been wars of limited objectives. The reason for this is simple, as Clausewitz points out, since such wars require "great superiority in terms of moral and physical resources" and an immense commitment over the long term, essentially the rebuilding of the defeated state along with dealing with other interested states. Our commitment to Roosevelt's declaration of "unconditional surrender" only ended in 1990 with the four plus two agreement and the reunification of Germany.<br /><br />Bush made his declaration of "Operation Enduring Freedom" on 7 October 2001:<br /><br />"Today we focus on Afghanistan, but the battle is broader. Every nation has a choice to make. In this conflict, there is no neutral ground. If any government sponsors the outlaws and killers of innocents, they have become outlaws and murderers, themselves. And they will take that lonely path at their own peril."<br /><br />Overthrow of the Taliban is not explicitly stated, but a warning to other states is! This when, as we know now, the administration was concocting their case against Saddam, who had been a target - perhaps the main target - since at least 12 September.<br /><br />It is important to note here that when Tony Blair (the UK was the only ally Rumsfeld initially accepted assistance from) came out and explicitly stated that the overthrow of the Taliban was a goal - at the END of October - he was roundly criticized in the UK.<br /><br />It is also important to note that Bush's own official document on Combating Terrorism - NSPD-9 only directs that planning of "military operations" be initiated against the Taliban and "if diplomatic efforts to do so [gain the desired objectives] failed, to consider additional means". <br /><br />http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-9.htm<br /><br />So, in the administrations own directives, "additional means" would be "considered" if diplomacy failed. How exactly could the most radical policy option have been the only option both practically and politically when their own documents don't indicate it?<br /><br />Given Afghanistan's history as "the graveyard of empires" there was opposition to the policy of overthrowing the Taliban from the start, as Bearden's piece indicates. This due to the simple fact that overthrow required long-term commitment (which Bush promptly ignored with his quick refocus on Iraq).<br /><br />William R. Polk was saying at the time that we should deal with this as a criminal act . . . that is before the Afghan campaign had begun.<br /><br />http://www.williampolk.com/html/articles_before_2002.html<br /><br />But there were other voices as well stating that an even more fundamental mistake was being made by Bush, that of language and its misuse/abuse which is the topic of course of this thread . . .<br /><br />http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/michael-howard--it-was-a-terrible-error-to-declare-war-615614.htmlseydlitz89https://www.blogger.com/profile/15431952900333460640noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-38714619796591546392009-11-26T22:11:43.682-08:002009-11-26T22:11:43.682-08:00Gee FDC, I'm not sure we have much evidence as...Gee FDC, I'm not sure we have much evidence as to how much or how little influence Phil had. He clearly had enough to get appointed.Charles Gittingshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14669296162762355112noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-31051556510000119912009-11-26T21:32:49.353-08:002009-11-26T21:32:49.353-08:00I saw the Greenwald post on PC, and he updated it ...I saw the Greenwald post on PC, and he updated it to specify that Carter's resignation wasn't overtly about any political conflicts he had with the current Administration. He says; "Wired's Noah Shachtman spoke to Carter today and came away convinced that his resignation was not due to policy differences with the administration, for what that's worth."<br /> <br />However, given the stark contrast between Carter's past statements on POWs/detainees and the policies the Obamites have continued I have a hard time believing that Carter wasn't tired of being the wallflower at the secret policeman's ball. He clearly had no influence, and what fun is it being a bureaucrat if you can't make people do what you want.<br /><br />I don't have any animus against Obama; I think the man is as genuinely decent as you can be and still get elected to national office. But the notion that electing him was going to produce some magic "change" was always nonsense. He did us the favor of putting rout to McSame and defenestrating the outright and open criminality of the Bushies, but I think it would have taken more than a tyro Senator from Illinois to evict the entrenched corruption, callousness and malfeasance that have taken root within the federal government.<br /><br />Sorry to say this, but the foxes have the security codes to the henhouse, and Carter is just another vagrant feather from the charnal feast.FDChiefhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10607785969510234092noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-70542921752299496462009-11-25T21:28:50.379-08:002009-11-25T21:28:50.379-08:00Gee, I'd like to think he quit because he got ...Gee, I'd like to think he quit because he got tired of working for a war criminal like Gates.... But all I know for sure is that I'd love to debrief him. Maybe he just got fed up with the BS. They've had three task forces going, each of them a joint enterprise between DOJ and DoD. I shudder to think what seven months of that was like.Charles Gittingshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14669296162762355112noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-34790703163980468612009-11-25T19:04:41.578-08:002009-11-25T19:04:41.578-08:00Well, shit, Andy, maybe we can hire Carter on here...Well, shit, Andy, maybe we can hire Carter on here. The pay sucks, but the fringes are great. <br /><br />Actually, I hope Phil resurfaces and gets back into the fray. His is a voice I miss. Along with that of JD Henderson. I wonder what happened to old JD. I hope he's all right.<br /><br />Never too many guys like Carter and Henderson.Publiushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06189226852559033120noreply@blogger.com