tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post2405298652462320343..comments2023-10-30T06:31:05.501-07:00Comments on MilPub: Towards a General Theory of Strategy: A Review of Admiral JC Wylie's "Military Strategy"FDChiefhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10607785969510234092noreply@blogger.comBlogger13125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-83738089408325113692018-04-07T08:06:48.705-07:002018-04-07T08:06:48.705-07:00AVAILABLE PETROLEUM PRODUCTS ON FOB ROTTERDAM CI D...AVAILABLE PETROLEUM PRODUCTS ON FOB ROTTERDAM CI DIP AND PAY.<br /><br />WE HAVE AVAILABLE PETROLEUM PRODUCTS FROM RELIABLE REFINERY IN RUSSIAN FEDERATION WITH BEST PRICE AND QUALITY. <br />BELOW PRODUCT ARE AVAILABLE WITH BEST OFFERS - FOB CI DIP AND PAY FOB PRODUCTS AVAILABLE<br /><br />JP54: Quantity: 500,000-2,000,000 Barrels <br />JetA1: Quantity: 500,000-2,000,000 Barrels <br />D2: Quantity: 50,000-150,000 Metric Tons <br />D6 Virgin: Quantity: 400,000,000-800,000,000 Gallon <br /><br />SERIOUS BUYERS PLEASE CONTACT US FOR MORE DETAILS WITH YOUR SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS SO AS TO ENABLE US PROVIDE YOU WITH OUR WORKABLE PROCEDURE. <br /><br />Maksim Yaroslav (Mr.)<br />EMAIL: neftegazconsultant@yandex.ru<br />EMAIL: neftegazconsultant@mail.ru<br />Skype: neftegazconsultant<br />TEL: +7 9265036551Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11637291085744922310noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-41376414282155374442010-11-14T06:26:43.312-08:002010-11-14T06:26:43.312-08:00Zenpundit linked to this post in connection with a...Zenpundit linked to this post in connection with a post he made on a Kings of War post . . .<br /><br />http://zenpundit.com/?p=3597#comment-23663<br /><br />Nice comment from Zen in regards to this post as well.seydlitz89https://www.blogger.com/profile/15431952900333460640noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-61960482305911031302010-11-10T08:19:23.467-08:002010-11-10T08:19:23.467-08:00Publius-
Glad you like it.
Strategic assumptions...Publius-<br /><br />Glad you like it.<br /><br />Strategic assumptions are of course important to identify. I would add that actually having a strategy is not necessarily the case many times; there are enough military campaigns in history which were based on simply the use of military force. Hitler's war against the USSR and Bush's war in Iraq are cases in point.<br /><br />Agree that Franks was derelict in fulfilling the miliatary aims which he had been publically assigned . . .<br /><br />DoD Briefing of 21 March 2003 . . .<br /><br />Coalition military operations are focused on achieving several specific objectives: <br /><br />to end the regime of Saddam Hussein by striking with force on a scope and scale that makes clear to Iraqis that he and his regime are finished. <br /><br />Next, to identify, isolate and eventually eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, production capabilities, and distribution networks. <br /><br />Third, to search for, capture, drive out terrorists who have found safe harbor in Iraq. <br /><br />Fourth, to collect such intelligence as we can find related to terrorist networks in Iraq and beyond. <br /><br />Fifth, to collect such intelligence as we can find related to the global network of illicit weapons of mass destruction activity. <br /><br />Sixth, to end sanctions and to immediately deliver humanitarian relief, food and medicine to the displaced and to the many needy Iraqi citizens. <br /><br />Seventh, to secure Iraq's oil fields and resources, which belong to the Iraqi people, and which they will need to develop their country after decades of neglect by the Iraqi regime. <br /><br />And last, to help the Iraqi people create the conditions for a rapid transition to a representative self-government that is not a threat to its neighbors and is committed to ensuring the territorial integrity of that country.<br /><br />--<br /><br />Note the last aim. Of course Franks didn't take any of these seriously, since he knew that these weren't the REAL military aims, rather only those for the rubes. That's why instead of getting fired, Idiot Bush pinned a PMOF on his chest.<br /><br />Agree too that "strategy" is defined in the US today as simply political machinations and domestic information ops to allow elite interests to do whatever they please with government assets/funds. There is no concept today of national interest. <br /><br />What allows for such an analysis as this imo is strategic theory, or the basic outline of a general theory of strategy, or in Wylie's terms, (un)conscious strategic patterns of thought . . .seydlitz89https://www.blogger.com/profile/15431952900333460640noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-12638596485618128682010-11-08T17:19:45.981-08:002010-11-08T17:19:45.981-08:00Seydlitz, you done good here.
And I'm with t...Seydlitz, you done good here. <br /><br />And I'm with the Ranger—who, despite what he writes, isn't at all weak on strategy—in wondering just how it is a government with a three trillion dollar+ operating budget can be so incredibly lousy in the essential art of strategic assumption. Assumptions drive the train; if they're skewed through political bias or just from plain stupidity, nothing will work out as intended or desired.<br /><br />Minstrel Boy's example of Franks' dereliction of duty in not preparing for occupation is understandable once we recall that, according to senior government officials, US troops would be met by cheering Iraqis. The strategic assumption—driven by ideological bias—was liberation; the reality was something entirely different.<br /><br />Minstrel Boy is also correct in that what passes for an Afghani strategy has everything to do with domestic politics and very little to do with anything else. No wonder it is failing.<br /><br />There is tons of strategic thinking in our modern political universe. Unfortunately, it mostly has to do with who gets elected and who does not, rather than with the fate of the nation.Publiushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06189226852559033120noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-72163336529732810142010-11-08T03:56:20.912-08:002010-11-08T03:56:20.912-08:00Minstrel Boy-
Welcome to the blog. Hope to be he...Minstrel Boy-<br /><br />Welcome to the blog. Hope to be hearing more from you in the future. Your comments reminded me of Moltke's concept of "Strategy is a system of expedients" . . . but there are other elements of that approach which we need to be aware of as well, as I introduce in the postscript . . . comments?<br /><br />jim-<br /><br />Looks to me that you've got a good handle on what strategy is, the question remains as to the place/utility of strategic theory, or in Wylie's contribution, the application of a general theory of strategy to the formulation of strategy . . .<br /><br />Andy-<br /><br />Glad you like it. I was kinda dreading this piece and had invested a good bit of time and effort in it. Nice to see that my thoughts have come more or less across . . .seydlitz89https://www.blogger.com/profile/15431952900333460640noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-3497638785329999412010-11-08T03:16:27.046-08:002010-11-08T03:16:27.046-08:00mike-
I think the connection between Mao and Clau...mike-<br /><br />I think the connection between Mao and Clausewitz pretty much common knowledge at this point. Perhaps the best discussion of the connections is Dirk Freudenberg's "Theorie des Irregulären: Partisanen, Guerillas und Terroristen im modernen KleinKrieg", pp 308-12. Unfortunately the intro to this chapter on Mao focusing on the influence of Clausewitz is not provided in the goggle version . . . American and British Clausewitz scholars have been unfortunately slow at uncovering the Mao-Clausewitz connection.<br /><br />http://books.google.com/books?id=gcLwE_bCIK8C&pg=PA309&lpg=PA309&dq#v=onepage&q&f=false<br /><br />The best reference in English is Beatrice Heuser's "Reading Clausewitz", pp 19 & 138-42. Heuser rightly refers to Mao as one of his "Communist disciples". . .<br /><br />Followers of 4GW have a big problem with this of course since it pretty much tips over their whole little applecart, but then if it's sooo easy to do then that should indicate something fundamental about their whole confusion . . .seydlitz89https://www.blogger.com/profile/15431952900333460640noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-71573202376263293902010-11-07T16:34:06.574-08:002010-11-07T16:34:06.574-08:00Excellent essay Seydlitz!Excellent essay Seydlitz!Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-25199613999857073782010-11-07T10:55:05.835-08:002010-11-07T10:55:05.835-08:00MB and all.
I'm weak on the strategy issue, th...MB and all.<br />I'm weak on the strategy issue, that is the correct terminology and all, but imho it all boils down TO THE FOG OF WAR.<br />To control the battle space,and therefore move the enemy to your will REQUIRES a correct set of assumptions BEFORE you can even define your strategy.<br />This imho is the weakness of US strategic thinking, at least since 1950.<br />Our assumptions are treated as fact when they are often totally fantastical.<br />Hope i'm OT.<br />jimjim at rangerhttp://rangeragainstwar.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-80587145935923268132010-11-07T07:16:58.060-08:002010-11-07T07:16:58.060-08:00A similar strategy in business is called 'logi...A similar strategy in business is called 'logical incrementalism' which is out of fashion now but which assumed there was high uncertainty and so decisions were made incrementally on a time-line toward a general goal and that decisions changed as circumstances changed in time. I found this to be closer to reality than the textbook discussions of strategy when I tried to apply them.<br /><br />Also if one stepped back and looked around at America today, one might say that the biggest deficiency might be in the use of strategy at all, especially between political and military institutions. <br /><br />Gen. Franks invading Iraq with not plan for occupations beggars the word 'strategy' in any context. <br /><br />Our current Afghan 'surge' might beggar it as well unless one thinks that the objective is US domestic politics and not 'victory' in Afghanistan. <br /><br />Indeed a definition of 'victory' in Afghanistan might be the first step toward a strategy of any kind.Brian T. Harthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09529137413679237960noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-54821783819293203862010-11-05T05:32:25.786-07:002010-11-05T05:32:25.786-07:00Ael-
You'll notice that I quote Schelling in ...Ael-<br /><br />You'll notice that I quote Schelling in my post, so very much agree as to game theory as used by Schelling who is a great strategic theorist imo. AI planning? Would have to refer to social relations/interactions . . . otherwise could be a should or more confusion, and we have more than our share of that in strategic thinking at the moment.<br /><br />mike-<br /><br />Thanks for the kind words. Yes, agree as to Wylie's very impressive accomplishments. It is for this reason, more his actual practical experience, than what he wrote in Strategy, that I use this more restrictive, but imo clearer definition of "control". I too thought of the use of "power" and "control" in the title, but find this more reflecting his background as well - systems ensure power as in force or compellence. This of course is true for naval and air operations, but they do not alone insure strategic success, as Wylie admits with his "man with the gun" metaphor.<br /><br />I have the reference on Mao at home and will post it later . . .<br /><br />Joseph-<br /><br />Welcome to our humble blog. I've taken a quick look at your latest post, but find your use of "power" and "control" to be too close, almost interchangable, blending into each other. For instance you present this Clausewitz quote:<br />"War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will." You say that "act of force" is power and "compel the enemy" is control, but power doesn't necessarily translate into control as I have stated, and force as only power restricts what power in fact is (also coercion/ compellence, "soft" and "smart") which all are different but don't all involve force which is a type of power as well. I like the technical/systems thinking connection with my use of the concept of control, since it explains how one can be "in control" of systems, but still lose a conflict, fail at exerting power. Control can be indicating one set of measures, but at the same time be hiding another, more important set . . .<br /><br />By using the Weberian concept of power (which would never assume "control" since it is a probability) we also open the door to a whole series of related concepts in the formultion of our general theory of strategy and make it accessible to alot of the current thinking in international relations, such as the work of Joseph Nye.seydlitz89https://www.blogger.com/profile/15431952900333460640noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-61856412358225391502010-11-04T19:21:24.418-07:002010-11-04T19:21:24.418-07:00Military Strategy suffers from its date of publica...<i>Military Strategy</i> suffers from its date of publication. Howard and Paret's translation was nine years in the future and the recent flourishing of Clausewitzian studies in English were in their infancy. Wylie didn't have access to that material when he wrote <i>Military Strategy</i> and didn't incorporate it in the interim between the original publication and the 1989 postscript (for whatever reason). <br /><br />John Boyd lists <i>Military Strategy</i> in the bibliography for his "Patterns of Conflict" briefing, the closest you get to a <i>summa theologica</i> of BoydThink. Whatever impact, if any, Wylie had on Boyd is unknown. Someone who looked through the Boyd papers doesn't recall seeing any other reference to Wylie.<br /><br />I took my own shot at a Clausewitz-Wylie synthesis recently:<br /><br />http://committeeofpublicsafety.wordpress.com/2010/10/23/control/<br /><br />I've done quite a lot of posting on the power and control issue. <br /><br />This was my first attempt:<br /><br />http://committeeofpublicsafety.wordpress.com/2009/07/11/power-and-control/<br /><br />It's sequel:<br /><br />http://committeeofpublicsafety.wordpress.com/2010/02/13/power-and-control-ii-passage/<br /><br />And a further sampling:<br /><br />http://committeeofpublicsafety.wordpress.com/2009/08/18/assumptions-power/<br /><br />http://committeeofpublicsafety.wordpress.com/2009/08/17/assumptions-control/<br /><br />http://committeeofpublicsafety.wordpress.com/2010/03/15/cops-glossary-for-frequently-used-terms/<br /><br />http://committeeofpublicsafety.wordpress.com/2010/02/27/death-by-tactics/<br /><br />http://committeeofpublicsafety.wordpress.com/2010/06/24/elements-of-war-control/<br /><br />http://committeeofpublicsafety.wordpress.com/2010/06/25/elements-of-war-power/Joseph Fouchehttp://committeeofpublicsafety.wordpress.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-33026157582565036192010-11-04T18:29:07.229-07:002010-11-04T18:29:07.229-07:00An interesting set of refinements Seydlitz. I con...An interesting set of refinements Seydlitz. I concur with your analysis. <br /><br />I do wonder though about your fifth point and his use of the words 'control over the enemy'. I agree with you about controlling systems and not controlling the enemy. It was probably a poor choice of words on the Admiral's part. However the sub-title of the book is "A General Theory of Power <b>Control</b>". So was Wylie not talking in shorthand about controlling power instead of controlling the enemy directly? Not having read the book, I will take your side. And at anywhere from $60 tom$200 per with no copies in the Seattle Library system I won't be reading it soon. Is it available any cheaper I wonder thru the Naval Institute?<br /><br />Fascinating that Mao both studied and taught Clauswitz. Is there a particular bio on Mao that covers some detail on that?<br /><br />Lastly, my thoughts on the good Admiral himself or maybe Lieutenant Wylie 68 years ago next Saturday. As you undoubtedly know but your readers may not, he was XO of a destroyer and running one of the first shipboard CICs in the Navy during the night of Bloody Friday in Ironbottom Sound. His ship saw only about 120 seconds of combat during that battle. But during that 120 seconds the CIC which he was running managed to direct several torpedoes into an IJN battleship and score deadly accurate 5-inch gunnery fire on that same battleship and on two IJN destroyers. Earlier in that battle he had passed accurate fire control data to American cruisers resulting in 85 direct hits on another IJN battleship. Quite a record! Without disrespecting Admirals Scott and Callaghan who were both KIA in that battle, and any of the other brave ships and men, or planes after daylight on the next day; in my humble opinion it was Wylie and his ship that was the straw that finally turned the tide against Admiral Abe's Attack Force.mikenoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-381917167978264683.post-73485554205501639902010-11-03T22:04:22.897-07:002010-11-03T22:04:22.897-07:00I think the languages of AI Planning and Game The...I think the languages of AI Planning and Game Theory have much to offer traditional strategic theory.<br /><br />I also think that a lot of the "inherent disorder" of strategy can be explained by the inability to distinguish what is possible from what is desired and the fact that ones "opponents" may not be playing the same game you are.<br /><br />Both situations lead to unexpected events.Aelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10788190394672505925noreply@blogger.com